Philbrick v. University of Connecticut
| Decision Date | 14 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:98cv1706(AHN).,3:98cv1706(AHN). |
| Citation | 90 F.Supp.2d 195 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | Dennis PHILBRICK v. UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT. |
Joseph D. Farrell, Benefits Litigation Concepts, Marlborough, CT, for plaintiffs.
Paul Mark Shapiro, Storrs, CT, Paul S. McCarthy, Atty General's Office, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, for defendant.
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff, Dennis Philbrick ("Philbrick"), brings this action against the defendant, the University of Connecticut ("UConn"), alleging violation of the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 ("FMLA"), breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and defamation of character.
Now pending before the court is UConn's motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, that motion [doc. # 23] is GRANTED.
A party may move to dismiss because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time during the course of an action. See Rules 12(b)(1) & 12(h)(3), Fed.R.Civ.P.; John B. Hull, Inc. v. Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc., 588 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1978). Once challenged, the burden of establishing a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Thomson v. Gaskill, 315 U.S. 442, 446, 62 S.Ct. 673, 86 L.Ed. 951 (1942); Grafon Corp. v. Hausermann, 602 F.2d 781, 783 (7th Cir.1979). Unlike a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), however, dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction are not predicated on the merits of the claim. See Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (2d Cir.1976).
In a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court construes the complaint broadly and liberally in conformity with the principle set out in Rule 8(f), Fed.R.Civ.P., "but argumentative inferences favorable to the pleader will not be drawn." 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 at 218-19 (1990 & Supp. 1991) ("Wright & Miller"). The mover and the pleader may use affidavits and other materials beyond the pleadings themselves in support of or in opposition to a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947); Exchange, 544 F.2d at 1130. However, litigants cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction by express consent, conduct, or estoppel. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 700, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982); 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, § 3522 at 66-67.
The Court accepts the following facts as true for the purposes of this motion.
In December 1996, Philbrick informed UConn, his employer at the time, that he was suffering from stress due to having to contend with both the demands of his job and the necessity of caring for his mother who had Alzheimer's Disease. (See Compl. ¶ 6.) He was absent from work on many occasions, sometimes without preapproval, due to his need to care for his mother. (See id.) These absences continued into and throughout most of 1997. (See id. ¶ 7.) Eventually, UConn terminated Philbrick due to his excessive absenteeism. (See id. ¶ 10.)
Philbrick alleges that his termination violates the FMLA because UConn had been notified of his need for the absences. (See id. ¶ 11.) In addition, he claims that UConn breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to respond to his proper notice and request for FMLA leave. (See id. ¶¶ 14-15.) Lastly, he alleges that UConn defamed his character when it amended his personnel file to state that he was involuntarily terminated and could not seek future employment with UConn or any other Connecticut state agency. (See id. ¶ 18.)
UConn argues that Philbrick's FMLA and state law claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment which grants states sovereign immunity from suits in federal court. See U.S. Const. Amend. XI. In particular, UConn asserts that Connecticut has not waived its sovereign immunity for such claims and that Congress has not effectively abrogated the sovereign immunity of the states for such claims. Philbrick responds to the motion by arguing that Congress did abrogate the states' sovereign immunity when it passed the FMLA.
The Eleventh Amendment states:
[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
This language not only prohibits suits against states brought by citizens of other states in federal court, but, implicitly, suits against a state in federal court brought by its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974).
Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, is not absolute. Indeed, there are two ways in which a state may be divested of its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Close v. State of New York, 125 F.3d 31 (2d Cir.1997). First, "a state may waive its immunity and agree to be sued in federal court." Id. Second, "[C]ongress may abrogate a state's sovereign immunity through a statutory enactment." Id. Neither party has argued that the State of Connecticut has waived its immunity from suits arising under the FMLA. Accordingly, the court must determine whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity from such suits and if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996).
"Congress may abrogate the states' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 631, 640, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). The FMLA states that "[a]n action to recover damages or equitable relief ... may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction ..." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). The FMLA incorporates the definition of "public agency" as it appears in the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") at 29 U.S.C. § 203(x). See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iii). The FLSA defines "public agency" as including a state or any agency of the state. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(x).
The Second Circuit, addressing the FLSA, has held that this language functions as a clear statement of congressional intent to abrogate the states' immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Close, 125 F.3d at 36; see also McGregor v. Goord, 18 F.Supp.2d 204, 207 (N.D.N.Y.1998). Read as a whole, the plain language of these statutory provisions demonstrates Congress' intent to subject states to suits for money damages at the hands of individual employees. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. 631, 640 (). Moreover, most district courts considering this statutory language have found that these provisions provide sufficient evidence of Congress' intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See McGregor, 18 F.Supp.2d at 207 (); Jolliffe v. Mitchell, 986 F.Supp. 339, 342 (W.D.Va.1997) (); Knussman v. State of Md., 935 F.Supp. 659, 663 (D.Md.1996) (); but see Driesse v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 26 F.Supp.2d 1328, 1331 (M.D.Fla.1998) ( the opposite). Accordingly, the court finds that Congress has unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), the Supreme Court recognized that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the validity of that congressional power on numerous occasions. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. 631, 644. Accordingly, the issue before the court is whether Congress' abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the FMLA was appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Resolution of this issue involves a three-prong inquiry referred to as the Katzenbach test: "(1) whether the statute may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause; (2) whether it is plainly adapted to that end; and (3) whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966).
"The simplest way to meet [the first] requirement is for Congress to declare explicitly that the legislation is passed to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights." Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir.1996); see also McGregor, 18 F.Supp.2d at 207. The congressional purpose in enacting the FMLA was to promote the stability and economic security of the family "in a manner that, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, minimizes the potential for employment...
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