Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. Brandstetter

• Decision Date: 19 January 1954
• Docket Number: No. 28763,28763
• Parties: PHILLIPS PIPE LINE CO. v. BRANDSTETTER et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 880

263 S.W.2d 880

241 Mo.App. 1138

PHILLIPS PIPE LINE CO. v. BRANDSTETTER et al.

No. 28763.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Jan. 19, 1954.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1954.

Robert A. Roessel, Keith M. Brownell, Ruth Boxdorfer, St. Louis, for appellant.

C. Kenneth Thies, Kerth, Thies & Schreiber, Clayton, Rayburn L. Foster, Harry D. Turner, Wm. J. Zeman, Bartlesville, Okl., for respondent.

ARONSON, Special Judge.

This case has come to us by transfer from the Supreme Court for reasons set forth in an opinion reported at 363 Mo. 904, 254 S.W.2d 636. Therein Judge Westhues epitomized the nature of the case as follows:

'This is a condemnation suit filed by respondent, Phillips Pipe Line Company, against appellants, Edward O. Brandstetter and his wife, to condemn land for the purpose of laying a pipe line. Commissioners were appointed to assess the damages; exceptions were filed to the report of the commissioners but these were later dismissed. In their answer the landowners, appellants here, challenged the right and power of respondent to condemn the land. Appellants' contention is that Section 523.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., does not authorize pipe line companies to institute condemnation proceedings. The trial court held that the respondent did have the right to condemn land and entered a judgment accordingly. The landowners appealed.'

Plaintiff is a corporation which was organized in Delaware as 'Independent Pipe Line Company,' its name later changed to 'Standish Pipe Line Company,' and in 1948 again changed to 'Phillips Pipe Line Company.' It is a separate and distinct corporate entity from an earlier Phillips Pipe Line Company which in 1940 had filed an affidavit of retirement and dissolution with the Secretary of State of Missouri.

The earlier Phillips Pipe Line Company had in 1933 instituted a condemnation proceeding in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, in which Edward O. Brandstetter and wife were defendants, wherein it seured a decree granting it a 30 foot right of way for the laying of an 8 inch pipe line, which pipe line was thereafter laid across defendants' farm property. In 1940, the said earlier Phillips Pipe Line Company transferred all its assets, including the said pipe line, to Phillips Petroleum Company. On June 30, 1951, the pipe line properties were transferred by Phillips Petroleum Company to the present plaintiff, so that plaintiff thereby became owner of the perpetual easement and right-of-way which were granted to the earlier corporation of the same name in the condemnation suit of 1933, as well as of the pipe line itself. It may be noted that this pipe line is part of a system which runs from Borger, Texas, through parts of Oklahoma, Kansas, Missouri and Illinois, to East Chicago, Indiana. It has one delivery point in Missouri, near Jefferson City; no points of origin in this state; there is another delivery station at East St. Louis, Illinois.

In the present proceeding plaintiff seeks condemnation of a right-of-way for the purpose of laying a second pipe line, 10 3/4 inches in diameter, parallel to the older pipe line. In the testimony, its plan was compared to double-tracking a railroad line where only a single track had been laid before. The new pipe line is to be located 8 feet north of the old, in the center of a new 33 foot right-of-way, and thus the two rights-of-way overlap considerably; only 9 1/2 feet of he new right-of-way extends beyond the limits of the earlier right-of-way, and 23 1/2 feet overlaps the earlier right-of-way.

Three points are presented by defendants: 1, that a pipe line company is not granted the right of eminent domain by Section 523.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; 2, that to allow plaintiff to determine the 'necessity' of its new pipe line will deprive defendants of rights without due process of law; and 3, that no 'public use' was shown, to justify the decree herein.

This case having been tried by the court below, without a jury, we review it both on the law and the facts. Section 510.310 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. Defendants offered no evidence, so that plaintiff's evidence was undisputed. We shall make further reference to the evidence below to such extent as seems necessary, as we discuss the issues.

With respect to the first issue, as to whether a pipe line company has the right to condemn rights-of-way in Missouri, defendants contend that Section 523.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. is purely procedural and grants no substantive rights, while plaintiff asserts that said statute does confer a substantive right of condemnation upon '* * * any oil, pipe line or gas corporation engaged in the business of transporting or carrying oil or gas by means of pipes or pipe lines laid underneath the surface of the ground * * *,' and that this construction has been acted upon for many years in many cases by the bar of this state and had been expressed, as a matter of dictum, by our Supreme Court in a few cases, and thereafter the legislature made no amendments to indicate its unwillingness to accept the actual construction placed upon its statutory enactment.

Section 523.010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., (previously Sec. 1504, R.S.Mo.1939 and Sec. 1340, R.S.Mo.1929) so far as pertinent here, reads as follows:

'In case land, or other property is sought to be appropriated by any * * * oil, pipe line or gas corporation engaged in the business of transporting or carrying oil or gas by means of pipes or pipe lines laid underneath the surface of the ground, * * * for public use, and such corporation and the owners cannot agree upon the proper compensation to be paid, * * * such corporation may apply to the circuit court of the county of this state where said land or any part thereof lies, or the judge thereof in vacation, by petition setting forth the general directions in which it is desired to construct their * * * oil, pipe line or gas line over or underneath the surface of such lands, description of the real estate or other property, which the company seeks to acquire; the names of the owners thereof, * * * and praying the appointment of three disinterested freeholders, as commissioners, or a jury, to assess the damages which such owners may severally sustain in consequence of the establishment, erection and maintenance of such * * * oil, pipe line or gas line over or underneath the surface of such lands; * * *.'

Previous to 1919, the condemnation statute contained no reference to oil, pipe line or gas companies. The amending law introducing these groups of corporations into the statute was enacted by the 50th General Assembly and was approved May 7, 1919, with an emergency clause. Laws of 1919, pp. 207-9. The caption of the legislative enactment described it as an Act to amend Sec. 2360, R.S.Mo.1909, authorizing lands to be condemned for electric corporations 'so as to authorize land to be condemned by oil, pipe line or gas companies for the purpose of transporting and carrying oil and gas by means of pipes and pipe lines underneath the surface of the ground.' (Emphasis ours.) The emergency clause of the Act declares the basis for immediate need of the amendment to be the incompleteness of the pre-existing statute 'in that it does not confer the power of eminent domain upon oil, pipe-line and gas companies' in this state. It would appear obvious that the Legislature intended by its action to remedy the situation by conferring the power.

To construe the statute as granting merely procedural rights would be to ascribe to the General Assembly the purpose of creating a procedure while knowing that there was no right and intentionally refraining from creating a right to use the newly-created procedure; which surely would have been a futile and unnecessary action. The emergency clause negatives any such purpose and our lawmakers must rationally have meant to create both substantive and procedural rights. Defendants insist that the rule of strict construction be applied. Such rule cannot blind us to the express inclusion of pipe line companies. Strict construction does not mean a strained narrow interpretation of language. It does not require that there be two statutes, one for substantive right and one for procedural. One statutory section is sufficient.

The fact that Chapter 523 is labeled 'Condemnation Proceedings' does not mean that it is wholly procedural. The word 'proceedings' must not be tortured into reading 'procedures.' 'Condemnation proceedings' as used as a chapter heading signifies no more than 'condemnation actions' would mean.

Defendants in their argument stress the language of the section-heading which now appears with Section 523-010 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.: 'Lands may be condemned, when--petition--parties.' When the 1919 amendment was adopted the section-caption read: 'Lands may be condemned, when.' We think defendants attribute excessive significance to the heading of the section as indicative of only procedural rights. These headings are usually the work of revision committees, and are not truly parts of the statute. They are surely of less importance than is the preamble of an amending act, in disclosing legislative intent.

From State v. Maurer, 255 Mo. 152, loc. cit. 160, 164 S.W. 551, 552, we quote the following:

'The headings of chapters, articles, or sections are not to be considered in construing our statutes; these indicia are mere arbitrary designations inserted for convenience of reference by clerks or revisers, who have no legislative authority, and are therefore powerless to lessen or expand the letter or meaning of the law. Ferguson v. Gentry, 206 Mo. 189, 195, 104 S.W. 104; State v. Doerring, 194 Mo. 398, 414, 92 S.W. 489; Logan v. Fidelity [& Casualty] Co., 146 Mo. 114, 122, 47 S.W. 948; Huff v. Alsup, 64 Mo. 51.'

See also Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. Drainage District No. 5 of Pemiscot Co., 215 Mo.App. 456, 247 S.W. 494, 495.

On the other hand, the title of a statute, being written by the General Assembly, can properly...