Phillips v. Com., 83-SC-888-MR

Decision Date15 November 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-SC-888-MR,83-SC-888-MR
Citation679 S.W.2d 235
PartiesMichael PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Mark A. Posnansky, Louisville, for appellant.

David L. Armstrong, Atty. Gen., David K. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

GANT, Justice.

Appellant, Michael Phillips, was convicted in the Pike Circuit Court of second-degree burglary, receiving stolen property over $100, and first-degree rape. After a finding that Phillips was a first-degree persistent felon, his sentence was enhanced to 40 years' imprisonment. Phillips appeals from the judgment of the Pike Circuit Court as a matter of right. We affirm.

On or about August 7, 1982, some person(s) entered Patricia Elswick's apartment, without permission, and stole a 19-inch General Electric television set. On August 7, 1982, Phillips attempted to sell the stolen set to one Verna Slone. When Ms. Slone declined to buy the television, Phillips struck her and, then, forcibly raped her. At trial, Phillips admitted that he had attempted to sell the stolen set to Ms. Slone, but claimed that he had purchased the television from an unknown individual for fifty dollars. Phillips also admitted to having sexual intercourse with Ms. Slone, but claimed that he had done so with her consent. Other facts will be discussed as they relate to particular arguments raised in this appeal.

Phillips first argues that his convictions for both burglary and receiving stolen property violated his right against double jeopardy, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution. Although Phillips did not raise this argument at the trial level, we will consider his double jeopardy claim on appeal. Sherley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 558 S.W.2d 615 (1977).

Phillips contends that, because the intent to commit the theft was an element of burglary, the act of taking the property was culminated when the burglary was culminated. Based upon this reasoning, he argues that his act of receiving stolen property merged with the burglary. We disagree. It is clear that two distinct offenses occurred here. The burglary was completed when Phillips entered the apartment with the intent to commit a crime inside. Even if he had then and there abandoned his activity, he would be guilty of burglary. KRS 511.020-.040. The fact that he stole the television set after he entered the apartment constituted a completely separate offense--theft or receiving stolen property. Based upon the proof available, the Commonwealth chose to prosecute Phillips on the charge of receiving stolen property. This court upheld a similar prosecution for both burglary and receiving stolen property in Sebastian v. Commonwealth, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 880 (1981), wherein we stated:

It is conceded that one may be convicted of both burglary and theft of property taken in the course of the burglary. We have held also that one may be convicted of the theft and retaining possession of the stolen property. Sutton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 879 (decided today). By parity of reasoning, it follows that a person can be convicted of both burglary and retaining possession of property stolen by him in the course of the burglary.

Id. at 881.

As part of his double jeopardy argument, Phillips asks this court to re-examine our holding in Sebastian in light of our recent decision in Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 670 S.W.2d 828 (1984). In Jackson, we overruled that portion of the Sutton decision which allowed prosecution for both theft and knowingly receiving the same stolen article. The simple result of Jackson is that the Commonwealth must choose between theft and receiving stolen property where a person could be charged with either offense based upon his unlawful acquisition of a certain item(s) of property. In the case at bar, the Commonwealth could have charged Phillips with either the theft of the television set or the unlawful receipt of the television, in addition to the burglary charge. The Commonwealth chose to charge him with the burglary and receiving stolen property. This comports with our decisions in Sebastian and Jackson, when read together. There was no double jeopardy violation.

Phillips next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find him guilty of receiving stolen property in addition to his conviction for burglary, because these offenses are legally inconsistent and inherently contradictory. However, Phillips failed to preserve this claimed error for appellate review because he did not object to the giving of the instruction on receiving stolen property at trial. RCr 9.54(2).

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32 cases
  • Garcia v. State, 88-205
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 13 de julho de 1989
    ...an alternative but not a double offense exposure by creation of a possession offense. See Jackson, 670 S.W.2d 828 and Phillips v. Com., 679 S.W.2d 235 (Ky.1984), holding that dual prosecution is inappropriate since the offenses ...
  • Epperson v. Com., No. 2003-SC-0595-MR.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 23 de fevereiro de 2006
    ...look at all of the evidence and determine whether the defendant has been unduly prejudiced by that isolated statement. Phillips v. Commonwealth, 679 S.W.2d 235 (Ky.1984). Considering the entire record, we must conclude that Epperson was not unduly prejudiced by the two V. Lack of Remorse Ep......
  • Foley v. Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 21 de novembro de 1996
    ...prejudice occurred. Weighing the relevancy against the prejudice is peculiarly within the province of the trial court. Phillips v. Commonwealth, Ky., 679 S.W.2d 235 (1984). United States v. Degaglia, 913 F.2d 372 (7th Cir.1990). The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The jury was alr......
  • Matthews v. Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 19 de maio de 2005
    ...of discretion.12 First we note that Mrs. Anderson's statement was, in part, non-responsive to the prosecutor's question. We noted in Phillips v. Commonwealth13 that "[w]here evidence of other crimes is introduced into evidence through the non-responsive answer of a witness, this court must ......
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