Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist.
Citation | 243 Cal.Rptr. 196,197 Cal.App.3d 922 |
Decision Date | 14 January 1988 |
Docket Number | No. E001815,E001815 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Previously published at 197 Cal.App.3d 922, 210 Cal.App.3d 1060 197 Cal.App.3d 922, 210 Cal.App.3d 1060 Paula E. PHILLIPS, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DESERT HOSPITAL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. |
Tanzer, Rosato & Samuels, Ellen Kamon, Beverly Hills, Haines, Russ, McMurry & Craig J. de Recat, Los Angeles, and Cary S. Samuels, Beverly Hills, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Thompson & Colegate, Riverside, Merrill & Neiswender, Redlands, Horvitz, Levy & Amerian, David M. Axelrad, David S. Ettinger, Grant Marylander and Michelle L. Stern, Encino, for defendant and respondent Desert Hosp. Dist.
Plaintiff Paula E. Phillips was admitted to Desert Hospital District, a state hospital district, for mammary dysplasia. On September 12, 1983, a bilateral mastectomy and reconstructive surgery were performed. Phillips and her husband (plaintiffs) claim: 1
On April 6, 1984, plaintiffs' attorney sent the following letter to Desert Hospital:
Defendant Hospital did not respond to plaintiffs' letter and on July 27, 1984, plaintiffs filed a complaint. At that time, plaintiffs were unaware defendant Hospital was a public entity. 2 Defendant Hospital demurred, asserting plaintiffs had failed to comply with Government Code section 900 et seq. 3 Specifically, defendant Hospital asserted plaintiffs had failed to comply with the 100-day claim presentation requirement of the Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs did not petition for late claim relief under section 911.4 from the 100-day claim filing requirement even though it is clear plaintiffs were unaware of the public entity status of defendant Hospital until the demurrer to the complaint was filed by Hospital.
On September 26, 1984, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, alleging: (1) They had "complied with the provisions of Government Code § 900, et seq." and (2) defendant Hospital "is estopped from asserting a defense pursuant to Government Code § 900, et seq." In regard to the second allegation, plaintiffs state their April 6, 1984, letter gave defendant Hospital notice of plaintiffs' claim, defendant Hospital failed to comply with section 7530, and defendant Hospital attempted to conceal its public agency status.
Defendant Hospital again demurred on the ground the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 4 The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court held plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of the Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs now contend the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the demurrer without granting leave to amend, and appeal from the January 15, 1985, order of dismissal.
Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58, sets forth the appropriate standards for reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer. " ( Id., at p. 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.)
Furthermore, as observed in Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 915, 918, 117 Cal.Rptr. 541, 528 P.2d 357:
COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 900 ET SEQ.
Section 911.2 requires that all claims against public entities be filed within 100 days after the cause of action accrues. "Compliance with the claims statutes is mandatory [citation]; and failure to file a claim is fatal to the cause of action." (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 454, 115 Cal.Rptr. 797, 525 P.2d 701.)
Plaintiffs contend they have alleged sufficient facts to reveal: (1) The cause of action accrued within 100 days of plaintiffs' letter and (2) plaintiffs' letter constitutes a "claim." Plaintiffs, therefore, contend the demurrer should not have been sustained.
Plaintiffs' first amended complaint merely alleges "Plaintiffs' cause of action accrued after September 14, 1983." Plaintiffs do not specifically state when the cause accrued. Plaintiffs' opening brief supplements their complaint:
(Emphasis added.)
As provided in Gonzales v. City of San Diego (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 882, 890, 182 Cal.Rptr. 73, for a complaint to state a cause of action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity. (See also, Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.2d 814, 819, 142 P.2d 37.) Such was not done in the present case. Plaintiffs did not allege when they discovered defendant Hospital's negligence or how defendant Hospital concealed its negligence. Even, however, were we to remand the cause and allow plaintiffs to plead defendant Hospital intentionally concealed its negligence and allow plaintiffs to state when they discovered defendant Hospital's negligence (see Donabedian v. Manzer (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1021, 1028, 232 Cal.Rptr. 325, where concealment was actually alleged in the complaint), plaintiffs would still have to show they filed a claim.
Plaintiffs contend their letter mailed to "Desert Hospital" on April 6, 1984, satisfies the "claim" requirement of sections 905, 911.2, and 945.4. We disagree.
In 1975, the Legislature enacted the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA). As part of MICRA, Code of Civil Procedure section 364 was added as an additional procedural pitfall in the path of plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions. This section requires a patient to give a health care provider at least 90 days' notice prior to commencement of an action based upon professional negligence. The notice shall notify defendant of the claim and the type of loss sustained, including with specificity the nature of the injury suffered.
The Legislature did not amend section 905 or 910 to eliminate the requirement of filing a claim against a public entity when the claim is based on professional medical negligence. It is, therefore, incumbent upon a plaintiff to give notice of intention to sue and to file a claim under the Tort Claims Act prior to filing a complaint against a public entity for such negligence.
Section 910 sets forth the information to be contained in a claim. 6 As plaintiffs point out, strict compliance with...
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...settled case law, we assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations of the complaint. (Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1988) 210 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1065, 243 Cal.Rptr. 196.) Plaintiff alleged that she was in the business of procuring and selling scrap metal to various scrap ......
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...notice generally mandate full compliance with all the information provisions of notice. For example, in Phillips v. Desert Hospital District, 243 Cal.Rptr. 196, 200-01 (Cal.Ct.App.1988), the California Court of Appeals held that where a plaintiff's notice letter lacked his address and the a......
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