Phillips v. Dixie Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1938
• Docket Number: 14635.
• Parties: PHILLIPS v. DIXIE STORES, Inc., et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

195 S.E. 646

186 S.C. 374

PHILLIPS v. DIXIE STORES, Inc., et al.

No. 14635.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 8, 1938

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenville County; E. C Dennis, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Carl A. Phillips claimant, opposed by Dixie Stores, Inc., employer, and the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, insurance carrier. From a decree of the court of common pleas reversing an award of the full Industrial Commission which had been entered on appeal from an award of a single commissioner, the employer and the insurance carrier appeal.

Decree reversed, and award of full Industrial Commission reinstated as made.

William Elliott, Jr., of Columbia, for appellants.

H. D Hawkins, of Greer, and Williams & Henry, of Greenville, for respondent.

BONHAM Justice.

Carl A Phillips was employed by Dixie Stores, Inc. Among the duties of his employment was that of driving trucks, and of delivering freight therefrom. March 10, 1936, he drove a truck laden with potatoes from Greenville, S. C., to Lenoir, N.C. Each sack of potatoes weighed from 150 to 200 pounds. While unloading the potatoes, with a bag of them on his shoulder, he stepped on the tailgate of the truck, which had been let down and which was held up by chains. These broke, or came loose, and he fell to the ground, some four or five feet; he fell on his back, his head and shoulders striking the ground. He drove back to Greenville that evening and drove a truck next day to Spruce Pine, N. C.

We will not follow the details of his injury, medical treatment, etc., since the determination of this appeal does not turn on them. He and his employer entered into an agreement of compensation at the rate of $9 per week for temporary total disability during the extent of plaintiff's disability, also, all his hospital, medical, and doctor's bills to be paid by the employer; at the end of the temporary total disability period, the case to be opened to consider the question of specific loss of arm; cost of the hearing to be paid by defendant.

Under this agreement, compensation was paid at the rate of $9 per week from March 10, 1936, to July 27, 1936. The employer then took the position that while such agreement had been entered into and compensation paid in accordance therewith, in the light of additional information such agreement was erroneously made. The employee was silent before Commissioner Hyatt as to this agreement.

Thereupon, Commissioner Hyatt, as hearing commissioner, took the testimony and on October 2, 1936, made and filed an award, with findings of fact. The award follows: "It is hereby ordered that the defendant pay to the plaintiff compensation at the rate of Nine Dollars ($9.00) per week for temporary total disability during the extent of plaintiff's disability, also, all hospital, medical and doctor bills incurred. At the end of temporary total disability period this case will be opened to consider the question of specific loss of arm. Cost of this hearing to be paid by defendant."

From this award of the hearing commissioner the defendants appealed to the full Industrial Commission, under the provisions of section 59 of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, approved the 17th day of July, 1935, 39 St. at Large, p. 1259, for a reconsideration of the evidence and an amendment of the award. This appeal was heard by the full Industrial Commission on October 26, 1936, which commission rendered its opinion December 14, 1936, by which it set aside the award of the hearing Commissioner, and ordered that compensation be paid the claimant at the weekly compensable rate of $9 for temporary total disability from and inclusive of March 12, 1936, to and exclusive of July 27, 1936, and that the defendant shall pay all medical and doctor bills for such period.

From this opinion, the plaintiff appealed to the court of common pleas. The appeal was heard by his honor, Judge Dennis, who, in due time, filed a decree reversing the award of the commission.

From this decree, defendants appeal to this court.

Judge Dennis, in his decree, said: "The principal question involved is whether the Full Commission erred as a matter of law in its decision."

Further, he stated: "The Full Commission found that there was no permanent injury sustained as a result of the accident of March 10, 1936, and that the paralysis or abnormal condition of claimant's arm, if any, was not proximated by the accident."

Further, he states: "An award of the commission shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact, but either party may appeal to the Court of Common Pleas for errors of law. Did the commission, therefore, err as a matter of law? It is the province of this Court to analyze the facts in order to apply the law and thus to ascertain whether the conclusions of the commission have adequate support in the evidence." (Italics added.)

Herein lies the fundamental error of the distinguished circuit judge. By his own statement, he is making himself a participant with the commission in determining "whether the conclusions of the Commission have adequate support in the evidence." (Italics ours.) This is just what he is forbidden to do. If there were absolutely no evidence in support of the findings of fact by the commission, we might say that the question thus becomes a question of law. But whether there is a sufficiency of evidence is strictly a matter of fact, and the findings of the commission thereabout are final.

The circuit decree enters into an analysis of the evidence to determine if there is evidence to sustain the findings of the commission upon the question whether the claimant's arm is paralyzed. He pays little attention to the...