Phillpot v. Shelton
| Citation | 875 P.2d 289,19 Kan.App.2d 654 |
| Decision Date | 03 June 1994 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 70519,70520 and 70521,s. 70519 |
| Parties | Charles PHILLPOT, Appellant, v. Jay SHELTON, Warden of the Norton Correctional Facility, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Kansas |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The power to prescribe the penalty to be imposed for the commission of a crime rests exclusively with the legislature, not the courts. The power of the legislature to specify the punishment for a crime is controlled only by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Kansas.
2. The fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all others are subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of the legislature govern when that intent can be ascertained from the statute.
3. Penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the persons sought to be subject to them. The rule of strict construction simply means ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning.
4. Postrelease supervision means the release of a prisoner to the community after having served a period of imprisonment or equivalent time served in a facility where credit for time served is awarded as set forth by the court, subject to conditions imposed by the Kansas Parole Board and to the Secretary of Corrections' supervision. Every inmate while on postrelease supervision shall remain in the legal custody of the Secretary of Corrections and is subject to the orders of the Secretary.
5. Inmates shall be released on postrelease supervision upon the termination of the prison portion of their sentence. The length of postrelease supervision depends upon the severity of the inmate's highest severity level offense. In addition, any time which is earned and subtracted from any presumptive sentence of any inmate pursuant to good time calculation shall be added to such inmate's time of postrelease supervision.
6. When a defendant is sentenced under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines, barring subsequent convictions or flight from justice, that defendant knows the total time he or she will be subject to imprisonment and postrelease supervision.
7. When an indeterminate sentence is converted to a sentence under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines, all of the rights and privileges accorded by the Guidelines become applicable. A person's sentence shall not be increased in length as a result of this conversion.
8. A reading of the statutes indicates that, under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, a defendant is to serve a bifurcated sentence--incarceration followed by postrelease supervision. Other than the interplay of good time credit, these two parts are effectively independent from one another. The statutes indicate postrelease time is mandatory and comes after a defendant has been released from incarceration. Because appellants have served only a period of incarceration under their indeterminate sentences, they are subject to postrelease supervision upon their release from incarceration.
Kevin G. Campbell, of Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., for appellants.
Robert Wasinger, Legal Counsel, Dept. of Corrections, for appellee.
Before BRISCOE, C.J., and BRAZIL and LARSON, JJ.
Eleven prisoners or former prisoners appeal district court orders requiring each to serve a period of postrelease supervision following their release from incarceration. The orders appealed were entered in three separate cases and have been consolidated for appeal.
All of the appellants were sentenced under sentencing statutes in effect prior to the passage of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4701 et seq. After the Guidelines became effective on July 1, 1993, the Kansas Department of Corrections provided reports on each of the appellants pursuant to K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4724(c) and recommended that the Guidelines be applied retroactively to each appellant. Each report included the individual's original indeterminate sentence, the amount of that sentence served, the converted sentence under the Guidelines, and the severity of the crimes involved. This information is summarized below:
Name/Case No.: Original Time Served: Sentence under Severity
Sentence: Guidelines
Charles Phillpot 4"12 years 8 years, 11 16 months (less 9
(No. 70,519) (commencing months, 19 days possible good
7/84) time)
Thomas L. Cooley 1"5 years 1 year, 6 6 months (less 10
months
(No. 70,520) (commencing 5 days possible good
1/92) time)
Kenneth W. Bayliff 1"2 years 1 year, 11 8 months (less 9
(No. 70,521) (commencing months, 3 days possible good
8/91) time)
John C. Bishop, Jr. 2"9 years 7 years, 7 18 months (less 9
(No. 70,521) (commencing months, 4 days possible good
12/85) time)
Harold D. Delonia 2"10 years 7 years, 10 14 months (less 9
(No. 70,521) (commencing months, 5 days possible good
9/85) time)
James E. Loftis 1"5 years 3 years, 10 6 months (less 9
(No. 70,521) (commencing months, 26 days possible good
8/89) time)
William R. McGinnis 1"5 years 1 year, 11 7 months (less 9
(No. 70,521) (commencing months, 29 days possible good
7/91) time)
Fernando V. Perez 1"5 years 3 years, 4 9 months (less 9
(No. 70,521) (commencing months, 6 days possible good
3/90) time)
Joseph Petrin 2"5 years 2 years, 5 18 months (less 9
(No. 70,521) (commencing months, 7 days possible good
2/91) time)
Delbert E. Trout, Jr. 4"20 years 7 years, 9 days 32 months (less 7
(No. 70,521) (commencing possible good
7/86) time)
Larry D. Wilson, Jr. 6"22 years 5 years, 8 12 months (less 9
(No. 70,521) (commencing months, 22 days possible good
10/87) time)
----------
This information regarding each appellant and the retroactive application of the Guidelines to each appellant is not disputed by the parties.
As all of the appellants were convicted of nondrug severity level 7 through 10 crimes that were not sexually violent or motivated, the length of each appellant's postrelease supervision is 12 months, plus the amount of good time earned and retained. K.S.A.1993 Supp. 22-3717(d)(1)(B). Therefore, at the time of the Department's report, all of the appellants, except Petrin, had been incarcerated for a period that exceeded the combined applicable periods of incarceration and postrelease supervision required under the Guidelines. When each appellant's sentence was converted under the Guidelines, the Department determined each appellant remained subject to postrelease supervision upon release from prison.
Appellants filed the present actions, contending the period of incarceration each has served in excess of the period of incarceration required under the Guidelines should be credited against the period of postrelease supervision required under the Guidelines. Appellee Jay Shelton, warden of the Norton Correctional Facility, argued the Guidelines should be interpreted to require all prisoners to serve a period of postrelease supervision upon release from incarceration. The district court agreed with appellee and held each appellant was required to serve the applicable period of postrelease supervision. Appellants appeal these orders.
The issue presented is whether, in cases where the Guidelines are retroactively applied, the period of incarceration served by a prisoner on an indeterminate sentence can be applied to satisfy the period of postrelease supervision required by the Guidelines when the prisoner's period of incarceration served is in excess of the period of incarceration required under the Guidelines.
Our resolution of this issue will require this court to interpret the applicable provisions of the Guidelines. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law. When determining questions of law, this court is not bound by the decision of the district court. State v. Donlay, 253 Kan. 132, 133-34, 853 P.2d 680 (1993). We are guided in our statutory analysis by the following:
State v. Keeley, 236 Kan. 555, 560, 694 P.2d 422 (1985).
State v. Thompson, 237 Kan. 562, 563, 701 P.2d 694 (1985).
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