State v. Castillo
| Decision Date | 09 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | 115,505,115,504 |
| Citation | 397 P.3d 1248,54 Kan.App.2d 217 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Bonnie L. CASTILLO, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Carl F.A. Maughan, of Maughan Law Group LC, of Wichita, for appellant.
Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before Leben, P.J., Gardner, J., and Walker, S.J.
This appeal asks whether the district court has the authority to revoke the postimprisonment supervision of offenders convicted of felony DUI. The district court found that it had the authority to do so, then revoked Bonnie L. Castillo's supervision and remanded her to jail. We affirm.
Castillo's underlying convictions relevant to this case are two convictions for driving under the influence (DUI). On October 4, 2013, Castillo drank a fifth of bourbon then drove to the liquor store to purchase more. While driving home, she was arrested for DUI and admitted that she was intoxicated to the extent that she could not safely operate her vehicle. Six days later, on October 10, 2013, nearly the same events occurred—Castillo drank a fifth of bourbon over a 3–hour period, then drove to the liquor store and purchased another fifth of bourbon. While driving home, Castillo was arrested for DUI and she admitted that she was intoxicated to the extent that she could not safely operate her vehicle.
Castillo's criminal history at the time included the following: 10 DUIs, a pedestrian under the influence, two counts of transporting an open container, weapons charges, drug charges, escape from custody, batteries, thefts, robbery, fleeing and attempting to elude, and other charges. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Castillo pleaded guilty to both counts of driving under the influence, and the State recommended that Castillo be sentenced to two consecutive 1–year sentences. For each count of DUI, the district court sentenced Castillo to a 1–year term, imposed a $2,500 fine, and ran the sentences consecutively. Additionally, the district court imposed 1–year postrelease supervision periods.
After serving 2 years in jail and being released, Castillo violated the terms of her postimprisonment supervision. Undeterred by her DUI jail sentences, she violated the terms of her supervision by submitting breath analysis tests with blood alcohol levels of .067, .212, and .262 and by failing to submit other breath analyses as directed by the alcohol monitoring device. Castillo stated that she failed to submit them because she was "passed out." The district court found that Castillo had violated her postimprisonment supervision, then it revoked her supervision and ordered her to serve the balance of her supervision period in county jail. Castillo appeals, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to do so.
We first address the State's argument that we should not consider the merits of Castillo's jurisdictional challenge. The State argues that Castillo did not raise that issue before the district court and has not briefed why the issue is properly before this court, in violation of Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 34).
Generally, issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth , 293 Kan. 375, Syl. ¶ 9, 266 P.3d 516 (2011). Exceptions to the general rule exist, State v. Spotts , 288 Kan. 650, 652, 206 P.3d 510 (2009), but if an issue was not raised below, "there must be an explanation why the issue is properly before [this court]." Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 35). The Kansas Supreme Court has directed us to strictly enforce that rule. State v. Godfrey , 301 Kan. 1041, 1044, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015). Castillo's brief does not state why her jurisdictional challenge properly falls within an exception to the general rule which would permit us to address it for the first time on appeal.
Nonetheless, the issue whether a district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any time, "whether for the first time on appeal or even on [this court's] own motion." State v. Sales , 290 Kan. 130, 135, 224 P.3d 546 (2010). Castillo does not specify what type of jurisdiction she believes the district court lacked, but she argues that the district court did not have the authority to revoke her "post-release supervision" and impose additional jail time. Because Castillo challenges the district court's authority, we construe her argument as one challenging the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Jahnke v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc. , 51 Kan.App.2d 678, 686, 353 P.3d 455 (2015) (). Castillo may raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. Sales , 290 Kan. at 135, 224 P.3d 546. Therefore, we find Castillo's jurisdictional challenge is properly before this court and will address its merits.
Castillo argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her postrelease supervision and to impose additional jail time. Castillo contends that the period following her release is more akin to postrelease supervision than to probation because she served her entire sentence and was released to community corrections for supervision. Castillo argues that the postrelease period for felony DUI should be treated the same way as a postrelease period from other felony convictions, which are governed by the sentencing guidelines. Castillo asserts that only the agency supervising such release has authority to revoke the release, and that agency was the Department of Corrections, not the district court which lost its jurisdiction upon sentencing her.
"Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited." Jahnke , 51 Kan.App.2d at 686, 353 P.3d 455. A court must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to hear and decide a case. 51 Kan.App.2d at 686, 353 P.3d 455. Similarly, interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Collins , 303 Kan. 472, 473–74, 362 P.3d 1098 (2015). Courts must construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results and presume the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless legislation. State v. Frierson , 298 Kan. 1005, 1013, 319 P.3d 515 (2014).
In Castillo's case, various terms were used to describe the period of supervision following her initial jail sentence. At sentencing, the district court referred to that period of time as "postrelease supervision." However, the related sentencing journal entry repeatedly refers to it as "postimprisonment supervision." Later, when the district court considered Castillo's postimprisonment violations, the district court acknowledged that Castillo was not sentenced to probation but stated that the period following Castillo's initial incarceration was "akin to probation." And the related journal entry imposing additional jail time refers to the period that followed Castillo's initial jail sentence as "postimprisonment supervision."
"Postrelease supervision," as defined in the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), submits the offender to the supervision of the Secretary of Corrections:
" ‘[P]ostrelease supervision’ means the release of a prisoner to the community after having served a period of imprisonment or equivalent time served in a facility where credit for time served is awarded as set forth by the court, subject to conditions imposed by the Kansas parole board and to the secretary of corrections' supervision ." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4703(q).
" ‘Every inmate while on postrelease supervision shall remain in the legal custody of the secretary of corrections and is subject to the orders of the secretary.’ " Phillpot v. Shelton , 19 Kan.App.2d 654, 658, 875 P.2d 289 (1994) (quoting K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 22-3717 [i] ).
In contrast, the term "postimprisonment supervision" is not defined by statute. We have explained that: "Post-release supervision in DUI cases is also known as post imprisonment supervision." State v. Sampsel , No. 112291, 2015 WL 5311995, at *1 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). And we have consistently used the term "postimprisonment supervision" in referring to the supervisory period following a felony DUI offender's release from imprisonment. K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1567(b)(3). See, e.g. , State v. Fisk , No. 115917, 2017 WL 840281 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion); State v. Remy , No. 114732, 2016 WL 6822484 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev . filed December 19, 2016.
Castillo was sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1567, the felony DUI law. That statute is a "self-contained habitual criminal statute." State v. Key , 298 Kan. 315, 321, 312 P.3d 355 (2013) (citing State v. Osoba , 234 Kan. 443, 444, 672 P.2d 1098 (1983) ). "Kansas' DUI law is a self-contained criminal statute, which means that all essential components of the crime, including the elements, severity levels, and applicable sentences, are included within the statute." State v. Reese , 300 Kan. 650, 654, 333 P.3d 149 (2014).
The statute is also a habitual criminal statute because it imposes progressively enhanced sentences for repeat offenders such as Castillo:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Bird
...jurisdiction at any time, whether for the first time on appeal or even on the appellate court's own motion. State v. Castillo , 54 Kan. App. 2d 217, 219, 397 P.3d 1248 (2017). Moreover, an appellate court has a duty to question jurisdiction on its own initiative and must dismiss the appeal ......
-
Macomber v. State
...may be raised at any time, whether for the first time on appeal or even on the appellate court's own motion. State v. Castillo , 54 Kan. App. 2d 217, 219, 397 P.3d 1248 (2017).Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel; a failure to object to the court......
-
State v. Galloway
... ... Both ... parties recognize that Galloway can make this claim for the ... first time on appeal because it presents a question of ... subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time ... See State v. Castillo , 54 Kan.App.2d 217, 219, 397 ... P.3d 1248 (2017). The parties also recognize that this court ... can correct an illegal sentence at any time. K.S.A. 2018 ... Supp. 22-3504(a); State v. Hambright , 310 Kan. 408, ... 411, 447 P.3d 972 (2019) ... Whether ... ...
-
State v. Foster
...supervision is akin to probation and appellate courts review revocation for an abuse of discretion. State v. Castillo , 54 Kan. App. 2d 217, 227, 397 P.3d 1248 (2017). "A judicial action constitutes an abuse of discretion if: (1) no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial......