Piah v. State
| Decision Date | 03 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-0835 |
| Parties | Felix Kasper Piah, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Hennepin County District Court
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this appeal from the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea for ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney: (1) failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and (2) argued against his request to withdraw his plea. Additionally, appellant claims that the postconviction court erred when it determined that the district court applied the correct standard when assessing his pre-sentencing plea withdrawal request. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In December 2014, appellant Felix Kasper Piah entered the United States from his home country of the Republic of Liberia on a temporary visa. Although his temporary visa expired in June 2015, Piah remained in the United States and moved to Minnesota to live with his father. Piah is not a legal resident of the United States.
On the night of January 21, 2016, police officers were dispatched to Northeast Minneapolis following a report of a domestic assault with a weapon. Upon reaching the scene, officers were flagged down by Piah's father, who was standing barefoot outside, and who informed the police that after he chastised Piah, Piah charged at him with a 16-inch kitchen knife held above his head. The father successfully wrested the knife away from Piah, but obtained a deep laceration on his left palm and a cut on his right finger from the struggle.
Later that same evening, police made contact with Piah, who acknowledged the struggle and claimed that his father had possibly cut himself when he tried to grab the knife. Piah was arrested and the state charged him with second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon under Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (2014).
On November 9, 2016, Piah pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault with intent to cause fear under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2014). The plea petition signed by Piah included the provision, "My attorney has told me and I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States this plea of guilty may result in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States of America or denial of citizenship."
At his plea hearing, the district court and Piah's counsel confirmed with Piah that he was making a voluntary and intelligent plea, but the district court did not address any possibility of immigration consequences based on his plea. Piah's attorney informed him that "the negotiation was the best we could do to protect him in immigration proceedings . . . but that he could still be deported because he had no legal status," and that the plea "would make [applying for asylum] at least possible." Piah later reported that his attorney advised him that he would be ineligible for asylum if he went to trial and was convicted of second-degree assault.
At his sentencing hearing, without first consulting with his attorney, Piah requested to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he was unsatisfied with the process, was confused when he agreed to the plea, and was not a criminal. Piah did not ask the district court to withdraw his plea because of any immigration consequences he faced.
The district court explained to Piah that the reasons he asserted were not legally valid reasons to withdraw a plea. The district court informed Piah that valid reasons to withdraw a plea include not being properly represented and not making a "knowing and intelligent plea." The district court asked Piah several times if he had any reasons to withdraw his plea. When Piah did not present any reasons in response to the district court'squestioning, the district court concluded that Piah had not "told [the district court] anything that leaves [it] to conclude that [Piah] did not make a knowing and intelligent plea in this case." When the district court asked Piah's attorney if she had anything to add, she responded that she did not have anything to add but went on to say:
Mr. Piah has always been concerned with the consequences, but I think they're really minimal compared to the 21-month prison sentence that he's facing. And his father was very willing to come forward, and had some very compelling testimony. This is an excellent deal for Mr. Piah.
The district court denied Piah's request to withdraw his plea for failure to provide the district court with "any legal basis" to grant his request and proceeded to sentencing. In June 2017, Piah was arrested for allegedly violating his probation and was transferred from state custody to federal immigration custody.
On January 3, 2019, Piah filed a petition for postconviction relief claiming that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because his attorney failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea and argued against his plea withdrawal request. Additionally, Piah claimed that the district court erred by applying the incorrect standard when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The postconviction court denied Piah's petition. This appeal follows.
Piah argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it denied his postconviction petition for relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, Piah contends that the postconviction court erred when it determined that the district court analyzed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the correct standardbecause the district court allegedly applied the stricter manifest-injustice standard rather than the more lenient fair-and-just standard.
In reviewing a postconviction court's denial of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court applies a clear-error standard of review to the postconviction court's factual findings, a de novo standard of review to the postconviction court's legal conclusions, and an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the postconviction court's ultimate decision whether to grant relief. Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 719-20 (Minn. 2017).
Piah argues that his guilty plea is presumptively invalid as a matter of law because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. As the plea is invalid, Piah argues, he is entitled to withdraw it.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. This right is the "right to the effective assistance of counsel." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Strickland dictates that a defendant must demonstrate two elements: (1) "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068. "The objective standard of reasonablenessis defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances." State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted).
The two-part Strickland test applies to a claim that a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985). A plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel is invalid as a matter of law. State v. Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d 531, 541 (Minn. App. 2017).
The first prong of Strickland requires a defendant to demonstrate to a reviewing court that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable. Swaney v. State, 882 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Minn. 2016).
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel requires a criminal defense attorney to advise a noncitizen client of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty—including the risk of deportation. 559 U.S. 356, 367-68, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482-83 (2010). If the applicable immigration statute "is not succinct and straightforward," rendering the deportation consequences of a plea to be unclear, an attorney need only advise a client that "pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences." Id. at 369, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. However, if the deportation consequences of a guilty plea are "truly clear," an attorney has a duty to accurately advise a client of those consequences. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has summarized an attorney's obligations to advise his or her client under Padilla:
Padilla establishes that criminal-defense attorneys must...
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