State v. Ellis-Strong

• Decision Date: 19 June 2017
• Docket Number: A16-1260
• Citation: 899 N.W.2d 531
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Joe Anthony Darnell ELLIS-STRONG, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

899 N.W.2d 531

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,

v.Joe Anthony Darnell ELLIS-STRONG, Appellant.

A16-1260

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed June 19, 2017

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent).

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant).

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

OPINION

KIRK, Judge

Appellant Joe Anthony Darnell Ellis-Strong challenges his conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, arguing that the district court erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Because Ellis-Strong's trial counsel affirmatively misadvised him concerning the length of the predatory-offender registration period, we conclude that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. We reverse, because if Ellis-Strong can successfully show ineffective assistance of counsel, his guilty plea would be manifestly unjust. However, because it is unclear from the record if Ellis-Strong was prejudiced, we remand for a postconviction hearing.

FACTS

In September 2015, Ellis-Strong was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2014), because of an incident of sexual penetration of a minor, alleged to have occurred in December 2014.

Trial was scheduled for March 8, 2016. Instead of going to trial on March 8, Ellis-Strong entered a "straight plea" of guilty to the first-degree CSC charge without a plea agreement with the state. Ellis-Strong understood that while there was no plea agreement, he would be able to argue for a downward durational departure at sentencing and the state would seek a guidelines sentence of 180 months.

During the plea colloquy, Ellis-Strong's trial counsel asked: "And you know that you will have to register as a sex offender for 10 years as well?" Ellis-Strong replied, "Yes."

At his sentencing hearing, Ellis-Strong moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The basis for the motion, according to Ellis-Strong's trial counsel, was that

at the time of the plea, Mr. Ellis-Strong was told by me and by the State, there was lengthy conversation about the length of his [predatory-offender] registration period. Everyone thought it was 10 years. That's what he was told. That's what he believed. That's what he understood. Since that time we learned that we were all wrong. We understand the status of the case law, which says that registration is a collateral issue. And usually in those cases the court is talking about whether the Defendant had to register or not. This case is a little different because he was advised. There is no question that he was going to register. The question was the length of time.

Ellis-Strong's trial counsel stated that based on the inaccurate advice concerning the length of the registration period, Ellis-Strong was denied the opportunity to "at least negotiate pleading guilty under a different section under [the CSC statute], which would have required 10 years [of registering]." The state responded that (1) Ellis-Strong made a straight plea, without a plea agreement, and (2) the registration matter was "collateral" according to established caselaw. Ellis-Strong's trial counsel conceded that Minnesota caselaw viewed predatory-offender registration as a collateral consequence, but stated that there is no caselaw addressing whether the length of the registration period would fall under a reason or basis to withdraw a plea.

The district court denied the motion, finding that the plea was entered knowingly with a written plea petition and that Ellis-Strong entered the plea of his own free will after having sufficient time to consult with his attorney. The district court granted a downward durational departure and imposed a 147-month sentence.

Ellis-Strong now appeals.

ISSUE

Did counsel's affirmative misadvice concerning predatory-offender registration amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering Ellis-Strong's guilty plea constitutionally invalid and manifestly unjust?

ANALYSIS

Ellis-Strong argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he was denied effective assistance of counsel before the entry of his plea. Ellis-Strong contends, specifically, that (1) his trial counsel affirmatively misadvised him as to the collateral consequences of his guilty plea, (2) his trial counsel's failure to investigate the law constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) such ineffective assistance of counsel constituted a "manifest injustice," under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, and, therefore, the less demanding presentence "fair-and-just" standard under rule 15.05, subdivision 2, was satisfied as a matter of law, requiring the district court to allow withdrawal of his plea.

The ultimate decision to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the district court, "and it will be reversed only in the rare case in which the appellate court can fairly conclude that the [district] court abused its discretion." Kim v. State , 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989). Although Ellis-Strong alleges the district court "erred" in denying his motion to withdraw his plea, Ellis-Strong is alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for the first time on direct appeal. Generally, an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim should be raised in a postconviction petition for relief, rather than on direct appeal, because an evidentiary hearing, if granted, provides the district court with additional facts to explain the parties' decisions. State v. Gustafson , 610 N.W.2d 314, 321 (Minn. 2000). But, "[w]hen a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal." Andersen v. State , 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013). Because Ellis-Strong brings an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal, we do not apply the "abuse-of-discretion" standard of review. Instead, if the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is properly before us, we examine the claim under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Andersen , 830 N.W.2d at 10.

Ellis-Strong's claim requires us to consider: (1) whether the two-prong test in Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, is applicable to Ellis-Strong's assertion that his trial counsel affirmatively misadvised him of a collateral consequence of his guilty plea; (2) if applicable, whether under the Strickland test Ellis-Strong showed his counsel was ineffective; and (3) whether a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea demonstrates a "manifest injustice," under Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1, thereby meeting the less demanding "fair-and-just" plea-withdrawal standard under rule 15.05, subdivision 2, as a matter of law.

Applicability of Strickland to Misadvice Regarding Collateral Consequences

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant a right to effective assistance of counsel, even "[b]efore deciding whether to plead guilty." Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 364, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1480-81, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). "A defendant's guilty plea may be constitutionally invalid if the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel." Sames v. State , 805 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn.App. 2011) (citing Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) ; State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 1994) ). To show ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate (1) "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Campos v. State , 816 N.W.2d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (quotations omitted); see Hill , 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370.

In considering ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, appellate courts make a distinction between a "direct" and "collateral" consequence stemming from a guilty plea. Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821, 823-24 (Minn. 2016) ; Sames , 805 N.W.2d at 567-68. "Direct consequences are those that have a definite, immediate and automatic effect on the range of a defendant's punishment," while "[c]ollateral consequences, on the other hand, are not punishment but, rather, are civil and regulatory in nature and are imposed in the interest of public safety." Sames , 805 N.W.2d at 568 (quotations omitted). In Minnesota, an attorney's representation does not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness required by the Sixth Amendment if the attorney fails to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. Id . Most federal circuit courts and numerous state appellate courts follow this rule. Id .

In Minnesota, the requirement to register as a predatory offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. Taylor , 887 N.W.2d at 823-24. In Taylor , the defendant moved postsentencing to withdraw his guilty plea, which required him to register as a predatory offender, claiming his counsel was ineffective and his plea was not intelligent and was invalid because his attorney never informed him of the registration requirements. Id . at 822. The Minnesota Supreme Court held in Taylor that because of the collateral nature of the predatory-offender registration requirements, a defense attorney's failure to inform a defendant about these requirements before the defendant enters a guilty plea does not violate a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel under the United States and...