Piche v. Halvorson
| Decision Date | 23 April 1937 |
| Docket Number | 31193. |
| Parties | PICHE v. HALVORSON. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Polk County; James E. Montague, Judge.
Action by Arthur Piche against Norman Halvorson. Verdict for plaintiff, and, from an order denying his motion for new trial, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
$9,000 held not excessive for injuries to 22 year old man capable of earning approximately $1,600 before injury which resulted in total permanent disability.
Syllabus by the Court .
1. Medical expert may give his opinion as to the duration and permanency of personal injuries and the nature and extent of disability caused by such injuries.
2. A sufficient foundation is laid for an opinion of a medical expert as to the cause of plaintiff's injuries by showing that he was present in court and heard the testimony of plaintiff and his witnesses that plaintiff was well and able-bodied before an automobile accident and injured and disabled immediately thereafter, and that the expert had examined plaintiff and had taken X-rays of the injuries; and such opinion is not inadmissible because it bears directly on an issue to be decided by the jury.
3. Plaintiff's net earnings from a farm, owned and equipped by his father but operated by plaintiff in return for a half share in the earnings, represented compensation to plaintiff for his personal services and not a return on invested capital, and evidence of such earnings is admissible in an action for personal injuries, in order that the jury might consider them in determining plaintiff's loss of earning capacity.
4. Verdict of $9,000 not excessive, where 22 year old man capable of earning approximately $1,600 per year received injuries resulting in total permanent disability.
Nilles, Oehlert & Nilles, of Fargo, N.D., and W E. Rowe, of Crookston, for appellant.
Robert Pearson, of Mahnomen, and Dell & Rosengren, of Fergus Falls for respondent.
Appeal by defendant from an order denying his motion for new trial after a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $9,000.
Plaintiff was injured on July 14, 1935, in a collision between his automobile and that of defendant. Defendant admitted liability and litigated only the question of damages. Plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was 22 years of age, in good health, and of more than average intelligence. From 1930 to the time of the accident, he managed and operated his father's farm of 320 acres, of which 55 acres were in pasture. He did most of the work, employing help only for the cleaning of seed and shocking and threshing of grain. His mother helped a little with the milking. He testified that he worked long hours, generally from 5 a. m. to 9 p. m., except on Sundays. As a result of the accident, plaintiff was very severely injured. The testimony tended to show that he sustained a basal skull fracture which injured the soft tissue of the brain. He sustained stomach injuries, a hernia, many bruises and lacerations, and severe shock and trauma. His sacroiliac joint and his liver were injured. Plaintiff's doctors testified that he was totally and permanently disabled.
Appellant has 55 assignments of error which he has divided into 12 groups. Each of them has received our thoughtful consideration. We shall refer only to those which present substantial questions.
1. Error is claimed because plaintiff's doctors were permitted to testify that plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled. It is urged that such testimony invades the province of the jury, that it left out of account certain disabilities due to prior injuries of plaintiff referred to in the evidence, and that there is no showing that the disabilities in this case were the result of the particular accident involved in this action. The last two grounds of objection may be disposed of by the fact that the medical opinions were based upon evidence that plaintiff had recovered from the previous injuries and was well at the time of the accident, and that his present disabilities were the result of injuries caused by this accident. Medical testimony is received because jurors, being inexperienced in such matters, are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment with respect to them without expert assistance. A physician testifying as an expert may give his opinion as to the extent of disability caused by, and the duration and permanency of, personal injuries. Dunnell, Minn.Dig. (2d Ed.) §§ 3325, 3327, note 40; 8 R.C.L. p. 635, § 177; 11 R.C.L. 609, § 33; 22 C.J. 673, § 763; Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 511, 39 N.W. 485; Cooper v. St. Paul City Railway Co., 54 Minn. 379, 56 N.W. 42; Donnelly v. St. Paul City Railway Co., 70 Minn. 278, 73 N.W. 157; Skelton v. St. Paul City Railway Co., 88 Minn. 192, 92 N.W. 960; Hoch v. Byram, 180 Minn. 298, 230 N.W. 823; 4 Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.) 197, § 1975; Cross v. Syracuse, 200 N.Y. 393, 94 N.E. 184,21 Ann.Cas. 324, note 326 et seq. There seems to be no dissent from this rule. Note, 21 Ann.Cas. at page 328; Hallum v. Omro, 122 Wis. 337, 99 N.W. 1051; Newton v. Gretter, 60 N.D. 635, 236 N.W. 254; Bankers Lloyds v. Montgomery (Tex.Civ.App.) 42 S.W.(2d) 285; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Shilling (Tex.Civ.App.) 259 S.W. 236, 238; McDonald v. City Electric Railway Co., 144 Mich. 379, 108 N.W. 85; Springfield Con. Ry. Co. v. Welsch, 155 Ill. 511, 40 N.E. 1034; Sillix v. Armour & Co., 99 Kan. 103, 160 P. 1021; Standard Oil Co. v. Ervin, 44 Wyo. 88, 8 P.2d 447; Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez (C.C.A.) 4 F.(2d) 215, 39 A.L.R. 1416; Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Sewell (C.C.A.) 37 F.(2d) 230; Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. Kerr (Tex.Civ.App.) 54 S.W.(2d) 349.
It is claimed, however, that such testimony is objectionable because it permits the medical expert to give his opinion upon an ultimate issue, citing U.S. v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 55 S.Ct. 273, 79 L.Ed. 617; U.S. v. Bowman (C.C.A.10th) 73 F.(2d) 716; U.S. v. Sparks (C.C.A.7th) 80 F.(2d) 392; Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah, 336, 40 P.2d 188. The Spaulding Case arose under a war risk insurance policy in which the sole and only issue was whether or not the plaintiff was ‘ totally and permanently disabled’ within the meaning of the policy so as to entitle him to the benefits thereof. After pointing out that the opinions of the experts in that case were without weight because they failed to consider evidence which showed that the plaintiff was not totally and permanently disabled, the court stated that the experts ought not to have been asked or allowed to state their conclusions on the whole case. But this is not such a case. It will be time enough to decide whether the rule of the Spaulding Case will be followed when such a case is presented. The other federal cases cited were war risk insurance cases and followed the rule of the Spaulding Case. Of course, we are not bound by the rule of the federal courts. But the rule of the federal courts both prior to and subsequent to the Spaulding Case has been in harmony with our own rule that an expert opinion may be received on an ultimate issue or fact to be decided by the jury. The federal cases observe a distinction that the rule stated is confined to cases in which the opinion does not extend to the merits of the entire case. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wolf (C.C.A.8th) 85 F.(2d) 162. The cited case distinguishes U.S. v. Spaulding and cites among many other cases State v. Cox, 172 Minn. 226, 215 N.W. 189. In the instant case the opinions of the experts did not extend to the entire case, but only to one fact to be considered by the jury in assessing damages. The opinions were admissible. Dunnell, Minn.Dig. (2d Ed.) § 3326. We find no error in this respect.
2. It is claimed that error resulted from admitting the testimony of a Dr. Pierce that plaintiff's disability at the time of trial was due to the automobile accident. It is said that no foundation was laid for this evidence because the doctor had not examined plaintiff prior to the accident and, further, that the opinion was as to an ultimate fact and thus invaded the province of the jury. A foundation for the testimony of Dr. Pierce was laid by showing that he was present in court during the trial and heard the testimony of plaintiff and plaintiff's mother as to the plaintiff's condition and injuries; that plaintiff had entirely recovered from the prior injuries and had thereafter been in good health until the time of the automobile accident. He had also heard the testimony of another physician who attended plaintiff for the injuries resulting from the accident. His testimony was based upon an assumption that the evidence stated was true. Dr. Pierce himself had examined plaintiff and had taken X-ray pictures of him which were introduced in evidence and which he used in testifying. This was a sufficient foundation for his testimony. Dunnell, Minn.Dig.(2d Ed.) § 3338.
With respect to the testimony invading the province of the jury upon the ground that it stated an opinion upon an ultimate fact or issue to be decided by the jury, it is the contention of appellant that it would have been proper to permit the doctor to state what might have caused plaintiff's injuries, but that it was not proper to permit him to state that, in his opinion, this particular accident caused plaintiff's injury. This distinction has been repudiated by the decisions of this court in previous cases as one which is too fine and fanciful as a practical matter. Experts are permitted to give their opinions upon the very issue which the jury will have to decide, but such opinions are not conclusive. Dunnell, Minn.Dig.(2d Ed.) §§ 3327, 3338; Donnelly v. St. Paul City Railway Co., 70 Minn. 278 73 N.W. 157; State v. Price, ...
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