Pickens v. Cnty. of Riverside

Decision Date19 May 2023
Docket NumberD080922
PartiesTAMARIA PICKENS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE et al., Defendants and Respondents
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County No RIC1901399, Harold W. Hopp, Judge. Affirmed.

Mahoney & Soll, Paul M. Mahoney and Ryan P. Mahoney for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Hurrell Cantrall, Thomas C. Hurrell, Melinda Lee Cantrall and Natalie Luongo for Defendants and Respondents.

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

Plaintiff and appellant Tamaria Pickens appeals a summary judgment and demurrer entered in favor of respondents County of Riverside (County), City of Moreno Valley, and Riverside County Sheriff Sergeant Edwin Baeza on Pickens's complaint for damages arising from her primary claim of false arrest and imprisonment.

The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer on her causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress in the operative second amended complaint, concluding all respondents were immune under Government Code section 821.6. It overruled the demurrer on the false arrest and imprisonment cause of action as to all defendants. As to Sergeant Baeza, it overruled the demurrer on the claim of violation of civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (section 1983)); but it sustained it as against the public entity defendants, granting Pickens leave to amend. Pickens did not amend her complaint.

The court granted Sergeant Baeza's summary judgment motion on the section 1983 cause of action, and granted it as to all respondents on the false arrest and imprisonment cause of action.

Pickens contends the court erroneously: (1) ruled on respondents' evidentiary objections in the summary judgment proceedings (2) granted summary judgment on all causes of action because respondents lacked probable cause to arrest her, as a reasonable officer cannot rely on illegally obtained statements to create probable cause and the arrest warrant did not establish probable cause; (3) sustained the demurrer as to the public entity defendants on the section 1983 cause of action; (4) ruled Sergeant Baeza was entitled to qualified immunity; and (5) sustained the demurrer as to the causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In reviewing the court's ruling on a summary judgment, we state the undisputed facts and other facts in the light most favorable to Pickens as the opposing party, resolving evidentiary doubts and ambiguities in her favor. (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347.)

The undisputed facts in the summary judgment papers show that in May 2017, B.P. reported to the Riverside County Sheriff's Department that her six-year-old daughter, D.A., said that Pickens touched her private area on two occasions while they were living in Pickens's home in 2017.

Sergeant Baeza, who was employed by County and an investigator with the City of Moreno Valley police station, investigated the allegations.

Sergeant Baeza arranged for a forensic interview of D.A. with a children's social worker. During the video-recorded interview, which Sergeant Baeza observed from another room D.A. said that Pickens, whom she called "granny," had touched her vagina on two occasions.

Sergeant Baeza did not order a physical examination of D.A., reasoning it was intrusive and unlikely to yield any evidence due to the passage of time.

Based on D.A.'s forensic interview, Sergeant Baeza arranged for B.P. to make a pretext call to Pickens. During the call, Pickens initially denied touching D.A., saying D.A. bathed herself at Pickens's house. However, after B.P. suggested that maybe Pickens had accidentally touched D.A.'s private parts while applying lotion to her after helping her bathe, Pickens changed her story and said she had helped D.A. put on her clothing, and showed her how to apply lotion. Pickens told B.P. this was a "family situation," which they should handle themselves and not report to Child Protective Services.

Sergeant Baeza and another officer interviewed B.P., who was consistent in her statements and showed concern for her child.

In May 2017, Sergeant Baeza asked Pickens to come to the police station voluntarily, and she did so. Sergeant Baeza told her she would return home that night and, "[i]f at any point you feel uncomfortable, all you have to do is get up, and I'll follow you and escort you to the front." Pickens stated she wanted to proceed with the interview. It lasted less than one hour.

Although Pickens suggested that D.A. was lying, she could think of no reason D.A. did that. Sergeant Baeza was polite to Pickens and did not raise his voice at her. She was not concerned about being arrested. Pickens understood that Sergeant Baeza needed to investigate the allegations as part of his job. Sergeant Baeza asked Pickens if she would like to take a polygraph test, and she agreed. The certified polygrapher asked Pickens whether she had touched D.A.'s vagina. Her negative response to that question elicited a notification stating, "deception indicated."

Sergeant Baeza and his partner conducted a post-polygraph interview of Pickens, which was audio-recorded. Pickens was advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) at the start of this interview.[1]

Pickens testified in a deposition that she told Sergeant Baeza in the post-polygraph interview that she had probably touched D.A.'s vagina with skin-to-skin contact on at least two occasions. Pickens claims Sergeant Baeza asked her if she would write an apology letter, and she "went along" with his request.

Sergeant Baeza prepared and submitted a probable cause statement to the Riverside County District Attorney's office. In May 2017, Pickens was detained for two days and released. After Sergeant Baeza resubmitted the file to the district attorney around the end of June 2017, he stopped investigating this case.

The District Attorney pressed charges against Pickens, and the court approved an arrest warrant. In September 2017, she was arrested a second time.

Pickens in discovery produced a police report stating that in August 2018, the Oceanside Police Department investigated a separate incident in which B.P. claimed that a family member had sexually abused D.A. The police concluded the allegations were not credible.

In October 2018, the Riverside District Attorney reportedly dismissed the charges against Pickens based on the Oceanside Police Department's investigation, and she was released from detention.

In November 2018, Pickens filed a government claim against the City of Moreno Valley. That same month, she filed a government claim against County.[2] In her operative complaint, Pickens alleged claims for: (1) violation of section 1983; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) false arrest and false imprisonment.

Pickens alleged as to all causes of action: "[Sergeant] Baeza violated [her] constitutional rights in a number of ways. First, he conducted illegal warrantless surveillance of [her] in violation of [her] 4th Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search. [Her] 1st Amendment privacy rights are also implicated by [Sergeant] Baeza's conduct .... [He] also subjected [her] to a coercive interrogation in violation of her 5th Amendment rights. [She] was denied the assistance of counsel throughout [Sergeant] Baeza's interrogation. Finally, [his] arrest of [her] was made without probable cause and in violation of her 4th Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. [Sergeant] Baeza lacked probable cause because, as described previously, he knew prior to [her] arrest that [B.P.] was a sick liar who previously lied about child molestation and therefore could not be trusted with respect to her allegations. He also knew that [B.P.'s] allegations were uncorroborated by any other source.... As a direct result of [Sergeant] Baeza's conduct, Pickens lost her job, was separated from her family, and suffered a nervous breakdown in prison." Pickens incorporated the above allegations by reference to all causes of action.

Pickens further alleged a claim under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690 (Monell). Under Monell, government officials sued in their official capacity cannot be held liable under section 1983 under a respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory. (Id. at p. 691.) Rather, liability must be based on an official policy that was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. (Id. at p. 694.) Pickens alleged her "injuries were directly caused by the official policies, customs, and practices of County of Riverside and the City of Moreno Valley . . . [which] treat allegations of child molestation and sexual assault differently from other crimes." She further alleged that when Sergeant Baeza investigated and arrested her, he and others were aware of these official policies. She alleged on information and belief that it is the official policy of County to provide no training to those who are directed and employed to investigate child molestation. Pickens also alleged County failed to promulgate proper and or adequate rules, regulations, policies and procedures for training and supervising officers and agents of the Riverside County Sheriff's Department and County with respect to the conduct of interrogations and techniques for questioning criminal suspects and witnesses.

Defendants demurred to the complaint, and the court sustained the demurrer on the causes of action for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress without leave to amend,...

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