Pickett v. Board of County Com'rs

• Decision Date: 10 June 1913
• Citation: 133 P. 112,24 Idaho 200
• Parties: JOHN W. PICKETT, Respondent, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

133 P. 112

24 Idaho 200

JOHN W. PICKETT, Respondent, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Appellant

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 10, 1913

RURAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT-ORGANIZATION OF-DUTY OF BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-OF BOARD OF TRUSTEES-ORGANIZATION DE FACTO OR DE JURE.

1. Under the provisions of an act of the legislature for the organization of rural high school districts (1909 Sess. Laws p. 73), the two jurisdictional requisites for the creation of such districts are, first, filing with the board of county commissioners the requisite petition, and second, the submission of the question to a vote of the electors, and if a majority of the votes cast at such election are in favor of creating the district, the district is thereby created.

2. That act of the legislature vested the power in the electors to determine whether or not a rural high school district should be organized.

3. The rights of electors should not be prejudiced by the errors or wrongful acts of the election officers, unless it be made to appear that a fair election was prevented by reason of such irregularities.

4. The duties of such boards under that act are ministerial.

5. After a rural high school district has exercised the functions of such district for a period of nearly two years its legal organization will be presumed, whatever may have been the defects and irregularities in the formation or organization of such district.

6. Under the facts of this case, held, that said rural high school district existed as a corporation de facto, if not de jure.

7. Held, that the order appealed from was not necessary to the organization of said district, and that the valid organization of said district could not be inquired into or attacked on an appeal from said order.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, in and for Fremont County. Hon. James G. Gwinn, Judge.

An appeal from the judgment of the district court reversing an order of the board of county commissioners and holding that Rural High School District No. 3, in Fremont county, has no existence de facto or de jure. Judgment reversed.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions. Costs awarded to the appellant.

Richards & Haga and Soule & Soule, for Appellant.

The steps prescribed by the statute after the district has been actually created are merely directory and not vital to the creation of such district, if not done in strict accordance with the terms of the statute, because the act does not declare them essential to the validity of the existence of such district. (Murphy v. City of Spokane, 64 Wash 681, 117 P. 476; Seymour v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427, 33 P. 1059.)

The right of the voters should not be prejudiced by the errors or wrongful acts of the election officers, unless it be made to appear that a fair election was prevented by reason of the alleged electors. (Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 126 P. 628, 127 P. 580; Wardner v. Pelkes, 8 Idaho 333, 69 P. 64; People v. Pike, 197 Ill. 449, 64 N.E. 393; State v. Town of West Port, 116 Mo. 582, 22 S.W. 888.)

The failure of officers to perform acts directory in their nature cannot nullify the will of electors expressed by their votes at an election. (People v. Van Cleve, 1 Mich. 362, 53 Am. Dec. 69; State v. Burkholder, 42 Kan. 641, 22 P. 722; Crabb v. Celeste Ind. School Dist. (Tex. Civ. App.), 132 S.W. 890; 15 Cyc. 378, 383, 387.)

"After a school district has exercised the franchises and privileges thereof for a period of one year, its legal organization will be conclusively presumed, whatever may have been the defects and irregularities in the formation or organization of such district." (State v. School Dist., 42 Neb. 499, 60 N.W. 912; Jameson v. People, 16 Ill. 257, 63 Am. Dec. 304; Bank of U.S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 64, 6 L.Ed. 552; State v. Huff, 105 Mo.App. 354, 79 S.W. 1010; Greenfield School Dist. v. Hannaford Special School Dist., 20 N.D. 393, 127 N.W. 501; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich. 463; Kockrow v. Whisenand, 88 Neb. 640, 130 N.W. 287.)

It seems clear that if this district did not exist as a de jure corporation, it did exist as a de facto corporation. (School Dist. v. Rice, 11 Idaho 99, 81 P. 155; Splonskofsky v. Minto, 62 Ore. 560, 126 P. 15; Gilkey v. Town of How, 105 Wis. 41, 81 N.W. 120, 49 L. R. A. 483.)

"A corporation de facto may legally do and perform every act and thing which the same entity could do or perform were it a de jure corporation." (People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 526, 8 P. 84; Miller v. Perris Irr. Dist., 85 F. 693.)

This rule is necessary not only to protect the good name of the state and the corporation, but also third parties, such as the purchaser of these bonds. (Speer v. Board of County Commissioners, 88 F. 749, 32 C. C. A. 101; Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Sheppard, 185 U.S. 1, 22 S.Ct. 531, 46 L.Ed. 773, 780.)

The board of county commissioners had no jurisdiction over the existence or nonexistence of this district, and therefore had no power to make any order that in any wise affected the existence of this district; and therefore the trial court acquired no jurisdiction greater than such board possessed, other than such jurisdiction as was necessary to declare such order void. (School Dist. No. 25 v. Rice, 11 Idaho 99, 81 P. 155; Millisor v. Wagner, 133 Ind. 400, 32 N.E. 927; Myers v. Gibson, 152 Ind. 500, 53 N.E. 646; David v. Hardin County etc., 104 Iowa 204, 73 N.W. 576.)

An estoppel by laches or acquiescence may be invoked against an attack upon the validity of the formation or organization of a public or public quasi corporation. (McDonald v. Parker, 130 Ky. 501, 110 S.W. 810; State ex rel. School Dist. v. Miller, 113 Mo.App. 665, 88 S.W. 637; McNutt v. Lemhi Co., 12 Idaho 77, 84 P. 1054; State v. Huff, 105 Mo.App. 354, 79 S.W. 1010.)

Under no statutory provision or principle of law could respondent directly or indirectly by any suit or proceeding assail the validity of the establishment and existence of Rural High School Dist. No. 3. (1 McQuillan, Mun. Corp., secs. 158, 159; 4 Dillon, Mun. Corp., 5th ed., sec. 1560; State v. Ryan (Utah), 125 P. 666.)

George H. Lowe and N. D. Jackson, for Respondent.

The appeal from the order of the board of county commissioners brought the matter of organization of the district before the district court for trial de novo. It was a direct attack upon the legality of the organization, and raised the question of whether or not Rural High School District No. 3 had a de jure existence. Such proceedings differ from one where it is sought to collaterally attack the existence of a corporation, in that where the attack is collateral it may be proper for the court to inquire whether the corporation had a de facto existence. Under our statute the appeal from the order of the board of county commissioners to the district court put upon the county board the burden of proof to make a prima facie case in support of its order, that is, to show the jurisdictional facts. (Gardner v. Blaine Co., 15 Idaho 698, 99 P. 826; Prothero v. Board of Commrs. of Twin Falls Co., 22 Idaho 598, 127 P. 175; Moorpark School Dist. v. Reynolds, 13 Cal.App. 170, 109 P. 149.)

"If the board acted without jurisdiction in the promulgation of such order, it was appealable, and subject to review in the district court on that ground, if no other." (School District v. Rice, 11 Idaho 107, 81 P. 155.)

No appeal from the order calling the election was necessary in order to procure a review of that order in the district court, on appeal from the final order. (Latah County v. Hasfurther, 12 Idaho 797, 88 P. 433.)

SULLIVAN, J. Ailshie, C. J., and Stewart, J., concur.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, J.

This is an appeal concerning an order made by the board of county commissioners of Fremont county, confirming the acts done in creating Rural High School District No. 3 and the acts of the board of trustees of such district, which order of the board was taken on appeal to the district court, and the district court set aside the order of the board of county commissioners and held that said Rural High School District had no existence de jure or de facto. From that judgment this appeal is taken.

It appears from the record that prior to March 3, 1910, there existed in Fremont county organized school districts Nos. 8, 48, 55, 60, 63, 66 and 74, and on March 3, 1910, a petition was filed with the board of county commissioners, pursuant to an act of the legislature of March 3, 1909 (Sess. Laws, p. 73), praying for the organization of Rural High School District No. 3. At its meeting held on May 23, 1910, the board of commissioners made an order calling an election for the purpose of organizing said high school district. The parties interested having failed to post notices required by said act, the matter was again brought before said board at its meeting on July 12, 1910, and the board made an order calling an election for the 23d of July, 1910. Said election was held on that date, the vote canvassed, and a board of trustees of said district was organized on August 1, 1910, which board certified to the clerk of the board of county commissioners the result of the election. One of the respondents here was one of said trustees.

Said high school district has conducted school, issued warrants in the usual way, which have been paid by the county treasurer bonds of the district were issued and sold in the sum of $ 20,000 for the erection of a schoolhouse, the warrants of such district for the expense of running such school for about two years were issued and paid, taxes were levied and collected and the proceeds of such bonds were paid to the district for the purpose of building a schoolhouse. On July 5, 1912, it was discovered that the return showing the votes cast at said election had...