Pickron v. State, 4 Div. 144
Decision Date | 08 May 1984 |
Docket Number | 4 Div. 144 |
Citation | 475 So.2d 593 |
Parties | Myra Jean PICKRON v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Larry R. Grissett of Prestwood, Prestwood & Grissett, Andalusia, and D. Patrick Harris of Harris & Harris, Montgomery, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Douglas L. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This appellant was found guilty by a jury and sentenced by the court to imprisonment for ten years on a trial on an indictment that charged that she "did, with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, cause serious physical injury to Joann Davis by means of a deadly weapon, or a dangerous instrument, to-wit: an automobile, in violation of Title 13A-6-20 of the Code of Alabama, 1975 ...."
No issue is presented on appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. We find it unnecessary to recite any of the details of the evidence other than those contained in the next paragraph.
After midnight on the night of May 1-2, 1982, the alleged victim was struck and seriously injured on a public street in Florala by an automobile owned by the appellant. The victim is the sister of appellant's husband, who had been separated from appellant about a year and a half. The husband, accompanied by the alleged victim and another female, were at a club, across the Alabama-Florida line, where there was much drinking and revelry, in which they participated. Appellant was also at the club that night, but was not in company with the other three mentioned. The other three had gone to the club in the automobile of appellant's husband, who after midnight returned with his sister and the other female in the automobile with him, first to the other female's home and then to his sister's home. As the sister was leaving the automobile and while she was still in the street, the mentioned automobile drove by and collided with her, knocking her down in the street, and did not stop at the scene.
The crucial issue of fact was whether defendant was driving the automobile when the alleged victim was struck by it. There was positive evidence that defendant was driving at the time; the defendant testified emphatically that she was not in the automobile at the time, and that she had allowed another female to borrow it.
During the testimony of Mr. Alcus Radney, the father of the defendant, who had testified that he was with the defendant at the club on the night of the alleged crime, the following occurred during the direct examination of the witness:
:
Appellant urges that the trial court was in error in sustaining the State's objection to the inquiry of the witness as to what "Mildred" had said to the defendant, and insists that what she said would have disclosed a request by "Mildred" to borrow the defendant's automobile. Our view is that the testimony of the witness otherwise shows clearly that he in effect testified clearly that "Mildred" did ask or request the defendant to let her borrow the automobile, and that defendant was not prejudiced by the rulings of the court as shown above.
Appellant's second issue pertains to the court's ruling relative to objections or motions by defendant to questions propounded to the defendant, and other witnesses for her, on cross-examination as to whether the witness knew "what perjury is."
The transcript shows the trial court did not rule adversely to defendant as to any objection or motion made by defendant as to such inquiry, except defendant's motion for a mistrial, which the trial court overruled, which ruling constitutes the basis for the fourth issue presented by appellant, which we will hereafter consider in the order presented in appellant's brief.
As a third contention for a reversal, it is argued in appellant's brief:
One incident on the trial is referred to by appellant in support of the contention just quoted. It occurred during the redirect examination of one of defendant's witnesses, who had worked at the Dinner Bell in Florala. The transcript shows the following on the particular point:
We fail to see, as does appellant, anything wrong with the form of the question, unless perhaps it was somewhat leading or suggestive. However, we also fail to see any harm to defendant by the court's sustension of the State's objection to the question. Appellant argues that "the testimony supported the previous testimony of the witness, Alcus Radney. (R-94)." We have already discussed and quoted from the testimony of Alcus Radney at page 94 of the record. No categorical answer to the question to which the objection was sustained would have tended to support the material part of the testimony of the witness, Alcus Radney, to the effect that defendant was not in her own automobile at the time the alleged victim was struck by the automobile. There was no prejudicial error committed by the sustension of State's objection to the question asked the witness Shirley Henson as to whether she remembered seeing a girl whose first name was Mildred come in the Dinner Bell.
We add to what we have stated under II above the following as to the last reference in the transcript as to what was said by any witness, any attorney, or the trial judge, as to whether any witness "knew what perjury is":
Under the above caption appellant's brief contains the following:
The material at which appellant's contention is directed is found during the following portion of the closing argument of the District Attorney:
The reference to a letter was a reference to defendant's Exhibit 1, a letter bearing the date of February 15, 1983, with the envelope postmarked Panama City, Fla., 18 Feb. 1983, addressed to Myra...
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