Piedmont Public Service Dist. v. Cowart, 2366
| Citation | 459 S.E.2d 876,319 S.C. 124 |
| Decision Date | 04 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 2366,2366 |
| Parties | PIEDMONT PUBLIC SERVICE DISTRICT, Respondent, v. Douglas W. COWART, Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Deborah R.J. Shupe, of Berry, Adams, Quakenbush & Dunbar; and Herbert W. Louthian, Jr., of Louthian & Louthian; Columbia, for appellant.
Michael A. Farry, of Horton, Drawdy, Ward & Johnson, Greenville, for respondent.
The Piedmont Public Service District (the District) brought this action against Douglas W. Cowart seeking a judgment of $30,000.00 and a declaration that Cowart's employment contract with the District was void as a matter of public policy. Cowart counterclaimed, seeking to enforce the contract and collect $11,100.48 due under the contract. The trial court granted the District's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Cowart's counterclaim. Cowart appeals. We affirm.
The Piedmont Public Service District, a special purpose district covering portions of Greenville and Anderson counties, was created by the legislature in 1955. Act No. 389, 1955 S.C. Acts 776. In 1974, the District employed Cowart as the fire chief. Cowart later was named administrator of the District. On November 1, 1984, the District and Cowart entered into an employment contract for a period of twenty years. The contract contained a termination clause which required the District to pay Cowart two years salary upon the termination of employment, even "in the event of any violation by employee." On November 4, 1985, the contract was modified to increase the severance pay period to five years, regardless of the reason for termination.
On November 12, 1992, at a regular meeting of the commissioners of the District, the commissioners announced they would go into executive session to discuss a "personnel matter." During the executive session, the commissioners voted four to one to terminate Cowart's employment without cause and to honor his employment contract. The commissioners and Cowart then signed a separate contract encompassing the severance provisions of the employment contract. The separate contract provided that Cowart would receive $37,781.40 annually for a period of five years, as required under the employment contract. The District paid Cowart $30,000.00 immediately, and agreed to pay the additional $7,781.40 on January 5, 1993. The commissioners adjourned the executive session, and announced the results of the vote to the public. Each commissioner was then publicly polled as to his understanding of the vote.
On December 4, 1992, the commissioners sent Cowart a letter advising him that the November 12 vote violated the Freedom of Information Act and, therefore, was invalid. They directed Cowart to return the $30,000.00, along with all other funds and benefits he had received. Cowart refused, and the District, at its meeting on January 5, 1993, voted to terminate Cowart for insubordination. This suit followed.
Pursuant to the District's motion for summary judgment, the trial court ruled the District's November 12 vote violated S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-70 (1991), more commonly known as the Freedom of Information Act. The court therefore ruled the vote was without effect. In addition, the trial court found the District's termination of Cowart on January 5, 1993, was proper, and Cowart's failure to return the $30,000.00 constituted insubordination. The trial court also found the twenty year employment contract with Cowart to be against public policy and void as a matter of law. The court dismissed all of Cowart's counterclaims.
The Freedom of Information Act (the Act) dictates the procedures by which public bodies must conduct their meetings. S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-70(a)(6) (1991) states:
Prior to going into executive session the public agency shall vote in public on the question and when such vote is favorable the presiding officer shall announce the specific purpose of the executive session. No formal action may be taken in executive session. As used in this item "formal action" means a recorded vote committing the body concerned to a specific course of action. No vote may be taken in executive session. (Emphasis added).
There is no dispute the District's vote to terminate Cowart took place while the District was in executive session. Because the vote was taken in violation of the requirements of the Act, the trial court held the vote was ineffective.
Cowart argues the trial court employed a hyper-technical reading of the Act. We disagree. If a statute's language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for employing rules of statutory interpretation. The court has no right to look for or impose another meaning. Miller v. Doe, 312 S.C. 444, 441 S.E.2d 319 (1994). The District clearly violated the plain language of the Act by voting while in executive session.
Cowart also contends the subsequent public ratification and polling of the commissioners satisfied the spirit of the Act, thus the vote was valid. However, an examination of the history of the Act refutes this argument. The Act originally allowed formal action to be taken in executive session if the action was later ratified in public. S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-70(a)(5) (Supp.1978) (). However, the 1987 amendments to the Act deleted the language allowing ratification of votes taken in executive session and specifically prohibited voting while in executive session. S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-70(a)(6) (Supp.1987). While a mere technical error may not constitute a violation of the Act, see Multimedia, Inc. v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 287 S.C. 521, 522, 339 S.E.2d 884, 887 (Ct.App.1986) (), given the history of the Act, we cannot characterize the District's error as merely technical. By affirmatively deleting the ratification language, the legislature made its intent clear. Ratification no longer validates a vote cast during an executive session.
Moreover, the purpose of the Act "is to protect the public from secret government activity." Bellamy v. Brown, 305 S.C. 291, 295, 408 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1991). The elimination of the ratification provision furthers this purpose. Subjecting the vote itself to the bright light of public scrutiny helps ensure that the issue is fully debated and more carefully considered, while the ratification procedure keeps the debate behind closed doors. We recognize, of course, that a public body may hold a meeting closed to the public to discuss employment, compensation, or termination of an employee. S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-70(a)(1). Moreover, there is no requirement that the details of matters properly discussed in a closed meeting be revealed to the public. See Cooper v. Bales, 268 S.C. 270, 233 S.E.2d 306 (1977). Nonetheless, requiring votes to be taken in public heightens the public awareness and understanding of the issue, and forces each member of the body to take responsibility for his vote. In fact, the case at bar provides an excellent example of the problem the Act seeks to avoid. The District apparently met in executive session for over an hour to discuss Cowart and the details of his termination. After the vote, however, the District told the public only that the commissioners
voted to dismiss and terminate Douglas Cowart without cause, and [that] he be relieved of his duties immediately. Furthermore, on this day, the same commissioners voted to honor the contract entered into between Doug Cowart and the Piedmont Public Service District on November 1st, 1984 in its entirety. The vote to terminate Doug Cowart without cause carried four to one. Commissioner Roper, is that the way you understand it?
[Response] That's the way I understand it.
Commissioner Dickson, is that the way you understand it? Commissioner McAbee, is that the way you understand it? Furthermore, to honor the contract of Doug Cowart entered into on November 1st, 1984 in its entirety, do you understand it that way?
[Response] Right.
Do you understand it? Everybody agree on that?
The District did not inform the public of the terms of the 1984 contract and that Cowart was to receive over $180,000 after being terminated. While the public knew the vote was four to one, the public did not know which commissioner voted against the termination. Clearly, the procedure used by the District satisfied neither the letter nor the spirit of the Act.
Upon finding a violation of the Act, the trial court may order equitable relief as it considers appropriate, and a violation of the statute must be considered to be an irreparable injury for which no adequate remedy at law exists. S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-100(a). The vote to terminate Cowart was taken in violation of the Act. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in ordering the equitable relief of invalidation of the vote. See Business License Opposition Comm. v. Sumter County, 311 S.C. 24, 426 S.E.2d 745 (1992) (). 1
Cowart argues the trial court erred when it found, as a matter of law, Cowart's twenty year employment contract void as a matter of public policy. We disagree.
A municipal corporation 2 is a creature of statute and has only the powers expressly granted it, those which are necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the express powers, or those powers essential to the accomplishment of its purpose. Creech v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645 (1942). Thus, while a municipal corporation has the power to enter into contract,...
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