Pierce v. Pierce
Decision Date | 11 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 2000-81-A.,2000-81-A. |
Citation | 770 A.2d 867 |
Parties | Cheryl A. PIERCE v. Paul O. PIERCE. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.
George J. Bauerle, III, Mark J. Trovato, Westerly, for Plaintiff.
Lauren E. Jones, Providence, Domenic A. Mosca, Jr./Fred J. Volpe, North Kingstown, for Defendant.
This action for modification of a final judgment of divorce before the Supreme Court addresses three questions certified to us by the Family Court. At issue is whether a parent's child support obligations extend beyond a child's twenty-first birthday when the child is a young adult with special needs. The certified questions are:
These are hard questions to answer — hard because our hearts go out to the young adults with special needs whose very lives will be affected by our answers. In the words of Abraham Lincoln:
"In this sad world of ours, sorrow comes to all; and, to the young it comes with bitterest agony because it takes them unawares."1 But, at the same time, in light of our precedent and the mandate set forth by statute, these questions easily are answered. We conclude that G.L.1956 § 15-5-16.2(b) terminates the Family Court's jurisdiction over a young adult with special needs who has reached the age of twenty-one and whose custodial parent is seeking child support. We further conclude that Siravo v. Siravo, 424 A.2d 1047 (R.I.1981), does not provide the Family Court with jurisdiction to extend a parent's responsibility for the support of a young adult with special needs beyond the age of twenty-one. Therefore, we answer the first certified question in the affirmative and the second certified question in the negative; as a result, we do not reach the third certified question.
A statement of facts was agreed to by the parties. On August 24, 1992, Cheryl A. Pierce (Cheryl or plaintiff) and Paul O. Pierce (Paul or defendant) were divorced. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Paul was ordered to pay $200 per week in support for the minor children of the parties. Furthermore, the parties recognized that Devan Pierce (Devan) was a special needs child with disabilities. Thus, Paul was ordered to pay support for Devan until she reached the age of twenty-one. However, the final judgment of divorce did not state that Cheryl was prevented from seeking support for Devan beyond the age of twenty-one, nor did it state that support automatically terminated once Devan turned twenty-one.
Subsequent to the entry of the final judgment of divorce, the parties modified the child support order, without the involvement of the Family Court, to $150 per week when the eldest child turnedeighteen and graduated from high school. In April 1997, Devan suffered an unanticipated debilitating seizure, confining her to a wheelchair. On June 5, 1999, Devan turned twenty-one.
On August 6, 1999, Paul filed a motion to terminate his child support obligation. Cheryl objected to the motion to terminate and filed a motion to continue child support payments. Paul objected to Cheryl's motion. The parties appeared before the Family Court in Washington County. After reviewing the memoranda prepared by the parties in support of their arguments, the trial justice certified three questions to this Court. We address the certified questions in sequence.
The Certification General Laws 1956 § 9-24-27 provides in pertinent part that:
"Whenever in any proceedings * * * in the [S]uperior [C]ourt or in any [D]istrict [C]ourt, any question of law shall arise or the constitutionality of an act of the [G]eneral [A]ssembly shall be brought in question upon the record, which, in the opinion of the court * * * is of such doubt and importance and so affects the merits of the controversy that it ought to be determined by the [S]upreme [C]ourt before further proceedings, the court in which the cause is pending shall certify the question or motion to the [S]upreme [C]ourt for that purpose and stay all further proceedings until the question is heard and determined * * * ."
"[J]ustices of the [F]amily [C]ourt shall have, insofar as they are applicable, the same obligations and duties as [S]uperior [C]ourt justices, and in all matters within the jurisdiction of the court shall be vested with all of the prerogatives and authority of associate justices of the [S]uperior [C]ourt." G.L.1956 § 8-10-43. This Court has found that § 8-10-43 makes § 9-24-27 applicable to the Family Court, and "authorize[s] Family Court justices, like their Superior and District Court counterparts, to certify questions to this Court `of such doubt and importance and [that] so affect[] the merits of thecontroversy that [they] ought to be determined by the [S]upreme [C]ourt before further proceedings.'" Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 963 n. 3 (R.I.2000).
However, "certification require[s] more than just simply being a question on which a justice [is] unwilling at the time to make an immediate ruling." Bayview Towing, Inc. v. Stevenson, 676 A.2d 325, 329 (R.I.1996) (citing Tillinghast v. Johnson, 34 R.I. 136, 139, 82 A. 788, 790 (1912)). Our case law explicitly prescribes what is required of a trial justice before he or she can certify questions of doubt and importance to this Court. We have previously stated that:
Richardson v. Bevilacqua, 115 R.I. 49, 52, 340 A.2d 118, 119-20 (1975) (quoting Easton v. Fessenden, 63 R.I. 11, 14, 6 A.2d 714, 715 (1939)).
This Court has "consistently and repeatedly mandated that a trial or hearing justice should not certify a question of law to Court unless and until he or she first carefully considers the question or questions sought to be certified and then, after having had the benefit of counsels' research and informed arguments, believes that he or she is unable to resolve the question satisfactorily." Bayview Towing, Inc., 676 A.2d at 329 (citing Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Martin, 671 A.2d 798 (R.I.1996); Richardson v. Bevilacqua, 115 R.I. 49, 340 A.2d 118 (1975); Jerome v. Pratt, 111 R.I. 56, 298 A.2d 806 (1973); State v. Flynn, 100 R.I. 520, 217 A.2d 432 (1966); Easton v. Fessenden, 63 R.I. 11, 6 A.2d 714 (1939)). By making a ruling or decision, after the benefit of counsels' research and arguments, and then certifying a question to this Court, the trial justice — in the instant case, the Family Court justice — creates a thorough record and provides this Court with the benefit of his or her reasoning and rationale in making our decision. There is no reason why the distinguished Family Court justice who presided over this matter below could not have decided these questions in the first instance. That being said, and to avoid any further delay, we address the merits of this case.
Does § 15-5-16.2(b) Terminate the Family Court's Jurisdiction over a Young Adult with Special Needs who Has Reached the Age of Twenty-One and whose Custodial Parent is Seeking Continued Child Support?
"The Family Court possesses limited jurisdiction, and its authority to take action in a specific situation or to provide a particular type of relief must be granted by statute." Furia v. Furia, 638 A.2d 548, 552 (R.I.1994) (citing Adam v. Adam, 624 A.2d 1093, 1098 (R.I.1993)); see also Carr v. Prader, 725 A.2d 291, 293 (R.I.1999)
(). Furthermore, "[t]he Family Court's ability to compel the parties to pay support is limited by the statutory authority that the Legislature has granted to the court." Olivieri v. Olivieri, 760 A.2d 1246, 1251 (R.I.2000). Section 15-5-16.2(b), which governs child support, provides that:
(Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff argues that this section does not terminate the Family Court's jurisdiction over a young adult with special needs who has reached the age of twenty-one.
Our canons of statutory construction are well-established. "Generally when a statute expresses a clear and unambiguous meaning, the task of interpretation is at an end and this [C]ourt will apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words set forth in the statute."...
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