Pierce v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 43265

• Decision Date: 06 June 1973
• Docket Number: No. 43265,43265
• Citation: 279 So.2d 281
• Parties: Edward Delano PIERCE, Petitioner, v. PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 281

279 So.2d 281

Edward Delano PIERCE, Petitioner, v. PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, et al., Respondents.

No. 43265.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 6, 1973.

Rehearing Denied July 23, 1973.

Paul A. Gamba of the Law Offices of C. R. McDonald, Jr., Fort Pierce, for petitioner.

Michael Jeffries, of Neill, Griffin, Jeffries & Lloyd, Fort Pierce, and Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., Florida Industrial Relations Commission, Tallahassee, for respondents.

ROBERTS, Justice.

By petition for writ of certiorari, we have for review an order of the Industrial Relations Commission reversing and remanding this cause to the Judge of Industrial Claims for further findings of fact.

Claimant Pierce allegedly sustained an industrial accident on May 12, 1971, while he was at work at Piper Aircraft Corporation instructing several employees, and as a result of which accident, petitioner contends a disc in his back was ruptured. Respondent controverted on the ground that the claimant had not sustained an industrial accident and was, therefore, entitled to no benefits. Finding that claimant had suffered a compensable injury, the Judge awarded future medical care and treatment as the nature of claimant's injuries shall require, temporary total disability until such time as claimant shall reach maximum medical improvement, and in the event that claimant commences earnings prior to that time, shall pay claimant temporary partial disability. In entering said order, the Judge made the following findings, inter alia:

'3. I further find that the claimant sustained a compensable industrial accident on May 12, 1971, in which he injured his back, and due to that back injury, he had to undergo a laminectomy, and the claimant has not reached his point of maximum medical improvement so that the full nature of this injury cannot yet be fully determined, assessed and evaluated, and that the claimant will be entitled to temporary total disability or temporary partial disability, as provided by statute, for this injury.

'4. It is my finding of fact that EDWARD DELANO PIERCE on May 12, 1970 (sic), while working over a mold, at Piper Aircraft, first sustained a burning sensation in his back when he reached up to pull the mold down, and shortly thereafter while leaning over with a trim knife, trimming said mold, he sneezed, and at that point had knots in his back, and I find that this is the point of time in which the claimant ruptured a disc in his back, and that this is a compensable injury incurred in the course of the claimant's employment, and for which he is entitled to compensation as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act.

'5. In making this finding of fact, I reject the testimony or inference from any witness to anything contrary. There is a question from the testimony of Nurse Donovan as to whether this accident happened on May 11 or May 12, and I find that it was May 12, and I further find that if it were May 11, that that would be irrelevant and immaterial and would not change my finding of fact in this case.

'6. I further find that the employer had knowledge of an industrial accident, that it is recorded on May 13, 1971, in the employee's record with the employer company, that the accident as described by the claimant is a compensable accident and that he is entitled to the requested compensation benefits.

'7. I further find from the testimony of Mr. Myers that the claimant did recite to him a history of accident on the next day, and I further find from the nurse's notes that the claimant was seen by her after advising Mr. Myers of his accident, and that on May 13, 1971, the claimant became temporarily and totally disabled and has been temporarily and and totally disabled from that date to the date of the hearing, and can now only do limited work, and has not reached his point of maximum medical improvement.'

The Industrial Relations Commission quoted brief excerpts from the above findings and then concluded that the critical findings of the Judge were devoid of and unsupported elsewhere by,

'. . . a statement of rationale or findings of fact which would resolve or attempt to resolve the fulsome evidence, both testimonial and documentary, subversive of the abovequoted findings (conclusions) of the Judge of Industrial Claims. The record fairly teems with evidence contradictory of, or contrary to, the abovestated findings of the Judge, and a brief review of that evidence is in order for reasons hereinafter stated.'

The Commission further explained that,

'It is apodictic that the Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims is not to be disturbed so long as it is foundationed by competent, substantial evidence according with logic and reason. U.S. Casualty Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 So.2d 741 (Fla.1951). But the foregoing rule does not empower the Judge of Industrial Claims to enter a conclusionary Order devoid of the findings of fact explanatory of whatever peremptory resolution of conflicts he might subliminally have made, as here. Ball v. Mann, 75 So.2d 758, 760 (1954). Such findings of fact are prerequisite to an intelligent review on appeal of the Order of the Judge of Industrial Claims. Brown v. Griffin, 229 So.2d 225 (Fla.1969); Hardy v. City of Tarpon Springs, 81 So.2d 503 (Fla.1955). Absent such a sufficiency of findings, this Commission or the Supreme Court must be rendered unable to determine whether the Judge of Industrial Claims fairly and properly adjudicated the cause or merely immediately came to a conclusion--in derogation of the mediated conclusion which the law requires of Judges.'

Respecting the requirement imposed upon the Judge of Industrial Claims in making findings of fact, this Court has set out certain guidelines. In Ball v. Mann, 75 So.2d 758, 760 (Fla.1954), this Court declared,

'In disposing of a claim for compensation, a Deputy Commissioner has a duty to make findings of fact. Section 440.25(3)(b), F.S.1951, F.S.A. Mere recitals of the evidence do not satisfy this requirement. A Deputy Commissioner should resolve all conflicts in the evidence upon material matters and make specific findings of fact sufficient to show clearly the basis for the award. By adherence to this procedure, the record will advise the litigants, and they are entitled to know, of the facts taken into consideration in assessing an award and will facilitate the task of any reviewing authority.'

Subsequently in Hardy v....