Pierce v. State

• Decision Date: 06 May 2014
• Docket Number: 111,419,111,420.,Nos. 111,418,s. 111,418
• Citation: 327 P.3d 530
• Parties: Phillip Ryan PIERCE, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

327 P.3d 530

Phillip Ryan PIERCE, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant/Appellant.

Nos. 111,418, 111,419, 111,420.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 6, 2014.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION IV.

¶ 0 The plaintiff/appellee, Phillip Ryan Pierce (Pierce/driver), appealed the suspension of his driver's license by the defendant/appellant, State of Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Public Safety (State/Department), in an administrative proceeding for driving under the influence (DUI). Pierce alleged that the Department's delay of a revocation hearing for a period of approximately twenty (20) months violated his right to a speedy trial under the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6. The trial court agreed, setting aside the revocation order and reinstating Pierce's driving privileges. A divided Court of Civil Appeals reversed. Although expressing its concern related to the inordinate delay in the proceedings, the appellate court determined that Pierce had not asserted his right to a speedy resolution of his cause, was not prejudiced by the postponement, and that the Department did not abuse its discretion in waiting almost two years to finalize the charges in the cause. Here, the driver lived under the cloud of a pending revocation proceeding for approximately twenty (20) months. Knowing that its complaining witness was scheduled to be deployed to serve his country, the Department intentionally postponed the proceeding and did not schedule a hearing to allow the driver to be heard either on the merits or on the delay. The Department took these actions although the arresting officer would have been available for a hearing during the five (5) months and, on an emergency basis, for three (3) additional months preceding his deployment and delayed the hearing for more than a month after the officer returned stateside. These delays occurred despite the driver's timely request for a hearing. Under these unique facts, we hold that the driver's right to a speedy hearing, guaranteed by the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6, was violated and order reinstatement of his driving privileges.

COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

Barry K. Roberts, Norman, Oklahoma, Dave Stockwell, Stockwell Law Offices, Norman, Oklahoma, for plaintiff/appellee.

Brian Kieth Morton, Department of Public Safety, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for defendant/appellant.

WATT, J.:

¶ 1 Certiorari was granted to address a single issue.¹ Was the delay of approximately twenty months in scheduling a revocation hearing aimed at suspending the driving privileges of the plaintiff/appellee was a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6? ²

¶ 2 The driver lived under the cloud of a pending revocation proceeding for some twenty (20) months. Knowing that its complaining witness was scheduled to be deployed to serve his country, the Department intentionally delayed a hearing, not only depriving the driver of being heard on the merits but also denying his opportunity to oppose the delay. It did so despite the fact that the arresting officer was available to testify for the five (5) months preceding deployment. He could also have been called to testify via subpoena, on an emergency basis for an additional, three (3) months.³ Once he returned from his assignment, the Department again was slow to docket the proceeding, waiting for more than a month after the officer returned stateside. The unwarranted delay to schedule an administrative proceeding occurred despite the driver's timely request for a hearing. We hold that, under the unique facts presented, the driver's right to a speedy hearing, guaranteed by the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6, was violated and order reinstatement of his driving privileges.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 3 On October 31, 2010, Pierce was stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated by a University of Oklahoma police officer, Sergeant Bishop. Bishop then contacted Officer Hewett (Hewett), who with the aide of another officer, administered field tests to detect intoxication. Pierce failed these tests and a blood sample was taken. Hewitt executed an arrest. The following day, on November 1, 2010, Pierce filed a timely request for an administrative hearing to contest revocation of his driver's license.⁴

¶ 4 For a period of approximately eight months following the driver's request for a hearing, Hewitt was in the United States. In April of that year, he was called to active duty as a member of the Oklahoma National Guard. Nevertheless, he was able to attend court in Cleveland County during this period. Furthermore, the arresting officer testified that he could have been available for a hearing on an emergency basis until he left the country in July 2011 for Kuwait.⁵ Hewett was back in Cleveland County by April of 2012. However, the administrative hearing, requested in November of 2010, did not take place until approximately twenty (20) months later on June 8, 2012. At the conclusion of the hearing, Pierce's drivers' license was suspended for one-hundred-and-eighty (180) days. Less than a week later, the driver appealed the revocation to the district court.⁶

¶ 5 The district court heard the matter on August 16, 2012. Although Pierce did not dispute the procedures or results of the tests and investigation, he did argue that his constitutional right to a speedy resolution of the cause, as guaranteed by the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6, ⁷ was denied. The trial court agreed and reversed and vacated Pierce's driving prohibition, reinstating his drivers' license. Over a vigorous dissent, the majority of the Court of Civil Appeals reversed.

¶ 6 Pierce filed a petition for rehearing before the Court of Civil Appeals which was denied on December 13, 2013. Thereafter, the driver filed a timely petition for certiorari on January 2, 2014. The Department filed for an extension to respond thereto. The response was received on February 3rd to which Pierce replied on the 13th. The record was received from the Court of Civil Appeals on March 25, 2014. Certiorari was granted the same day.

Constitutional issues are subject to de novo review.

¶ 7 Whether an individual's procedural due process rights have been violated is a question of constitutional fact which is reviewed de novo.⁸De novo review requires an independent, non-deferential re-examination of the administrative agency's legal rulings.⁹

¶ 8 The right to a speedy and certain remedy without delay, in a civil proceeding, is one of the rights enjoyed by Oklahoma citizens, ¹⁰ including drivers having a recognized property interest ¹¹ in the license that allows them to travel freely through the utilization of an automotive vehicle. In determining whether Pierce suffered a deprivation of that right in this civil proceeding, we consider four factors: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the party's assertion of the right; and 4) the prejudice to the party occasioned by the delay.¹²

¶ 9 Under the unique facts presented, the twenty (20) month delay in scheduling an administrative hearing violated the driver's right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Okla. Const. art. 2, § 6.

¶ 10 a) The Department had a sufficient period of time, between five and eight months, to either present the arresting officer to testify or to secure his testimony in some other appropriate manner.

¶ 11 The Department asserts that its delay of some twenty (20) months in scheduling a revocation proceeding in the instant cause is justified, largely on an argument that its complaining witness was unavailable. Pierce points out that for a minimum of five (5) months following his being detained, the arresting officer was easily available to testify in a proceeding in Cleveland County and could have been made available, on an emergency basis, for the following three months.¹³ In an alternative argument, the Department insists that budgetary and personnel matters kept it from setting Pierce's revocation hearing at an earlier date. The Department's arguments are unconvincing.

¶ 12 The most troubling factor in this cause is the one that the trial court recognized,a delay of some twenty (20) months when, for a period of some eight (8) months, the Department's witness was available and able to testify either in person or telephonically. Originally, the Department blamed the delay on budget cuts, limited personnel, and the number of DUI's being filed.¹⁴ This argument makes the Department's assertion that the delay was “totally ... due to the unavailability of the witness” less than convincing.¹⁵

¶ 13 b) The delay in scheduling of an administrative hearing rests entirely with the Department.

¶ 14 All the facts indicate that the driver acted in a timely fashion from the date of his arrest until the time of filing for certiorari to have this matter resolved at the first opportunity. However, the Department, on February 8, 2011, three months before the arresting officer actually left the United States and two months after the Department received the results of Pierce's blood tests, asked the arresting officer to compile a list of cases which needed to be postponed because he would be the testifying witness. In so doing, the Department advised the arresting officer's supervisor that the appeal to the district court might be heard three months in the future.¹⁶ Clearly, at least in this case, if the Department had acted promptly in hearing the matter, i.e. by filing the cause shortly after having received the blood level evidence, absence of the arresting officer for appeal purposes would have presented no problem as this would have afforded the Department a minimum of five (5) months and a maximum of eight (8) months to complete the appeal.

¶ 15 The ultimate responsibility for the delay was the Department's deliberate actionin postponing the cause.

Such a delay weighs heavily against the...