Pierce v. State, M2020-00533-COA-R3-CV
| Decision Date | 25 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. M2020-00533-COA-R3-CV,M2020-00533-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | CURTIS PIERCE ET AL. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission
James A. Halton, Commissioner
This is a negligence case that was dismissed in the Tennessee Claims Commission for several articulated reasons, including that Tennessee's recreational use statute barred the plaintiffs' claims. For the specific reasons stated herein, we affirm the decision of the Claims Commission.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Claims Commission Affirmed
Christopher Smith and David Randolph Smith, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Curtis Pierce and Hannah Pierce.
Herbert H. Slattery, III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; and Heather C. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINIONThis case stems from a tragic accident at Cummins Falls State Park ("the Park") on June 9, 2019, when Steven Pierce, the two-year-old son of Curtis and Hannah Pierce,drowned after a flash flood at the Park. Following the death of Steven, his parents ("the Pierces") sought to hold the State of Tennessee ("the State") liable and, in alleging negligent and grossly negligent behavior, contended that the State had breached a duty to make the Park safe for visitors. The operative complaint against the State, filed in the Claims Commission, averred that the State owned the Park and that its immunity had been waived against the asserted claims in the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(C) and section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E). As part of their allegations, the Pierces also averred that certain assumed duties had been breached by the State.
According to the complaint, the Pierces traveled with their son to the Park on the date of the underlying incident from their home in Eddyville, Kentucky. They had never been to the Park before and were accompanied by Mr. Pierce's brother and a family friend. The Park had been closed the previous two days because of rain, and rain was also in the weather forecast on the date of the Pierces' trip to the Park. Sometime between noon and 12:30 p.m., the National Weather Service called officials at the Park and advised that rain was coming to the area.
The Pierce family arrived at the Park around 2:00 p.m., and upon their arrival, Park Rangers instructed the family to "be safe" and "get out of the water if you hear the whistle blow." Later, sometime between 3:00 and 3:30 p.m., Mr. Pierce arrived at the falls area with Steven. The weather was clear at that time.
The State provides life jackets adjacent to the swimming hole area, not at the "Trail Waypoint," where the "Falls Route," a .5 mile route that proceeds along the water's edge, begins. Mr. Pierce placed a State-provided life jacket on his son, but he returned it to the life jacket station adjacent to the falls as required before beginning to make his way out of the Park at approximately 5:00 p.m.
As Mr. Pierce began his return back along the Falls Route with his son in his arms, Park Rangers suddenly blew their whistles. Floodwaters had begun to pour over the falls. Park Rangers told guests to get out of the water and to go back towards the Trail Waypoint. Subsequently, Park Rangers changed their instructions, telling guests to instead seek high ground. The Pierces' family friend, who was behind Mr. Pierce and his son, called to Mr. Pierce to try to convey the new instructions from the Rangers, but when he turned to Mr. Pierce, he saw him trying in vain to grab on to rocks and then saw the floodwaters sweep Mr. Pierce and his son around the bend. Tragically, Steven Pierce was ultimately swept from his father's arms and drowned.
As detailed in the complaint, another deadly flash flood incident had previously occurred at the Park in 2017. During that event, one woman drowned after being swept away in a flash flood, and another died during the search for the woman who was swept away. As with the 2019 incident at issue, the weather was clear at the time the flash flooding began in 2017. Although the Park announced plans to install water gaugesfollowing the 2017 event in order to better monitor rising water levels upstream, these plans were not implemented before the death of the Pierces' son.
After the Pierces filed their complaint, the State moved to dismiss it on the ground that it was barred by Tennessee's recreational use statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101 et seq. Under the recreational use statute, a "landowner, lessee, occupant, or any person in control of land or premises," subject to certain exceptions, "owes no duty of care to keep such land or premises safe for entry or use by others for . . . [certain][2] recreational activities." Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. In the same vein, absent a delineated exception, the landowner is not required to give any warning of "hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such land or premises to any person entering on such land or premises for [recreational purposes.]" Id. The State further asserted that the Pierces' action fell outside of Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E), which, as noted earlier, was one of the statutory provisions relied upon by the Pierces for a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity.
The Claims Commission subsequently entered an order dismissing the Pierces' complaint. A review of the order reflects that the Claims Commission considered all asserted claims to be barred by the recreational use statute. As to the Pierces' pursuit of relief under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E), the Claims Commission also specifically concluded that the Pierces were "not the types of persons covered by the statute." Moreover, as to the Pierces' attempt to recover for breach of assumed duties pursuant to the principles codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(c), the Claims Commission separately held that such a theory was not tenable on sovereign immunity grounds. This appeal followed.
At issue in this appeal is the Claims Commission's dismissal of the Pierces' complaint. "We review a trial court's resolution of a motion to dismiss de novo with no presumption of correctness." Woodruff by and through Cockrell v. Walker, 542 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). Part of our discussion on appeal involves questions of statutory interpretation. The construction of a statute is also a question of law which is reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 308 (Tenn. 2012). Statutory construction starts with an examination of the statute's language, and when the import of a statute is unambiguous, we discern legislative intent from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language employed. Id. When a statute is ambiguous, however, courts may reference "the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources." Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011). Also at issue is the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission,another question of law that we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Mullins v. State, 320 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Tenn. 2010).
This appeal involves the consideration of two separate legal concepts of immunity. The first concept—that of sovereign immunity—is triggered for our consideration due to the fact that the State is the defendant in this action. The second legal concept at issue relates to the application of Tennessee's recreational use statute, a statute which our Supreme Court has noted "provides the State with limited immunity for injuries occurring on state-owned property during recreational use." Parent v. State, 991 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tenn. 1999).3
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been a part of the common law of Tennessee for well over a century and derives from feudal notions of the divine right of kings. Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Tenn. 1997). The doctrine provides that a lawsuit may not be brought against a governmental entity unless that entity has consented to be sued. Id. Our own State Constitution reflects the doctrine. Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000). Article 1, section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution states that "[s]uits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct." As is relevant here, we observe that the Legislature has "waived [the State's] sovereign immunity as to certain actions brought before the Tennessee Claims Commission." Brown v. State, 333 S.W.3d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Morton v. State, No. M2008-02305-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3295202, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2009)).
The specific categories of claims for which suits against the State are authorized are listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1) (). At issue here are the categories listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(C) and Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-307(a)(1)(E):
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