Pierce v. The State Of Ga.
| Decision Date | 31 July 1874 |
| Citation | 53 Ga. 365 |
| Parties | James L. Pierce, plaintiff in error. v. The State of Georgia,defendant in error. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
*Criminal law. Witness. Evidence. Charge of Court. Drunkenness. Before Judge McCutchen. Bartow Superior Court. September Adjourned Term, 1873.
James L. Pierce was indicted for the offense of using obscene and vulgar language in the presence of Lucinthia E. Jones, a female, on March 31st, 1871. He pleaded not guilty. There was no question made by the evidence except as to the fact of the use of the language charged. The jury found the defendant guilty, but recommended him to the mercy of the court. The errors complained of will sufficiently appear from the motion for a new trial, together with the following synopsis of a portion of the testimony:
Mrs. Jones testified as to the use of the language charged, and that she asked the defendant at the time if he was drunk or crazy; to which he replied that he was neither, but was under the influence of morphine, and felt "mighty good;" that no one was present except the witness and the defendant.
It was disclosed that the defendant was the pastor of the Methodist church in Cartersville; that the same afternoon the offense is alleged to have been committed, he performed the funeral service at the burial of a Mrs. Espy, a member of his church: that shortly after (the evidence does not disclose the intervening time) the discharge of this pastoral duty, he went to the house of Mrs. Jones, when the obscene and vulgar language according to the evidence for the state, was used. The prosecution proved, over the objection of the defendant, by James E. Roberts and Agnes Terrell, facts tending to show that he was under the influence of stimulants from the time of leaving the residence from which the corpse was taken, to his return from the grave-yard. These witnesses were allowed to give their opinions, based on the facts testified to by them, that the defendant was drunk. Evidence was also introduced tending to show that he was sober.
It is impossible to gather from the record the exact time which elapsed between the defendant's departure from theformer residence of Mrs. Espy, and his arrival at the house *of Mrs. Jones. It appeared that the funeral service at the grave was unusually short.
A motion for a new trial was made upon the following grounds:
1st. Because the court allowed the witnesses, James E. Roberts and Agnes Terrell, to testify that the defendant was drunk on the day and immediately preceding the time of the alleged offense.
2d. Because the court allowed these witnesses to give their opinions that the defendant was drunk at the time aforesaid.
3d. Because the court refused to charge the jury as follows: "The speaking of the words charged in the indictment, to be a crime, must have been an insult to Mrs. Jones at the time they were uttered, and if the evidence showed that the words were spoken to her and in her presence, and were not offensive to her, they were not criminal and the defendant should be acquitted."
4th. Because the court charged the jury as follows:
The motion was overruled and the defendant excepted.
Warren Akin; ABDA Johnson; William T. Wofford, for plaintiff in error, cited the following authorities.
1st. Evidence as to drunkenness inadmissible: Roscoe's Ev. 1st., 57; 1 Green. Ev.. sections 51, 52.
2d. Opinions as to drunkenness inadmissible: Code, section 3867; 24 Ga. R.. 518; 36 Ibid., 64; 38 Ibid., 409; 45 Ibid., 443. 3d. Charge erroneous as to credibility of witness who had *sworn falsely; 1 Starkie\'s Ev., section 520; 7 Wheat., 283; 13 Ga. R., 512; 23 Ibid., 297; Ibid.. 576.
4th. Request to charge should have been given: 41 Ga. R., 278; 14 Peter's R., 198; 24 Pick. R., 370. A. T. HackeTT, solicitor general; J. A. W. Johnson; John W. Wofford, for the state.
1st. Opinions of witnesses as to drunkenness, based on facts, admissible: Code, section 3867; 10 Ga. R., 511; 12 Ibid., 257, 271; 31 Ibid., 465; 38 Ibid., 409; 6 Ibid., 244; 20 Ibid., 480, 600; 24 Ibid., 518; 30 Ibid., 116; 17 Ibid., 484; 24 Ibid., 26.
2d. Charge as to credibility of witness correct: 13 Ga. R., 508; 22 Ibid., 478; 23 Ibid., 216; 34 Ibid., 339; 47 Ibid, 71; Code, section 3875.
The grounds taken in the motion for a new trial are considered in the inverse order from what they appear in the motion.
1. In the case of Morris Fishel v. Lockard & Ireland, 52 Georgia Reports, 632, the judge of the superior court, on the trial thereof, charged the jury, that "if a witness swears willfully and knowingly false, even to a collateral fact, his testimony ought to be rejected entirely, unless it be so corroborated by-circumstances or other unimpeached evidence, as to be irresistible." Upon a review of that charge it was held to be error, and that although the charge was in the words of the head-note to the case of Ivey v. The State, 23 Georgia, 236, upon an examination of the judgment of the court in that case, it did not sustain the rule to the full extent to which it went in the head-note. It was also said that it was much broader than the rule stated in Day & Company v. Crawford, 13 Georgia, 508, which is, that "if a witness swears willfully false upon any one material point, the jury are at liberty to disregard his testimony altogether unless corroborated by circumstances, or other unimpeachable evidence." *Reference was also made to the decision in McLean v. Clark, 47 Georgia, 508, in which it is held that "the point upon which the untruth is stated must be material." We think the true rule to be deduced from these decisions, and one that is proper to be given in charge to the jury when the question arises, is, if a witness knowingly and willfully swears falsely...
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State v. Boyles
...the one generally approved by the courts where unaffected by statutory provision, and in our view correctly states the law. (Pierce v. State, 53 Ga. 365; v. State, 75 Neb. 153, 106 N.W. 421; Bonnie v. Earll, 12 Mont. 239, 29 P. 882.) An instruction based on the maxim, Falsus in uno, falsus ......
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Meeks v. Lunsford
...this sense, it is opinion testimony, although not expert opinion testimony. See Green, Ga. Law of Evidence, §§ 110-112. See also Pierce v. State, 53 Ga. 365. Such foundation may be laid by showing that the witness had an opportunity to observe and did observe the person alleged to have been......
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Roberts v. State
...In Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, it was held competent for witnesses to state that the accused "appeared to be drinking." In Pierce v. State, 53 Ga. 365, it was held that, where it was competent to prove drunkenness, a witness might give his opinion thereon, after stating the facts on which ......
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Roberts v. State
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