Piersall v. SportsVision of Chicago, 1-90-1963

Decision Date26 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1-90-1963,1-90-1963
Parties, 172 Ill.Dec. 40, 20 Media L. Rep. 1223 James A. PIERSALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SPORTSVISION OF CHICAGO, an Illinois joint venture, Edward Einhorn, Jerold Reinsdorf, National Broadcasting Company, Inc., an owned and operated subsidiary of RCA Corp., d/b/a WMAQ Radio, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Law Offices of Joseph V. Roddy, Chicago (Joseph V. Roddy, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Katten Muchin & Zavis, Chicago (Donald E. Egan, Kirk T. Hartley and Carole J. Ryczek, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, James Piersall (Piersall), appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, Jerry Reinsdorf (Reinsdorf) and Edward Einhorn (Einhorn) as to counts I, II, and IV of his amended complaint. 1 Counts I and II alleged that Reinsdorf and Einhorn tortiously interfered with Piersall's business relationship and contract with WMAQ radio, and count IV alleged that Reinsdorf libeled Piersall by calling him a liar. 2 On appeal, plaintiff contends that: (1) he sufficiently alleged a cause of action against Reinsdorf for defamation in count IV of his amended complaint, and (2) that counts I and II are sufficient to show that Reinsdorf engaged in tortious interference of contract. Reinsdorf cross-appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in permitting the continued prosecution of this action in light of Piersall's alleged unverified answers to interrogatories. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following relevant facts. Piersall is a former All-Star major league baseball outfielder. In 1981, Reinsdorf and Einhorn, owners of the Chicago White Sox baseball team, hired Piersall for the 1981 and 1982 baseball seasons as a broadcast commentator on "SportsVision," a cable television program that they owned and operated. During that time, Piersall was also employed by NBC-owned radio station WMAQ as an announcer and talk show host. On April 5, 1983, following the first White Sox game of the season, Einhorn and Reinsdorf discharged Piersall as a SportsVision broadcaster.

On September 19, 1983, in the course of interviews after the game in which the White Sox clinched the 1983 American League Western Division title, reporters asked Reinsdorf about Piersall and Harry Caray, another former White Sox announcer. In response to questions posed by reporters, Reinsdorf was quoted as making the following statements about Piersall and Caray:

"I don't mind criticism, but they both told a lot of lies. They wanted us to lose. They thought they were bigger than the club and did not want the attraction shifting to the field." (Chicago Sun-Times, September 19, 1983);

and

"The public could not know the truth about them; they are both liars. They both said things on the air they knew were not true." (Chicago Tribune, September 19, 1983).

On the following day, September 20, 1983, during a radio interview on the Wally Phillips Show, Reinsdorf stated:

"But I also think people would not have listened to these two people if they had realized what kind of character they actually had and I just felt that I wanted to go public because I don't mind criticism but what I have never been able to understand [is] lying and they just lied."

The above remarks are the subject of the alleged libel in count IV of Piersall's amended complaint.

On November 2, 1983, Piersall was discharged from his WMAQ talk show host position. In counts I and II, Piersall contends that Reinsdorf conspired to interfere with his business relationship with WMAQ and coerced WMAQ's management into terminating his employment contract.

Defendants presented a motion for summary judgment on counts I, II, and IV, and submitted a number of affidavits and depositions in support thereof. The trial court granted defendants' motion, concluding that there were no facts that would support a finding of actual malice on the defamation count and that there was no evidence of tortious interference. This timely appeal followed.

Piersall contends that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment as to the defamation action contained in count IV of the amended complaint. Piersall concedes that he is a public figure, and argues that he has proved that Reinsdorf's statements were made with "actual malice" as required by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, and extended to public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967), 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094.

To establish actual malice, a defamation plaintiff must show that (1) the utterance was false and (2) that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true. (New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280, 84 S.Ct. at 726.) "Reckless disregard" has been defined as proceeding to publish the defamatory matter despite a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or entertaining serious doubts as to its truth. St. Amant v. Thompson (1968), 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262; Mittelman v. Witous (1989), 135 Ill.2d 220, 142 Ill.Dec. 232, 552 N.E.2d 973.

The burden of proving malice is on the party claiming injury. (Vantassell-Matin v. Nelson (N.D.Ill.1990), 741 F.Supp. 698, 706.) This burden is not satisfied by the bare allegation that a defendant acted maliciously and with knowledge of the falsity of the statement; the plaintiff must allege facts from which actual malice may be inferred. Vantassell, 741 F.Supp. at 706 (citing American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Association (1982), 106 Ill.App.3d 626, 632, 62 Ill.Dec. 325, 435 N.E.2d 1297).

At the summary judgment stage, a judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. (Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986), 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202.) When a motion for summary judgment is made by a defendant in a defamation case, the plaintiff must set forth by "clear and convincing" evidence that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant made an alleged defamatory statement with actual malice. (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Reed v. Northwestern Publishing Co. (1988), 124 Ill.2d 495, 512, 125 Ill.Dec. 316, 324, 530 N.E.2d 474, 482.) Summary judgment may be granted in favor of the defendant where the plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact by presenting clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made his allegedly libelous statements with actual malice. (Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.) The party opposing summary judgment cannot rely upon his complaint or answer alone to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co. (1974), 57 Ill.2d 376, 380, 313 N.E.2d 457.

Reinsdorf argues that the granting of summary judgment was proper because there was no genuine issue of material fact over whether he made his statements with actual malice. In his amended complaint, Piersall alleged that Reinsdorf "falsely and maliciously, with the intent to injure and destroy Piersall's good name * * * made certain false and defamatory remarks." Reinsdorf supported his motion for summary judgment with his own sworn affidavit wherein he delineated a number of statements made by Piersall that Reinsdorf knew were not true, and that Reinsdorf had in mind at the time that he made the statements that Piersall was a liar.

In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Piersall relied upon the allegations of his amended complaint supported by his own affidavit. Therein, Piersall admitted to making a number of the statements, knowing them to be untrue, but insisting in some instances that the statements were made in jest.

For example, Reinsdorf states in his affidavit that in 1981, in the course of a television interview, Piersall said that the wives of the baseball players did not understand the game of baseball and were merely "horny broads * * * who say yes very easily." Reinsdorf testified that he had met and knew the wives of various baseball players and thought that Piersall's statement was false. Piersall responds that this statement was "a quick pop goofy answer" to an interview question, and admits that the White Sox suspended him for making the remark.

Reinsdorf testifies to various statements by Piersall regarding Tony LaRussa, the White Sox' manager, that he knew to be untrue. After the "horny broads" statement, Piersall made a statement to the effect that LaRussa threatened Reinsdorf that he would not bring the White Sox players onto the field if Piersall was in the broadcasting booth. Reinsdorf knew that LaRussa had not made that threat to Piersall. Piersall admits that he made the statement about LaRussa based upon information he received from a young White Sox intern, whom he did not know by name, and that he had no other indication that the players were being kept off the field. Piersall also admits that the players were not kept off the field.

On September 10, 1981, Reinsdorf saw a newspaper article which quoted Piersall as saying on a television broadcast, "I have never ripped Tony LaRussa on the air." Reinsdorf stated that he heard Piersall criticize LaRussa on the air too many times to count in broadcasts prior to September 10, 1981. Piersall admits that he did criticize LaRussa during broadcasts prior to September 10, 1981.

Reinsdorf further testifies that Piersall made an untrue statement regarding an altercation he had had with sportswriter Bob Gallas in 1980. On Piersall's call-in radio program on May 22, 1983, Piersall denied choking Gallas, insisting instead that he held Gallas for only three seconds. Reinsdorf...

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