Pietri v. State

• Decision Date: 26 August 2004
• Docket Number: No. SC02-2314, No. SC03-1044.
• Parties: Norberto PIETRI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Norberto Pietri, Petitioner, v. James V. Crosby, Jr., etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

885 So.2d 245

Norberto PIETRI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Norberto Pietri, Petitioner, v. James V. Crosby, Jr., etc., Respondent.

Nos. SC02-2314, SC03-1044.

Supreme Court of Florida.

August 26, 2004.

Rehearing Denied October 18, 2004.

Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel and William M. Hennis, III, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant/Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General and Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Appellee/Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

Norberto Pietri appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Pietri also petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's order denying Pietri's motion for postconviction relief and further deny his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Norberto Pietri was adjudicated guilty of the 1988 murder of West Palm Beach police officer Brian Chappell. See Pietri v. State, 644 So.2d 1347, 1349 (Fla.1994)

.¹ The facts surrounding the murder of Officer Chappell were fully detailed in our direct appeal opinion. See id. at 1350. The jury, by a vote of eight to four, recommended that a sentence of death be imposed, and, following that recommendation, the trial court entered a sentence of death. See id. The trial court found that four aggravating circumstances were present: (1) the murder was committed by someone under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) the murder was committed while Pietri was fleeing after committing a burglary; (3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP); and (4) the murder was committed to avoid arrest or to escape, the murder was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful enforcement of laws, and the victim was a law enforcement officer performing his official duties. See id. at 1349.² The trial judge found no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factors to be present. See id. On direct appeal, this Court upheld Pietri's conviction and sentence. See id. at 1355.

On direct appeal, Pietri asserted twenty issues. See id. at 1350 n. 6. Although we denied eighteen of his claims, we held that the trial court had erred in finding the CCP aggravating factor to be applicable. See id. at 1353. Despite the erroneous finding of CCP, however, the sentence of death was upheld in light of the three remaining aggravating factors and the complete lack of mitigation. See id. at 1353-54. Importantly, we noted that even if the trial court had found mitigators, including a deprived childhood, a reasonable likelihood that the trial court would have imposed a life sentence did not exist. See id. at 1354.³

Pietri timely filed his initial postconviction 3.850 motion, and two amendments followed. His final amended motion for relief contained thirty-three claims. A Huff⁴ hearing was held on August 10, 2000. Shortly thereafter the trial court issued a pre-evidentiary hearing order on Pietri's postconviction motion. In that order, the court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was warranted on three claims and a portion of a fourth. The court summarily denied the remaining claims, holding that they were either legally insufficient, had or should have been asserted on direct appeal, were conclusively refuted by the record, or were moot.

An extensive evidentiary hearing was subsequently held. Pietri presented the testimony of five mental health experts, the two attorneys who served as his defense counsel at trial, an attorney presented to be a "Strickland⁵ expert," three attorneys who worked for the public defender's office at the time of Pietri's trial, and six family members and friends of Pietri. The State presented only one witness, a mental health expert. At the end of the hearing, the trial judge requested that both parties submit a written post-evidentiary hearing memorandum addressing the relevant issues. Both sides agreed, without objection. On August 27, 2002, the trial court issued a one-page order denying Pietri's claims. The order stated, "A copy of the State's [post-evidentiary hearing memorandum] is incorporated by reference and made a part of the record." Pietri now appeals the denial of his postconviction motion, asserting ten claims of error.⁶ Pietri has also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he raises four issues.⁷

3.850 APPEAL

Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be considered meritorious, must include two general components. First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.

Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed question of law and fact, and, therefore, are subject to plenary review based on the Strickland test. See id.; see also Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1033 (Fla.1999)

. Under this standard, this Court conducts an independent review of the trial court's legal conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court's factual findings. See id.

There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective. As Strickland provides: "Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and further: "[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant alone carries the burden to overcome the presumption of effective assistance: "[T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The United States Supreme Court explained that

a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.

Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974, 984 (Fla.2000)

("[T]he defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards and was not a matter of sound trial strategy."). Finally, "[J]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." 466 U.S. at 689,

104 S.Ct. 2052. It is under this legal framework that we address Pietri's claims.

Failure to Present a Voluntary Intoxication Defense

In his first claim, Pietri argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and present a voluntary intoxication defense, and that if they had performed effectively, it could have been demonstrated that due to Pietri's intoxication, he lacked the requisite specific intent to commit the murder. Pietri's claim must fail, however, because Pietri did not present any evidence at the postconviction evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that he was in fact intoxicated at the time of the offense. Furthermore, he did not present any competent evidence proving his inability to form the specific intent to commit the crime. Pietri relies upon the theory that as a result of his persistent use of cocaine on the days prior to the crime he was in a state of "metabolic intoxication" at the time of the offense and, therefore, could not have formed the requisite specific intent. This Court has consistently rejected this theory, holding that evidence of "metabolic intoxication" is not admissible at trial. Because counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to present inadmissible evidence, Pietri's first claim is denied.

Importantly, it must be recognized that Pietri is not asserting that he was actually intoxicated (i.e. that had he been given a blood test it would have registered any level of cocaine in his bloodstream) at the time of the offense. Pietri's own expert, Dr. Lipman, testified that it was his conclusion that Pietri was on the "clearance curve of the cocaine elimination phase" at the time that the offense occurred. In other words, Dr. Lipman opined that the actual amount of cocaine in Pietri's system at the moment he shot the officer would have been quite low. Dr. Lipman's conclusion is supported by Pietri's own testimony at trial, where he explained that several hours had passed between the time he smoked the last of his cocaine and the time he fired the fatal shot into Officer Chappell.

Apparently recognizing that he has no valid claim that he was actually intoxicated at the time of the offense, Pietri is now attempting to assert that his chronic drug abuse had a lasting impact, and that while he had little to no cocaine in his bloodstream at the time of the offense, he was under the effects of the...