Asay v. State
Decision Date | 29 June 2000 |
Docket Number | No. SC90963.,SC90963. |
Citation | 769 So.2d 974 |
Parties | Marc James ASAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Counsel, Northern Region, and Heidi Brewer, Assistant CCRC, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida; Rachel E. Fugate and Gregg D. Thomas of Holland & Knight LLP, Tampa, Florida; and Stephen F. Hanlon, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals, and Curtis M. French, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee.
Marc James Asay, an inmate under sentence of death, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.
Asay was convicted and sentenced to death for the July 17, 1987, murders of Robert Lee Booker and Robert McDowell. On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts of the crime as follows:
Asay v. State, 580 So.2d 610, 610-12 (Fla. 1991).
The jury found Asay guilty of the murders of both Booker and McDowell and recommended sentences of death for both murders. After concluding that the aggravating circumstances1 surrounding the crime outweighed the mitigating circumstances,2 the trial court imposed the death penalty for each of the murder convictions. We affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal.3 See id. at 614.
Asay filed his first motion for postconviction relief in the trial court on March 16, 1993.4 On November 24, 1993, Asay filed an amended motion alleging twenty claims.5 In addition, on March 30, 1993, Asay filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge from presiding over the postconviction proceedings primarily on the basis of comments that the judge made during Asay's 1988 trial. The trial judge denied the motion to disqualify. After holding a Huff6 hearing, the trial court summarily denied many of Asay's claims,7 but the court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Asay's ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief on these claims as well.
The first issue Asay raises on appeal is that judicial bias during the trial and postconviction proceedings resulted in a denial of "a fair and impartial tribunal throughout his proceedings in violation of his due process rights."8 The same judge presided over both Asay's trial and his postconviction proceedings.
Asay points to two statements the trial judge made during trial and one statement written in an order discharging counsel and granting attorney's fees. According to Asay, these statements show that the trial judge was actually biased during the original trial and that the trial judge should have granted Asay's motion to recuse the judge from presiding over the postconviction proceedings. As part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Asay also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to disqualify the trial judge on the basis of these statements.
The first comment relied upon by Asay occurred during voir dire, when the assistant state attorney asked a venireperson whether he could follow the law with regard to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The venireperson answered, At a bench conference concerning this venireperson, the trial judge stated, "I think what we ought to do is let him off the jury, but put him on the Supreme Court."
Asay also relies upon a second comment that was made during a bench conference that occurred prior to the State resting its case. During this discussion regarding what jury instructions are required by law, the trial judge stated, "The First District Court of Appeals won't hear the appeal in this case if there is a first-degree conviction of murder."
Third, Asay points to a comment in an order concerning discharge of Asay's court-appointed counsel and payment of attorney's fees. According to Asay,9 the order stated that defense counsel had to endure the wrath of the victim's family and friends. Asay contends that the trial judge must have meant that defense counsel had to endure the wrath of the defendant's family and friends, and that the judge must have had improper ex parte contact with defense counsel in order to learn this.
As to Asay's claims of actual bias, these claims are procedurally barred because the grounds upon which the claims are based were known at the time of the direct appeal. See Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477, 481 n. 3 (Fla.1998); Stano v. State, 520 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1988); Zeigler v. State, 452 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla.1984). The statements relied upon by Asay contrast markedly with those in Porter v. State, 723 So.2d 191, 194 (Fla.1998),cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1120, 119 S.Ct. 1772, 143 L.Ed.2d 801 (1999), a case in which we vacated the death sentence due to evidence of the trial judge's actual bias during the penalty phase.10 In Porter, the evidence of actual bias was unknown at the time of the original trial and direct appeal. See id. at 195. Further, the statements in Porter showed the judge actually lacked impartiality, thus violating the defendant's "constitutional right to a fair and impartial tribunal." Id. I...
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