Piloski v. Div. of Emp't Sec.

• Decision Date: 25 October 2016
• Docket Number: WD 79597
• Parties: David PILOSKI, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

503 S.W.3d 253

David PILOSKI, Appellant,

v.DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Respondent.

WD 79597

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: October 25, 2016

David Piloski, Appellant Pro Se.

Bart A. Matanic, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division One: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

David Piloski ("Piloski") appeals the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission ("Commission") denying him unemployment benefits following his resignation from FTL Nimbus, LLC, d/b/a Automation Service ("Employer"). Piloski argues that the Commission erred in concluding that he voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to Employer. We affirm the Commission's decision.

Factual and Procedural Background¹

Piloski was hired by Employer's predecessor in October 2007, after Piloski responded to an advertisement for a welder position that indicated "Will work in clean, A/C environment." After he was hired, Piloski and one other welder welded flow control systems, work that had to be done in a temperature controlled "clean room." Two other welders worked outside the clean room welding valve bodies and valve balls that did not have to be welded in a clean room. Piloski was occasionally required to weld outside the clean room to fill in for a welder working in that area. This occurred on average once or twice a month, and usually for thirty to sixty minutes at a time.

Employer acquired the business that had hired Piloski in August 2013. After Employer acquired the business, Piloski was again periodically asked to perform welding work outside the clean room. Piloski refused, telling Employer he had not been hired to work outside the clean room. Piloski's supervisors consulted with the human resources department, and were told that Piloski needed to work where ordered to work. Nonetheless, for some period of time, Piloski's supervisors appear to have acquiesced in Piloski's objection to working outside of the clean room.

Eventually, however, in early August 2015, Employer told Piloski and the other clean room welder that they would each be required to work outside the clean room for two hours per day. The valve bodies and valve balls welded outside the clean room could contain chemical residue which, when heated, could give off fumes. Employer provided a fume extractor to catch any chemical residue fumes. When Piloski was required to work outside the clean room, he was the only welder doing so, and had exclusive access to the fume extractor.

On approximately August 15, 2015, Piloski was told by Employer that he and the other clean room welder would be required to work alternating weeks outside the clean room because a welder in that area had quit. Piloski believed Employer was moving to having him work outside the clean room more regularly on a permanent basis.

On August 17, 2015, Piloski told Employer that he experienced chemical residue fumes working outside the clean room and got a headache. Piloski told Employer he would not work outside the clean room anymore.

On August 18, 2015, Employer met with Piloski. Piloski told Employer he had been hired to be a welder in the clean room. Employer told Piloski he had been hired to be a welder. Piloski raised concerns about chemical fumes that could result from welding outside the clean room. Employer told Piloski that whenever he was assigned to work outside the clean room, he would be the only welder in the area, and would have exclusive use of the fume extractor.

During this meeting, Employer told Piloski that if he refused to weld outside the clean room, he would be terminated for insubordination. Piloski asked if he could resign. Employer told Piloski that was his prerogative.

The next day, Piloski reported for work as directed outside the clean room. However, he submitted a resignation notice on Employer's form indicating his resignation effective September 11, 2015. Although the form provided space for Piloski to explain why he was resigning, Piloski's offered no written explanation. From August 19, 2015, until September 11, 2015, Piloski worked as a welder where instructed, including outside the clean room.

After the effective date of his resignation, Piloski applied for unemployment benefits. A deputy of the Division of Employment Security ("Deputy") concluded that Piloski was disqualified from receiving benefits because he voluntarily quit work without showing good cause attributable to Employer. The Deputy concluded that Piloski did not take reasonable steps to maintain his employment.

Piloski appealed the Deputy's decision to the Appeals Tribunal ("Tribunal"). The Tribunal heard testimony from Piloski and two Employer representatives. The Tribunal concluded that requiring Piloski to work outside the clean room constituted a substantial change in the terms and conditions of Piloski's employment that would compel a reasonable employee to cease working. The Tribunal reversed the Deputy's determination that Piloski was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.

Employer appealed to the Commission. The Commission adopted the Tribunal's factual findings, and made some additional factual findings. The Commission concluded that Piloski did not sustain his burden to establish that he had good cause for voluntarily quitting his employment. The Commission concluded that Piloski's decision to quit was not compelled by a medical need, and that Piloski quit in response to a change in his work conditions that he found unacceptable. The Commission concluded that the change in Piloski's work conditions was not substantial, and that Piloski did not act as a reasonable employee would act in electing to voluntarily quit. The Commission also concluded that Employer's response to mitigate Piloski's expressed concern about chemical fumes was reasonable. The Commission reversed the Tribunal's decision, and denied Piloski unemployment benefits.

Piloski filed this timely appeal.

Standard of Review

Article V, section 18 of the Missouri Constitution provides for judicial review of an administrative decision affecting private rights to determine if it is authorized by law and "supported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 18. Section 288.210² governs appellate review of the Commission's decision in an unemployment compensation case. Stephenson v. Div. of Emp't Sec. , 411 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). Relevant to this case, we may modify, reverse, remand, or set aside a decision of the Commission where "the facts found by the commission do not support the award; or ... there was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making [or denial] of the award." Section 288.210(3)-(4).

Our review "must examine the whole record to determine if it contains sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award, i.e., whether the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Sheridan v. Div. of Emp't Sec. , 425 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (quoting Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection , 121 S.W.3d 220, 222–23 (Mo. banc 2003) ). We do not review the decision of the Tribunal, except to the extent factual findings of the tribunal are adopted by the Commission. Sanders v. Div. of Emp't Sec. , 417 S.W.3d 895, 897 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014). While we give deference to the Commission's findings of fact, we are "not bound by the Commission's conclusions of law or the Commission's application of law to the facts." Timberson v. Div. of Emp't Sec. , 333 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

Analysis

Piloski raises a single point on appeal. Piloski argues that the Commission erroneously applied the law to the facts to conclude that he did not have good cause to voluntarily quit his employment because: (i) a reasonable employee would quit if he knew work conditions were causing adverse health effects; (ii) Employer acquiesced for 8 years about where his work would be performed; (iii) there was a substantial change in his work conditions; and (iv) the fume extractor was not a solution because Employer knew the work load would require two welders to be working outside the clean room at the same time.

Unemployment benefits are reserved "for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own," and Missouri employment security laws must be "liberally construed to accomplish [this] purpose." Section 288.020. Section 288.050 disqualifies a claimant from receiving unemployment compensation if "the claimant has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work or to the claimant's employer." Section 288.050.1(1). The requirement of showing good cause following voluntary resignation "bespeaks a legislative intention to create an incentive for employed persons to remain employed by withholding benefits from those who quit their jobs without good cause." Hessler v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n , 851 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Mo. banc 1993). Good cause is defined by statute as "only that cause which would compel a reasonable employee to cease working or which would require separation from work due to illness or disability." Section 288.050.1(1).³ Section 288.050.1(1) should be construed "strictly and narrowly in favor of finding that an employee is entitled to compensation." Martin v. Div. of Emp't Sec. , 460 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting Baby – Tenda Corp. v. Hedrick , 50 S.W.3d 369, 374 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) ).

It is uncontested that Piloski left work voluntarily. The sole issue raised by Piloski on appeal is whether he voluntarily quit his employment for good cause, and thus under circumstances that would compel a reasonable employee to cease working or which would require separation from work due to illness or disability. The determination of whether an employee had good cause to voluntarily quit his employment is a question of law we review without deference to the Commission's...