Pimental v. Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 07 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-208-M,88-208-M
• Citation: 561 A.2d 1348
• Parties: Joao PIMENTAL v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION for the State of Rhode Island et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1348

561 A.2d 1348

58 USLW 2095

Joao PIMENTAL v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION for the State of Rhode Island et al.

No. 88-208-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 7, 1989.

Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Providence, for plaintiff/respondent.

James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Thomas M. Dickinson, Jeffrey Greer, Asst. Attys. Gen., Providence, for defendant/petitioner.

John A. MacFadyen, Providence, for amicus curiae.

OPINION

FAY, Chief Justice.

This case is before the Supreme Court following our granting of a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to review a judgment of the District Court. That judgment reversed a decision of the Administrative Adjudication Division of the Department of Transportation, holding that drunk-driving roadblocks violate article I, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution. We affirm the District Court decision.

The relevant, undisputed facts are as follows. The town of Warren police department established a "sobriety checkpoint" or "drunk-driving roadblock" program in order to screen for intoxicated motorists. The program was initiated following a directive from Captain Robert G. Pare entitled "D.W.I. Roadblock Enforcement." The directive included strict guidelines regarding the planning, operation, procedure, and personnel of the roadblock-enforcement program.

On October 7, 1986, a press release in the Providence Journal indicated that the police department intended to set up weekend roadblocks at several sites in Warren, Rhode Island. The roadblocks, according to the newspaper article, would end a two-month highway-safety program. Although the newspaper column stated that multiple roadblocks would be placed in high-volume-traffic areas, the article did not reveal their precise times or locations.

On October 10, 1986, in the late-evening hours, the police department established a roadblock checkpoint on Metacom Avenue. The roadblock remained in operation into the early morning hours of October 11, 1986. During the period in which the roadblock was in force, police stopped all vehicles passing through the checkpoint area.

The defendant Joao Pimental's vehicle was pulled over at the Metacom Avenue roadblock at approximately 1 a.m. Upon stopping Pimental, the police officer "detected an odor of alcohol [and] noted that defendant's eyes were watery, * * * bloodshot, and that [his] pupils were dilated." Thereafter, the police officer removed Pimental from the roadway, read him his rights, conducted a field sobriety test, and requested that defendant submit to a chemical test. Pimental refused the test and was charged pursuant to G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-27-2.1, as amended by P.L.1986, ch. 508, § 1. ¹ The officer then issued defendant a summons under the statute and released him.

The defendant challenged the summons and under § 31-27-2.1 requested a hearing before the Administrative Adjudication Division (AAD) of the Department of Transportation. Prior to the hearing, defendant filed a motion to suppress and exclude all the state's evidence against him because it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 6, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The administrative law judge rejected defendant's motion, finding that the roadblock was constitutional.

In reviewing the circumstances surrounding Pimental's arrest, the administrative law judge noted that the roadblock was conducted pursuant to the guidelines incorporated in Captain Pare's directive. The judge also found that the police officers involved in the roadblock had limited discretion in implementing the program. The checkpoint, according to the judge, was accomplished with minimal intrusion to motorists, and the public received adequate prior notice. Therefore, the judge sustained the charge against Pimental and ordered multiple sanctions. The sanctions included a mandatory fine of $203 and a highway-safety assessment of $250. In addition the judge suspended Pimental's license and privilege to operate a motor vehicle for three months, required defendant to participate in the alcohol-education program, and assigned him ten hours of community service.

On April 23, 1987, defendant filed an appeal with the AAD Appellate Panel, reiterating his claim that the roadblock violated the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. The appellate panel denied Pimental's assertion, and pursuant to G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-43-4(9), as amended by P.L.1982, ch. 222, § 1, defendant sought review of the panel's finding in District Court. ² The chief judge of the District Court reversed the AAD finding in a bench decision, holding that absent statutory authorization, law enforcement officials cannot constitutionally erect roadblocks. Subsequent to the District Court order, the state successfully petitioned for certiorari.

The sole issue to be decided here is whether the Warren police department's drunk-driving roadblock was justified. We have previously noted that Rhode Island citizens hold "a double barrelled source of protection which safeguards their privacy from unauthorized and unwarranted intrusions: the [F]ourth [A]mendment of the Federal Constitution and the Declaration of Rights which is specified in the Rhode Island Constitution." State v. Sitko, 460 A.2d 1, 2 (R.I.1983) (quoting State v. Luther, 116 R.I. 28, 29, 351 A.2d 594, 594-95 (1976)). Our resolution of the question of whether this drunk-driving roadblock violates the Federal Constitution is controlled by United States Supreme Court precedent. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d 570, 576 (1975).

The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the right and power of state courts as final interpreters of state law "to impose higher standards on searches and seizures [under state constitutions] than required by the Federal Constitution." Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, 734 (1967). This greater protection may be afforded to citizens under a state constitution even if the federal and state language is similar. Id. The Federal Constitution only establishes a minimum level of protection. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 719, 95 S.Ct. at 1219, 43 L.Ed.2d at 576.

We have departed from these minimum standards only when we have determined that our guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures requires greater protection. Although the Supreme Court had found that a six-person petit jury in a criminal prosecution was adequate under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970), we held that sections 10 and 15 of article I of the Rhode Island Constitution require a twelve-person jury. In re Advisory Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. 628, 278 A.2d 852 (1971). In State v. Maloof, 114 R.I. 380, 333 A.2d 676 (1975), we required stricter compliance with the provisions of our electronic-eavesdropping statute than the Fourth Amendment's requirement of an almost identical federal statute, holding that the search in question was intrusive and unauthorized. Thereafter, in State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895 (R.I.1980), we invalidated the warrantless search of an automobile four hours after the vehicle had become immobile, despite the fact that the police had seized the automobile lawfully. In finding the seizure unconstitutional, we departed from the Supreme Court's holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement included immobilized vehicles. Id. at 900-01; see generally Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct.1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), and Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975). In State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I.1984), we again suppressed seized evidence under our own constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In excluding the evidence, we stated that even if the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated, our constitution required a finding of an illegal search. Id. at 1019.

Although we may grant this greater protection, we note that the Fourth Amendment is an essential guardian of fundamental rights and should, when interpreted, receive great deference by state courts. State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d at 899. In most instances the Fourth Amendment provides adequate protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. Therefore, our decision to depart from the minimum standards of the United States Constitution and increase the level of protection to Rhode Island citizens "should be made guardedly and * * * supported by a principled rationale." Duquette v. Godbout, 471 A.2d 1359, 1361 (R.I.1984) (quoting State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d at 899).

We believe that this case deserves an analysis of whether a principled rationale exists to depart from the standards of protection provided under the Fourth Amendment. Previously, federal law allowed the seizure of a person or automobile only on the basis of probable cause. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Federal case law remained relatively unchanged until the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Terry the Court determined for the first time that a law enforcement official could make a limited seizure of a person without probable cause. The officer, however, was required to have reason to believe that a criminal activity was occurring and that the person involved in such activity was armed and dangerous.

Thereafter, the Supreme Court extended the Terry doctrine beyond a search for weapons as long as a trained police officer, relying on articulable facts and rational inferences based upon his experience, formed a reasonable suspicion that a driver of a vehicle might be engaged in illegal conduct. See United States v. Cortez, 449...