Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 4D99-2641.
Decision Date | 26 December 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 4D99-2641.,4D99-2641. |
Citation | 802 So.2d 486 |
Parties | PINECREST LAKES, INC. and Villas at Pinecrest Lakes Limited Partnership, Appellants, v. Karen SHIDEL, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Elliot H. Scherker and Clifford A. Schulman of Greenberg Traurig, Miami, for appellants.
Richard J. Grosso, Environmental & Land Use Law Center, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
ON MOTIONS TO RECALL MANDATE AND FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION
Our opinion in this case was filed and distributed to the parties on September 26, 2001. Having received no motion under rule 9.330 within fifteen days thereafter, we issued our mandate on October 12th. Five days later, however, new counsel appeared on behalf of appellants and filed motions to recall the mandate and for leave to file a motion for certification of a question of great public importance to the supreme court.1 We write to explain our denial of these motions.
The motions explain that new counsel was retained on the day after our mandate was issued. Apart from that fact, the only grounds suggested for such relief are that this court has the power to recall its mandate during the term of court in which it was issued,2 and that the 15 day time limit on filing motions under rule 9.330 is not jurisdictional. They say that such motions may be filed "within such other time set by the court."3 The motions close by arguing:
That constitutes all of the reasons offered by appellants for withdrawing our mandate and for considering an untimely motion to certify to the Supreme Court a question of great importance.
Pinecrest cites State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Judges of District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, 405 So.2d 980 (Fla.1981), Maffea v. Moe, 483 So.2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), and State v. In Interest of D.I., 477 So.2d 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). These three cases recognize that appellate courts have the discretion to recall a mandate, limited to the term during which the mandate was issued. State Farm, 405 So.2d at 982-83; Maffea, 483 So.2d at 831; Interest of D.I., 477 So.2d at 72. See also Thompson v. Singletary, 659 So.2d 435, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
. But the issue we face is not whether we have the power to recall our mandate—for clearly we do, as here, within the same term—but whether Pinecrest has shown us a basis to exercise such discretion.
In Chapman v. St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church, 105 Fla. 683, 138 So. 630 (1932), the court offered a rationale for exercising discretion to recall a mandate:
"during the term at which a judgement of this court is rendered, this court has jurisdiction and power which it may exercise, as the circumstances and justice of the case may require, to reconsider, revise, reform, or modify its own judgments for the purpose of making the same accord with law and justice, and that it has the power to recall its own mandate for the purpose of enabling it to exercise such jurisdiction and power in a proper case." [e.s.]
105 Fla. at 697, 138 So. at 632. Pinecrest does not here argue that we should exercise discretion "to reconsider, revise, reform, or modify [our] own judgments for the purpose of making the same accord with law and justice." Instead it argues that we should do so to permit an untimely motion for certification simply because we have the authority to do so and because our decision is important.
133 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1961). As the court explained:
131 So.2d at 23-24. In Simpson v. State, 505 So.2d 1378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the court exercised its discretion to withdraw its mandate because its original opinion "indicated such lack of clarity in our reasoning and discussion that clarification by further opinion was required." 505 So.2d at 1380. No similar basis is urged in this case.
As the First District suggested in Whitaker, the time to request certification is properly during the court's principal consideration of the case, and certainly no later than within the time for rehearing. While rule 9.330 authorizes us to consider a motion beyond the regular 15-day period, such a request must be accompanied by a showing of good cause apart from the importance of the question sought to be certified. The rationale proposed by...
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...seems that the only function of a term of court is to artificially limit our power to recall a mandate." Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 802 So.2d 486, 487 n. 2 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (emphasis added). Moreover, the "term" limitation has been completely abandoned in the federal "Our power ......
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