Pinellas County v. Brown, 81-1463
| Decision Date | 07 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-1463,81-1463 |
| Citation | 420 So.2d 308 |
| Parties | PINELLAS COUNTY, Florida, Appellant, v. Peter BROWN and J. Warren Hughes, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Charles L. Siemon and Wendy U. Larsen of Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago, Ill., W. Gray Dunlap, County Atty., and Helen K. Hobbs, Asst. County Atty., Clearwater, for appellant.
James A. Martin, Jr., of McMullen, Everett, Logan, Marquardt & Cline, Clearwater, for appellees.
Appellant, Pinellas County, challenges a judgment for damages awarded against it because it withheld issuing a building permit to appellee landowners. We reverse.
On May 10, 1979, appellees Brown and Hughes applied to the county for a permit to erect a manufacturing plant for their yacht business. When appellees purchased their land in 1978, it was zoned M-1, an industrial classification which permitted their proposed use. Although there had been no change in the zoning, the county denied the permit because its comprehensive land use plan, adopted in 1974, did not sanction manufacturing uses on appellees property. The county's policy in this situation was to withhold the permit until the conflict was resolved.
Appellees were informed of the policy and proceeded to petition the county to amend its plan to allow their request. On July 24, 1979, the county denied the request and directed its staff to initiate rezoning of appellees' parcel to C-3. This is a commercial zoning category in harmony with the land use plan but it would not permit appellees' proposed use.
Appellees sued the county seeking injunctive relief and damages. During the litigation on November 15, 1979, the county attorney represented to the court that the county had determined to revise the land use plan to accommodate appellees' request and that the permit would be issued. That point was then moot so the litigation proceeded only on the count seeking damages which appellees claimed on the basis of the county's initial denial and its attendant delay in approving their application for a permit. Before the appellees were assured of receiving their building permit, they purchased another suitable parcel and erected their plant thereon. The county's acts finally became official on February 20, 1980, when the Pinellas County Planning Council amended the countywide plan to reflect the change to an industrial classification of appellees' property.
In a nonjury trial the court awarded appellees $116,077.15. The county's motion for rehearing was denied and this appeal ensued. The court made no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law as to the basis of its award. However, both parties argue this appeal in light of whether there has been a taking by the county compensable under the theory of inverse condemnation.
Did the county's denial in issuing a building permit for a use permitted by its zoning ordinance while it resolved the conflict between its ordinance and comprehensive land use plan constitute a taking, thereby rendering the county liable to the appellees for damages? We think not.
At the outset, we recognize that the basic rights arising from ownership of property must always be balanced against the government's power to protect and regulate in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Thus, the zoning of land and the attendant administration of zoning ordinarily gives no rise to any claim for compensation by owners against the zoning authority.
Appellees, however, seek to sustain their judgment for damages on the ground that the county's action precluded them from using their property for one of the uses permitted under the applicable zoning ordinance. The county's action, appellees say, was equivalent to the county condemning their property under its power of eminent domain.
Eminent domain is the exercise of the government's power to take private property for public purposes. This sovereign power is limited by our constitution, which states that any taking of private property for a public purpose must be with full compensation to the owner....
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