Pines v. State

Decision Date22 January 2014
Citation115 A.D.3d 80,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 00335,979 N.Y.S.2d 142
PartiesEmily PINES, et al., respondents, v. STATE of New York, appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany, N.Y. (Andrew D. Bing and Julie M. Sheridan of counsel), for appellant.

Steven Cohn, P.C., Carle Place, N.Y. (Richard Lieb and Paula Schwartz Frome of counsel), for respondents.

Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Joseph L. Forstadt, Alan M. Klinger, Ernst H. Rosenberger, Burton M. Lipshie, Jerry H. Goldfeder, and Linda M. Melendres of counsel), for amici curiae Association of Justices of Supreme Court of State of New York, Supreme Court Justices Association of City of New York, Inc., and New York State Association of City Court Judges.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., PLUMMER E. LOTT, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

MILLER, J.

At the time this lawsuit was commenced, more than a decade had passed since the plaintiffs and their colleagues in the New York State judiciary had received a pay raise authorized by the Legislature. While caseloads continued to increase with each passing year, the compensation of New York jurists remained fixed ( see An Overdue Raise, Albany Times Union, June 1, 2005). When adjusted for inflation and the cost of living, the compensation of New York State Supreme Court justices was found to be the lowest in the nation ( see Final Report of the Special Commission on Judicial Compensation [August 29, 2011] at 7 http:// www. judicial compensation. ny. gov/ assets/ FinalReportSpecialCommissionJD.pdf> [accessed January 16, 2014] ).

During this period of stagnant salaries, the plight of the judiciary was widely recognized, even outside of legal circles. Several dozen editorials in a variety of newspapers throughout the state repeatedly emphasized the pressing need for enacting pay increases for the judiciary ( see They Deserve Better: Unanimous Support for Judicial Compensation Reform, [accessed January 16, 2014] ). In addition, professional groups in the legal community, civic and political organizations, educational institutions, and commercial entities across the State of New York expressed their similarly strong support for such long-overdue increases ( see id.).

The situation deteriorated to the point that judges and justices, including some of the most respected appellate jurists in the state, felt compelled to resign from the judiciary, citing economic considerations ( see e.g. Daniel Wise, Judge Resigns Second Department Over Wages, NYLJ [online], September 20, 2011; Daniel Wise, Family Trumps Love of Law for Departing Justice, NYLJ [online], November 15, 2010; Daniel Wise, Second Department Judge Quits Over Lack of a Raise, NYLJ [online], August 4, 2009). In reaction to one such resignation, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman was quoted as stating, [t]he judiciary is being torn down brick by brick and we are now losing the judges who shape our jurisprudence’ (Daniel Wise, Family Trumps Love of Law for Departing Justice, NYLJ [online], November 15, 2010).

In the face of this threat to the judiciary's existence as an independent and co-equal branch of the state government, and given the failure of the Legislature to enact meaningful relief, members of the judicial branch understandably turned to the courts for recourse. In 2008 alone, three separate groups of jurists sought to hold the Legislature accountable for its inaction through the implementation of litigation ( see Justin S. Teff, The Judges v. The State: Obtaining Adequate Judicial Compensation and New York's Current Constitutional Crisis, 72 Alb. L. Rev. 191 [2009] ).

In one such case, Matter of Maron v. Silver, 14 N.Y.3d 230, 261, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899, the Court of Appeals held that the Legislature's practice of linking full-time judicial salary increases to pay increases for part-time legislators was an unconstitutional infringement on the independence of the judiciary under the Separation of Powers Doctrine. However, in deference to the Legislature's discretionary authority, the Court of Appeals refused to direct an increase in judicial compensation ( see id. at 263, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899).

In this case, the plaintiffs, duly elected or appointed judges or justices of the Unified Court System, seek a judgment declaring that the compensation of judges and justices of the Unified Court System of the State of New York was duly increased pursuant to the Laws of 2009, chapter 51, § 3. The plaintiffs maintain that this legislation effected a pay raise for the judiciary because it set aside approximately $51 million for that purpose, and did not reference the need for any future legislation.

In navigating the legal issues presented by this appeal, we remain mindful of the distress caused by the Legislature's past failure to adequately compensate the judges and justices of this state and of the indignation engendered among those who felt such treatment unworthy of a co-equal branch of the government. We also do not fail to recognize the perception that an inherent conflict of interest is presented by a case in which the pecuniary interests of the justices deciding it are implicated. We are nevertheless compelled, by the Rule of Necessity, to determine the merits of this appeal. In so doing, we conclude that the compensation of judges and justices of the Unified Court System of the State of New York was not increased by the enactment of the Laws of 2009, chapter 51, § 3. In reaching our determination we are guided by the language of the statute, the New York Constitution, and the numerous manifestations of legislative intent which demonstrate that the Legislature did not increase judicial compensation through the enactment of the subject legislation, no matter how warranted such an increase may have been.

I. Background

The rate of judicial compensation in the State of New York, subject to certain limitations, has long been entrusted to the province of the legislative branch. The New York Constitution of 1846 provided that [t]he judges of the Court of Appeals and justices of the Supreme Court shall severally receive ... for their services, a compensation to be established by law” (1846 N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 7). Although the discretion of the legislature in this area was briefly limited through constitutional enactments that incorporated the specific salary schedules pertaining to each class of jurist directly into the constitution itself ( see 1894 N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 12, as amended Nov. 2, 1909; N.Y.S. Const. Ann. at 1709), in 1925, the New York Constitution was again amended to grant the Legislature the authority to increase judicial compensation through legislation ( see 1925 N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 19).

Article VI, section 25(a) of the New York State Constitution, known as the “Compensation Clause,” now provides, inter alia, that the compensation of judges and justices of the state “shall be established by law” (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 25[a] ). The Compensation Clause, construed “to give its provisions practical effect” (Ginsberg v. Purcell, 51 N.Y.2d 272, 276, 434 N.Y.S.2d 147, 414 N.E.2d 648), is a constitutional requirement that judicial compensation be set forth by the Legislature through the enactment of affirmative legislation ( see Matter of Maron v. Silver, 14 N.Y.3d at 249, 899 N.Y.S.2d 97, 925 N.E.2d 899).

In the 50 years following the constitutional enactments of 1925, the Legislature exercised its authority under the New York Constitution by periodically adjusting the salary schedules of various classes of judges and justices through the enactment of legislation ( see L. 1926, chs. 94, 155; L. 1929, ch. 464; L. 1947, chs. 419, 462; L. 1948, ch. 591; L. 1949, chs. 45, 195; L. 1950, ch. 621; L. 1952, ch. 88; L. 1957, ch. 993; L. 1975, chs. 150, 152). It was through this legislation that the Legislature fulfilled its constitutional mandate to ensure that the compensation of judges and justices of this state was “established by law” (N.Y. Const., art. VI, § 25[a] ).

In 1979, the Legislature enacted article 7–B of the Judiciary Law (L. 1979, ch. 55; seeJudiciary Law §§ 220–224). That article set forth the various salaries to be paid to the judges and justices of the Unified Court System. During the next 20 years, article 7–B of the Judiciary Law was amended on five occasions to increase the judicial rate of pay ( see L. 1980, ch. 881; L. 1984, ch. 986; L. 1987, ch. 263; L. 1993, ch. 60; L. 1998, ch. 630). It was through these amendments to article 7–B of the Judiciary Law that the Legislature established the compensation of state-paid judges and justices as required by the Compensation Clause ( seeN.Y. Const., art. VI, § 25[a] ).

Each year, as a part of the executive budgeting process of this state, the Judiciary must estimate its financial needs and transmit a budget request to the Governor, who must include that request in his or her executive budget without revision ( seeN.Y. Const., art. VII, § 1). The executive budget must be transmitted to the Legislature ( seeN.Y. Const., art. VII, § 2), and those portions of the appropriation bill which the Legislature does not “strike out or reduce” immediately become law when passed by both houses (N.Y. Const., art. VII, § 4; see Pataki v. New York State Assembly, 4 N.Y.3d 75, 110, 791 N.Y.S.2d 458, 824 N.E.2d 898).

Beginning with its 20062007 budget request, and continuing for the next five years, the Judiciary repeatedly noted that the judges and justices of New York had not received pay increases since the 1998 amendment to article 7–B of the Judiciary Law, and urged the Legislature to take legislative action on judicial compensation” (20062007 Judiciary Budget Request at 504). The Judiciary included budget items in each of these requests to fund increases in judicial compensation ( see id.; 20072008 Judiciary Budget Request at 539; 20082009 Judiciary Budget Request at...

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