Pinkard v. Confederation Life Ins. Co., S-01-436.
Decision Date | 12 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. S-01-436.,S-01-436. |
Citation | 264 Neb. 312,647 N.W.2d 85 |
Parties | Glenda L. PINKARD, formerly known as Glenda L. Bolton, Appellant, v. CONFEDERATION LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Appellees, and Rose Bolton, Personal Representative of the Estate of William Bolton, Deceased, Intervenor-Appellee. |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Benjamin M. Belmont, of Lustgarten & Roberts, P.C., Omaha, for appellant.
Christian R. Blunk, of Berkshire & Blunk, Omaha, for intervenor-appellee.
This is a declaratory judgment action involving two parties each claiming to be the beneficiary of an annuity contract. The Douglas County District Court found that the annuity benefits were payable to William Bolton's estate, and Glenda L. Pinkard, formerly known as Glenda L. Bolton (Pinkard), appeals.
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Nicholson v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 262 Neb. 879, 636 N.W.2d 372 (2001).
On May 16, 1989, Bolton was seriously injured when equipment he was operating rolled over on him. During Bolton's period of recovery, he and Pinkard were married. Because of Bolton's extensive injuries, Pinkard was appointed his guardian and conservator.
On March 15, 1991, the county court for Douglas County entered an order authorizing Pinkard to settle Bolton's workers' compensation claim. The settlement provided for an immediate payment of $75,000 and monthly payments of $1,900 commencing on April 1, 1991, for a period of 10 years certain. Under the terms of the order authorizing Pinkard to settle, Bolton could not assign or pledge any of the payments. The settlement was approved by both the Workers' Compensation Court and the Douglas County District Court as of April 15, 1991.
On November 3, 1992, Bolton's guardianship and conservatorship were voluntarily terminated. As a part of the termination, Pinkard agreed she would not have any access to or control over Bolton's money.
Pinkard filed for dissolution of marriage on January 22, 1993, and the parties entered into a property settlement agreement. Bolton was awarded as his sole and separate property all right, title, and interest in all pension plans, employee benefit plans, and 401K plans, including workers' compensation benefits, received by reason of his employment. Pinkard was awarded as her sole and separate property all right, title, and interest in all pension plans, employee benefit plans, and any other benefits received by reason of her employment.
As a part of the property settlement agreement, the parties executed a mutual release. The release provided that the parties accepted the benefit of the property settlement agreement in full and complete satisfaction of all financial claims. The property settlement agreement was incorporated into the decree of dissolution the same as if it had been fully set forth in the decree.
Bolton died on August 17, 1998, and his first wife, Rose Bolton, was appointed personal representative of his estate. The legal heirs of the estate are Bolton's children with the personal representative.
Pinkard commenced this action for declaratory judgment seeking the remaining balance of the annuity. She alleged that she was the designated beneficiary of the annuity. In her prayer for relief, Pinkard requested that the district court declare that she is the sole beneficiary of the annuity and that she should be paid all accrued benefits along with interest, attorney fees, and costs.
The personal representative intervened, alleging that the dissolution decree and the property settlement agreement between Bolton and Pinkard terminated Pinkard's rights in Bolton's workers' compensation benefits, including the annuity. The personal representative requested that the district court determine that the estate was the sole beneficiary of the annuity and all benefits payable thereunder.
Pinkard and the personal representative subsequently filed motions for summary judgment. In its order of April 2, 2001, the district court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the estate was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court entered judgment in favor of the estate and ordered payment to the estate of the remaining proceeds of the annuity when due. Pinkard's motion for summary judgment was overruled, and her petition was dismissed.
Pinkard assigns as error that the district court erred (1) in finding as a matter of law that Bolton's estate was entitled to a judgment for the balance of the annuity payments, (2) in finding that she waived her interest in the annuity via the property settlement agreement in the dissolution decree, (3) in finding that she could not be a beneficiary under the annuity because such status was contrary to the county court's order authorizing settlement of the workers' compensation claim, and (4) in not granting her motion for summary judgment.
In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Nicholson v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 262 Neb. 879, 636 N.W.2d 372 (2001). Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kirwan v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 261 Neb. 609, 624 N.W.2d 644 (2001).
Pinkard, as Bolton's guardian and conservator, entered into a settlement with his employer through its workers' compensation carrier, Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers). The county court order approving the settlement provided in relevant part:
As a part of the settlement, Travelers purchased an annuity from Confederation Life Insurance Company that was subsequently assumed by Pacific Life Insurance Company and administered through Allstate Life Insurance Company. The annuity contract contained a schedule of benefits which listed Bolton as the payee, Travelers as the owner, and "Glenda Bolton" as the beneficiary. The schedule of benefits stated that Pinkard was Bolton's...
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