Pinkney v. State
| Docket Number | 356363 |
| Decision Date | 26 May 2022 |
| Parties | EDWARD PINKNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and BERRIEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Court of Claims LC No. 18-000112-MM
Before: Gadola, P.J., and Servitto and Redford, JJ.
In this constitutional-tort case, plaintiff, Edward Pinkney, appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition to the State of Michigan (SOM) and the Department of Corrections (DOC)[1] under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) and denying plaintiff's request to amend his complaint. Plaintiff also challenges an earlier grant of summary disposition to defendant Berrien County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) under MCR 2.116(I)(2). The crux of plaintiff's claims is that his due process rights under the Michigan Constitution were violated when he was charged, convicted, imprisoned, and subject to parole supervision for a violation of MCL 168.937[2] because the Michigan Supreme Court later concluded that this statute does not, in fact, create a substantive crime. We affirm.
Pertinent background facts for the present case are set forth in People v Pinkney, 501 Mich. 259, 264; 912 N.W.2d 535 (2018) (Pinkney II):
Defendant [i.e., plaintiff in the present case] was charged with five counts of election-law forgery under MCL 168.937 and six counts of making a false statement in a certificate-of-recall petition under MCL 168.957. After being bound over to the Berrien Circuit Court on these charges defendant filed a motion to quash arguing, inter alia, that § 937 is a penalty provision, not a substantive, chargeable offense. The circuit court denied the motion to quash, and the case proceeded to trial. After an eight-day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the five felony counts and not guilty on the six misdemeanor counts. In a motion for a directed verdict, defendant again argued that § 937 is a penalty provision and not a substantive offense. The circuit court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 30 to 120 months.
After plaintiff appealed, this Court engaged in statutory construction and looked favorably to an unpublished opinion-People v Hall, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued October 23, 2014 (Docket No. 321045), rev'd on other grounds 449 Mich. 446 (2016)-and concluded that § 937 sets forth a substantive offense. People v Pinkney, 316 Mich.App. 450 462-465; 891 N.W.2d 891 (2016) (Pinkney I), rev'd by Pinkney II[3] The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that § 937 is a penalty provision and that the Legislature appeared to have inadvertently left it in-without a corresponding substantive offense-when amending the statutory scheme. Pinkney II, 501 Mich. at 285-287. The Supreme Court stated, "After focusing on the plain language, context, and history of § 937, we conclude that it is nothing more than an inoperative penalty provision," adding, "[W]e recognize that our conclusion that § 937 is an inoperative penalty provision is an unusual one, and it is not one that we reach lightly." Id. at 287.
After the vacating of his convictions by the Michigan Supreme Court, plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on the basis of a theory with roots in the United States Supreme Court case of Monell v Dep 't of Social Servs of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658; 98 S.Ct. 2018; 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In Monell, id. at 690, the Court stated:
Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom [42 USC] 1983[4]applies. Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover, although the touchstone of the § 1983 action against a government body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local governments, like every other § 1983 "person," by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental "custom" even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels.
After the issuance of Monell, this Court indicated that a Monell-type claim can be made against the state-not just local government units-for violations of the Michigan Constitution. For example, in Carlton v Dep't of Corrections, 215 Mich.App. 490, 504-505; 546 N.W.2d 671 (1996), the Court stated:
Plaintiff filed his complaint "against the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Corrections and Berrien County Prosecutor's Office (a Sub-Entity, Arm and/or Agency of the State of Michigan for Purposes of the Claims Herein) due to violations of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights." Plaintiff stated that "Defendant Berrien County Prosecutor is a subentity, arm and/or agency of the State of Michigan and is being sued in order to hold this subentity, arm and/or agency of the State of Michigan liable for the constitutional violation(s) herein as opposed to Michael Sepic [who held the position of Berrien County Prosecutor at the time of defendant's trial and conviction] being held personally liable for damages in his individual capacity." Plaintiff alleged that Sepic was a policymaker for purposes of holding the state liable under a Monell-type theory and violated plaintiffs constitutional rights by prosecuting plaintiff and convicting him of a nonexistent crime. He also alleged that the SOM/DOC had a policy of incarcerating and paroling convicted persons and that this policy rendered the state liable for violating plaintiff's constitutional rights.
After plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the lower court granted summary disposition to the BCPO under MCR 2.116(I)(2), concluding that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction for a claim against the BCPO because it was a county office.[6] Later, the court granted the SOM/DOC's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), concluding that no state policy was at issue for a claim such as that discussed in Carlton because the BCPO was a local-not a state-office. The court concluded that an additional basis for dismissal was the fact that plaintiff had not alleged a constitutional due-process violation because he in fact received due process throughout the criminal proceedings. The court also denied as futile plaintiffs attempt to amend the complaint.
As stated in Stehlik v Johnson, 206 Mich.App. 83, 85; 520 N.W.2d 633 (1994):
Summary disposition is reviewed de novo, because this Court must review the record to determine whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MCR 2.116(C)(8) permits summary disposition when the opposing party has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion under this subsection determines whether the opposing party's pleadings allege a prima facie case. The court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts. Only if the allegations fail to state a legal claim is summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) valid. A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a plaintiffs claim. MCR 2.116(C)(10) permits summary disposition when, except for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and the moving party is entitled to damages as a matter of law. A court reviewing such a motion must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and any other evidence in favor of the opposing party and grant the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party. [Citations omitted.][7]
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling regarding a motion to amend a complaint. Diem v Sallie Mae Home Loans, Inc, 307 Mich.App. 204, 215-216; 859 N.W.2d 238 (2014). "[A]n abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." In re Kostin, 278 Mich.App. 47, 51; 748 N.W.2d 583 (2008).
"Where it is alleged that the state, by virtue of custom or policy has violated a right conferred by the Michigan Constitution, governmental immunity is not available in a state court action." Smith v Dep 't of Pub Health, 428 Mich. 540, 544; 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987), aff d sub nom Will v Mich. Dep 't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). There is authority for concluding that the...
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