Pinnock v. City of New Haven

Decision Date14 May 2008
Docket NumberNo. 3:05cv927 (WIG).,3:05cv927 (WIG).
Citation553 F.Supp.2d 130
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
PartiesSadie PINNOCK, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Lakeia Dunkley, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN, Nicole Natale, Carlos Roman, Defendants.

Dawne Westbrook, East Glastonbury, CT, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan H. Beamon, Corporation Counsel's Office, Hartford, CT, Michael A. Wolak, III, Office of Corporation Counsel, New Haven, CT, Stephen P. Del Sole, Del Sole & Del Sole, Wallingford, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM I. GARFINKEL, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Sadie Pinnock, individually and as executor of the estate of Lakeia Dunkley has brought this wrongful death action against the City of New Haven and Police Officers Nicole Natale and Carlos Roman, seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants' alleged violation of the Decedent's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and also asserting state-law claims for false imprisonment, battery, and violation of Connecticut's wrongful death statute, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-555. The City of New Haven and Officer Roman have moved for summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiffs complaint [Doc. # 43]. Defendant Natale has also moved for summary judgment on all claims [Doc. # 39]. For the reasons set forth below, summary judgment is granted in favor of the City of New Haven. The motions for summary judgment of Officers Roman and Natale are granted in part and denied in part.

Summary Judgment Standard

A moving party is entitled summary judgment "if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. The burden of establishing that there are no issues of material fact lies with the moving party. See Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). A "movant for summary judgment `always bears' the burden of production or `the initial responsibility of informing the ... court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.'" F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (repealed 2007))).

After the movant has made a prima facie showing of the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden then switches to non-moving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial through the identification of specific facts, supported by sufficient concrete, probative evidence, to allow a rational trier of fact to find in its favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106. S.Ct. 2548. When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must—by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56—set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against that party. Rule 56(e)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P.; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct, 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

In ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court cannot resolve issues of fact. Rather, it is empowered to determine only whether there are material issues in dispute to be decided by the trier of fact. The substantive law governing the controversy identifies those facts that are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A court deciding a motion for summary judgment views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004). The court is not concerned with whether "the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-movant] on the evidence presented." Readeo, Inc. v. Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 295, 298 (2d Cir.1996) (alteration in original).

Factual Background

The following facts are undisputed unless indicated otherwise.1

The events giving rise to this action occurred on the evening of March 1, 2005, in the City of New Haven. On the evening in question, Officers Roman and Natale, both City of New Haven police officers, were on duty and were assigned to the Street Interdiction Detail ("SID").2 Officers Roman and Natale were not in uniform, but were wearing blue sweatshirts with yellow lettering that identified them as New Haven police officers, and both had their police badges hanging from chains around their necks. Officer Roman was driving an unmarked New Haven police car, with Officer Natale riding in the front seat. The unmarked police car did not have a siren or flashing lights, but it did have an exterior spotlight on the driver's side.

At approximately 7:35 p.m., Officers Roman and Natale were traveling in the unmarked police car on Day Street, immediately behind a car driven by Lakeia Dunkley with Ronshemu Pittman as a passenger in the front seat. Ms. Dunkley turned left from Day Street onto Chapel Street while the overhead traffic light was red. Officers Roman and Natale followed her and tried unsuccessfully to get her to stop by illuminating her vehicle with the police car's spotlight and flashing the high beams. After approximately two blocks, Officer Roman was able to pull along side of Ms. Dunkley's vehicle. Officer Natale identified herself and Officer Roman as police officers and requested that Ms. Dunkley pull over. Ms. Dunkley complied and pulled over at the corner of Chapel Street and Sherman Avenue. Officer Roman parked behind and to the left of Ms. Dunkley's car and placed a radio call for a marked New Haven police vehicle to assist, since this was a stop for a traffic violation. Officers Roman and Natale exited the police vehicle and approached Ms. Dunkley's vehicle, Officer Roman on the driver's side and Officer Natale on the passenger's side.

Officer Roman states that, once at the vehicle, he informed Ms. Dunkley of the reason for the stop and asked her for her driver's license, vehicle registration, and insurance information. Ms. Dunkley was upset and inquired again why she had been stopped, to which Officer Roman responded that she had made an improper left turn while the traffic light was red and that he had been following right behind her. According to Officer Roman, Ms. Dunkley then became agitated and very argumentative.3 Ms. Dunkley complained that this was not right and was harassment. She provided her license but was unable to locate her vehicle registration or insurance information and continued to argue with Officer Roman.

Officer Roman then asked the passenger for his name. The passenger responded that he was Ronshemu Pittman. Ms. Dunkley became more even more irate, yelling at Officer Roman and continuing to claim police harassment. He again asked for Ms. Dunkley's vehicle documents, but she did not provide them.

Officer Roman states that he was concerned about Ms. Dunkley's evasiveness and, at that point, asked Ms. Dunkley to remove the car keys from the ignition and to exit the vehicle "for officer safety reasons." (Roman Aff. ¶ 18.) Ms. Dunkley gave him her keys, which he placed on the vehicle roof. Upon exiting the vehicle, Ms. Dunkley grabbed the keys and threw them onto the driver's seat.

Officer Natale asked Mr. Pittman to exit the vehicle also, and "for officer safety" Officer Natale conducted an outer garment pat down of Mr. Pittman and then of Ms. Dunkley, while Officer Roman proceeded to the police car to start the legal forms documenting the traffic violation. (Pl.'s Ex. B, Roman Police Report at 2.) At this point, some other officers from SID arrived on the scene, but most left as soon as they became aware that this was just a traffic stop.

Ms. Dunkley continued to yell profanities at the officers and yelled that she did not want all of these people watching her. Mr. Pittman told her to calm down, stating that she was getting "too hyper." Id.

As Officer Roman was sitting in the unmarked police car preparing the ticket, he learned that Ms. Dunkley's driver's license had been suspended. As he was preparing to confront Ms. Dunkley with this information, he became aware that she was no longer standing. He learned from another officer that she was on the ground. Officer Roman immediately exited the police car and located Ms. Dunkley.

Another officer on the scene, Officer Terrence McNeil, had already called for emergency medical assistance. The paramedics and an ambulance arrived at the scene. Officer Roman was informed that Ms. Dunkley was not breathing. Upon orders from a superior officer, he followed the ambulance to the Hospital of St. Raphael. Efforts to revive Ms. Dunkley were unsuccessful, and Dr. Paul Russo pronounced her dead at 8:40 p.m. Pursuant to orders from a superior officer, Officer Roman then notified the Bureau of Identification of the death.

Officer Roman never conducted a search of the person of Ms. Dunkley or of the motor vehicle that she had been operating. Officer Roman never ordered an autopsy to be performed.

Officer Natale's report confirms that after Ms. Dunkley exited her vehicle, she continued to yell and swear at the officers that they were harassing her and had no reason to stop her, and that Mr. Pittman tried to get her to calm down. Officer Natale stated that Ms. Dunkley would...

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6 cases
  • State v. Edmonds
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • September 13, 2016
    ...safety does not constitute the sort of specific, articulable evidence necessary to justify a Terry stop. See Pinnock v. New Haven, 553 F. Supp. 2d 130, 141 (D. Conn. 2008). Accordingly, while we remain cognizant of law enforcement officers' legitimate safety concerns, we cannot allow the po......
  • State v. Edmonds
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • September 13, 2016
    ...their safety does not constitute the sort of specific, articulable evidence necessary to justify a Terry stop. See Pinnock v. New Haven, 553 F.Supp.2d 130, 141 (D.Conn.2008).Accordingly, while we remain cognizant of law enforcement officers' legitimate safety concerns, we cannot allow the p......
  • Ozga v. Elliot
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • December 21, 2015
    ...discretionary law enforcement acts and subject to none of the immunity exceptions described above. See, e.g., Pinnock v. City of New Haven, 553 F.Supp.2d 130, 144 (D.Conn.2008). Accordingly, I find that defendants are entitled to governmental immunity and I grant summary judgment as to Ozga......
  • Ochoa v. City of West Haven
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • July 29, 2011
    ...superior. While this immunity may be abrogated by statute, no such statute has been cited by Plaintiff[s]." Pinnock v. City of New Haven, 553 F.Supp.2d 130, 145 (D. Conn. 2008)(citation omitted). Additionally, "[t]he Connecticut Supreme Court has clearly held that a political subdivision of......
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