Pinson v. Minidoka Highway District

Citation106 P.2d 1020,61 Idaho 731
Decision Date29 October 1940
Docket Number6829
PartiesGRACE L. PINSON, in Her Own Behalf as Widow of JAMES EARL PINSON and on Behalf of SUSAN PINSON, Dependent Mother of JAMES EARL PINSON, Deceased, and SUSAN PINSON, Respondents, v. MINIDOKA HIGHWAY DISTRICT, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Appellants
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-EMPLOYER-ACCIDENT.

1. The identity of person paying compensation of employee, loaned by employer to do work for another, is not controlling on question whether person to whom employee is lent becomes his employer within Workmen's Compensation Act. (I. C. A sec. 43-901 et seq.)

2. Generally, right to control and direct employee's activities or power to control details of his work and determine how it shall be done and whether it shall stop or continue gives rise to relationship of employer and employee within Workmen's Compensation Act and person to whom services are furnished by another's employee under such person's direction and control becomes "temporary employer" liable for compensation for injuries to or death of such employee. (I. C. A., sec. 43-901 et seq.)

3. A highway district, under control of which employee of federal reclamation service was working in furtherance of district's business and affairs on district highway improvement project at time of accident resulting in his death, was his "temporary employer" and liable to his widow and dependent mother for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, though employee was hired and paid by the United States. (I. C. A., sec. 43-1001; 5 U.S. C A., sec. 751.)

4. The Industrial Accident Board's finding that brain stroke which caused employee's death, was result of his lifting and straining on drill stuck in hole and "personal injury by accident," warranted award of compensation for his death under Workmen's Compensation Act as against contention that board failed to find that injury was caused by accident. (I. C. A., sec. 43-901 et seq.)

5. To constitute "accident" within Workmen's Compensation Act, it is not necessary that workman trip or fall or that machinery fail, but "accident" occurs in doing what workman habitually does, if any unexpected undesigned, unlooked-for or untoward event or mishap, connected with or growing out of employment, takes place. (I. C. A., sec. 43-1001, as amended by Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 161, sec. 1.)

6. A rupture of blood vessel in employee's brain as result of lifting and straining on drill stuck in hole was personal injury by "accident," though he was doing work he expected to do in manner contemplated and there was no fall, slip, or stumble on his part or breakdown of machinery operated by him. (I. C. A., sec. 43-1001, as amended by Sess. Laws, 1939, chap. 161, sec. 1.)

APPEAL from order of the Industrial Accident Board.

Proceedings under Workmen's Compensation Act. Order of board awarding compensation. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Clarence L. Hillman, for Appellants.

Since the sole personal injury caused by an accident for which respondents sought relief was death by disease--a paralytic stroke and meningitis--the burden of proof was upon them to prove:

(1) That the decedent Pinson suffered a personal injury caused by an accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment with appellant Minidoka Highway District;

(2) That the decedent suffered a personal injury caused by an accident resulting in disease--a paralytic stroke and meningitis. (Sess. Laws, 1927, chap. 106, sec. 20; 1939 Laws, chap. 161, secs, 1, 2; I. C. A., secs. 43-1809, 43-1810, 43-1202, 43-1203, 43-1204, 43-1001 (as amended 1939 Laws, chap. 161, sec. 1); Walker v. Hyde, 43 Idaho 625, 253 P. 1104; Hawkins v. Bonner County, 46 Idaho 739, 271 P. 327; Reader v. Milwaukee Lbr. Co., 47 Idaho 380, 275 P. 1114; Croy v. McFarland-Brown Lumber Co., 51 Idaho 32, 1 P.2d 189; Moody v. State Highway Dept., 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1108.)

Since the decedent Pinson was employed and paid by the United States Government, and under its direction and control, the relation of master and servant existed between it and the decedent, and any liability for workmen's compensation due would be from and under the federal laws and not under the workmen's compensation statutes of Idaho; and the relation of master and servant is to be determined under the common-law rule. (Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 11J, 53 Idaho 49, 22 P.2d 299; Bisson v. Winnipesaukee Air Service, Inc., et al., (N. H.) 13 A.2d 821; Rich Hill Coal Co. et al. v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 7 A.2d 302, 319, 320.)

H. A. Baker, for Respondents.

"Accident," as used in Workmen's Compensation Law, has always been defined to be "an undesigned, sudden, unexpected, or unlooked-for, untoward event or mishap connected with or resulting from the industry or employment." (Mcneil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., 34 Idaho 773, 203 P. 1068; Aldrich v. Dole, 43 Idaho 30, 247 P. 87; Reader v. Milwaukee Lumber Co., 47 Idaho 380, 275 P. 1114; In re Larson, 48 Idaho 136, 279 P. 1087.)

A finding that an employee "received an injury by accident" as used in sec. 43-1810, amounts to a finding that he "received injury--the result of an accident" as used in sec. 43-1809, and to a finding that he "received an injury caused by an accident" as used in sec. 43-1001, as amended. (Smith v. Mercy Hospital, 60 Idaho 674, 95 P.2d 580.)

To constitute an "accident" it is not necessary that workman slip or fall or that machinery fail. "Accident" occurs in doing what the workman habitually does if any unexpected, undesigned, unlooked-for or untoward event or mishap, connected with or growing out of the employment, takes place. (McNeil v. Panhandle Lumber Co., supra; In re Larson, supra; Leach v. Grangeville Highway Dist., 55 Idaho 307, 41 P.2d 618; Beaver v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 55 Idaho 275, 41 P.2d 605, 97 A. L. R. 1399; Cook v. Winget, 60 Idaho 561, 94 P.2d 676; Hieronymus v. Stone's Food Stores, Inc., 60 Idaho 727, 96 P.2d 435.)

"Employee" as used in the Workmen's Compensation Law, includes loaned employees of another. To make one an "employee" it is not necessary that the alleged employer pay him his wages, the right to direct and control being the principal test. (Sec. 43-1807, I. C. A.; Larson v. Independent School Dist., 53 Idaho 49, 22 P.2d 299; Modlin v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 49 Idaho 199, 286 P. 612; Palmer v. J. A. Terteling & Sons, 52 Idaho 170, 16 P.2d 221; 71 C. J. 405-408; Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29 S.Ct. 252, 254, 53 L.Ed. 480; Altherhold v. William Stoddart Co., 286 Pa. 278, 133 A. 504.)

BUDGE, J. Ailshie, C. J., and Givens, Morgan and Holden, JJ., concur.

OPINION

BUDGE, J.

In January, 1940, the Minidoka Highway District desired to and did thereafter improve a certain highway within its boundaries under the direction and supervision of G. W. Jones its engineer engaged for that work. The district did not have the necessary machinery for the removal of rock and through its attorney solicited the United States Reclamation Service to furnish an air compressor and operator and two jack-hammers or drills. The reclamation service, with the knowledge of the highway district, furnished an air compressor and operator and two jack-hammers with operators, of whom Pinson, the deceased, was one. The men were engaged by the reclamation service on January 4th for the specific purpose of working on the highway and were told that Jones, the engineer in charge, would tell them what to do. The work was not that of the United States. The men were hired by the reclamation service, paid by the United States and directed to work under the order of the highway engineer.

Mr. Pinson, a man sixty years of age and weighing about 150 pounds, began to work on the highway pursuant to the arrangement above outlined, on January 5th and continued to January 13th, operating a jack-hammer, a machine weighing 65 pounds and operated by a rotating and pounding motion accompanied by violent jerkings and vibrations. On January 13th, the drill the deceased Pinson was operating caught or became stuck in the materials through which it had been driven and he attempted to remove the drill by his own strength and efforts but was unable to do so. A co-worker observing his difficulty went to his aid and the two removed the drill. Soon and within ten minutes from the time he endeavored to remove the drill it appeared to the other occupants of the automobile in which the workers were then riding to another point where work was to be continued that Pinson's sight was failing and there was some discussion with him about it. He complained of severe headache and requested another occupant of the car to drive. When they reached the place where they were to continue work Pinson did not leave the automobile and a short time later one of the workmen returned to the car and found Pinson very sick. Jones, the engineer, directed two men to take Pinson home, one to drive his car and the other to follow in another car to return the men to the job. On reaching home Pinson vomited two or more times and was assisted into the house by Mrs. Pinson. He said he was dreadfully sick, complained of pain over his right eye, could not walk alone or see distinctly and wanted aspirin.

Dr Elmore was called and found Pinson complaining of severe pain in his head and observed he had difficulty in seeing and in talking and did not have use of his left arm and leg. Pinson told the doctor of the trouble he had in removing the drill. It was the positive conclusion of the attending and a consulting physician that the exertion in his efforts to remove the drill increased the blood pressure in his circulatory system beyond the ability of some blood vessel in his brain to withstand and a rupture resulted, causing paralysis. ...

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