Pippins v. State, 24703
| Citation | 224 Ga. 462,162 S.E.2d 338 |
| Decision Date | 02 July 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 24703,24703 |
| Parties | Rayburn PIPPINS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The evidence authorized the verdict of guilty of robbery by force.
2. It was not error to permit two witnesses to testify after they had remained in the courtroom notwithstanding invocation of the rule for sequestration of witnesses.
3. Failure to charge on circumstantial evidence was not erroneous.
4. The court should have charged on alibi, even without request, since this was the defendant's sole defense and was sustained by some evidence.
Carlisle & Chason, Ralph E. Carlisle, Cain, Smith & Porter, J. R. Porter, Cairo, for appellant.
Fred B. Hand, Jr., Sol. Gen., Pelham, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Marion O. Gordon, Asst. Atty. Gen., William R. Childers, Jr., Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Upon indictment for robbery by force, Rayburn Pippins was tried and found guilty in the Superior Court of Grady County and sentenced to five years confinement in the penitentiary. His motion for new trial complains of the general grounds and also of permitting the sheriff and a deputy sheriff to testify although they remained in the courtroom after the sequestration of witnesses rule had been invoked. Enumerated as error in this appeal are the denial of this motion for new trial and also the failure of the court to charge the jury on circumstantial evidence and alibi.
1. The general grounds are not meritorious since there was evidence to support the verdict. The testimony was that the defendant, another person and the victim were together in a pool hall earlier on the evening of the robbery. The latter testified that he had money on his person; that he accepted the offer by the defendant and the other person to carry him to his hotel; that instead they took him to the edge of town where they stopped the car; that the other person struggled with him and tried to seize his billfold; that the defendant knocked him unconscious; and that when he regained consciousness he was in the hospital and his money was gone. He was positive in his identification of the defendant. There was also testimony which identified an automobile belonging to the defendant's uncle and frequently used by the defendant as the one parked by the edge of the road where the victim was found a short while later.
2. No error was committed in permitting the sheriff and his deputy to testify over the defendant's objections.
Those objections were essentially the same. As to the sheriff, the objection was that the rule was invoked and the witnesses sent out, but that he had stayed in the courtroom and heard all of the testimony. As to the deputy the objection was that the rule was invoked by the State and the witnesses sent out of the room, and he was not privileged to stay in the courtroom and hear testimony and then testify.
It should be pointed out that the objection was not that the trial court abused its discretion in applying Code § 38-1703, by permitting these officers to remain in the courtroom. See Dye v. State, 220 Ga. 113, 114-115, 137 S.E.2d 465.
Rather, the objection was that they were incompetent to testify because they had violated the rule by remaining and hearing the testimony of other witnesses. This court has repeatedly held that the fact that a witness had violated the rule does not disqualify him from testifying. McWhorter v. State, 118 Ga. 55(6), 44 S.E. 873; Phillips v. State, 121 Ga. 358(3), 49 S.E. 290; Shelton v. State, 220 Ga. 610, 140 S.E.2d 839. The violation may be considered on their credibility, as the trial court instructed the jury.
3. The trial court did not err in failing, without request, to charge on circumstantial evidence. The State's case did not rest upon circumstantial evidence alone. There was direct evidence as to the identity of the defendant as a perpetrator of the crime and as to the...
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Rivers v. State
...of alibi, no doubt in large part because of the confusion over whether alibi was an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Pippins v. State, 224 Ga. 462(4), 162 S.E.2d 338 (1968). As noted above, Lavender v. State changed the rule that it was ordinarily error to fail to charge on an affirmative de......
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Allen v. State, s. 30311
...No error was committed in this case. See Childers v. State, 130 Ga.App. 555, 557, 203 S.E.2d 874 (1974); also Pippins v. State, 224 Ga. 462, 162 S.E.2d 338 (1968); Fountain v. State, 228 Ga. 306, 185 S.E.2d 62 (1971); Prevatte v. State, 233 Ga. 929, 214 S.E.2d 365 (1975). But, see Montos v.......
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Stuart v. State, 45833
...may abuse his discretion in applying said statute, by permitting these witnesses to remain in the courtroom. See Pippins v. State, 224 Ga. 462(2), at p. 463, 162 S.E.2d 338. Or the trial judge may fail to exercise the discretion vested in him, which would, in effect, be the same as abusing ......
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Dudley v. State, 56667
...112 S.E. 724. The witness here was not incompetent or disqualified, and his testimony was relevant and material. See Pippins v. State, 224 Ga. 462(2), 464, 162 S.E.2d 338; McWhorter v. State, 118 Ga. 55(6), 44 S.E. 873; Phillips v. State, 121 Ga. 358(3), 49 S.E. 290; Shelton v. State, 220 G......