Piro v. Piro
| Decision Date | 10 July 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 16025,16025 |
| Citation | 327 S.W.2d 335 |
| Parties | Herbert PIRO, Appellant, v. Rosie Nell PIRO, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
John H. Holloway, Houston, for appellant.
O'Neal Morris, Houston, for appellee.
On June 5, 1959, we entered judgment reforming and affirming the judgment of the trial court. After further study of the case on motion for rehearing we have come to the conclusion that we were in error in so doing. The former opinion is hereby withdrawn and the following substituted therefor.
The basic question to be resolved on appeal is that determining the extent, if any, of the community estate and interest in and to an unsettled pending compensation claim growing out of an alleged injury to the husband, as calculable upon the date a decree is entered divorcing such injured person from his wife. Elements of such a claim for compensation include the question of liability of third-party insurance companies therefor, and, if liability exists, to what extent and for what period.
It has been held that a claim for death benefits under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, a claim separate from that based upon the injury itself, is vested, complete and absolute, and may be assigned. Swain V. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 1937, 130 Tex. 277, 109 S.W.2d 750; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Boysen, Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1939, 123 S.W.2d 1016, writ dism., judgment correct. It has been held that compensation paid to one marital partner becomes the community property of both. Pickens v. Pickens, 1935, 125 Tex. 410, 83 S.W.2d 951.
We believe such holdings to be correct, and it follows that a chose in action for compensation because of an injury to one marital partner is the community property of both to the extent that it is a liquidated claim and demand, as for accrued compensation. Contrarily, however, as to the extent such chose in action is a claim and demand, as for an unliquidated amount, for compensation which has not yet accrued, it remains the separate property of the injured person and constitutes no part of the community property of such person and his marital partner. Thus, if it is possible at any time for married persons to determine what part of a compensation claim may properly be arrived at as then fixed, due and owing, they can treat same as community property.
In the event of a dissolution of the marriage relation of a husband and wife by a decree of divorce, a calculation of the amount of compensation due and accrued as community property may be possible in some instances. If not calculable in money at such time, but will be as of such time, upon entry of a final judgment or award in a pending compensation case, the court trying the divorce case can divide the interest in compensation which is calculable as having accrued on and prior to the date thereof. However, in the event the decree of divorce grants to the uninjured partner any interest in the compensation claim of the injured partner which 'reaches into' compensation which has not accrued, or which may be determined in the trial of the compensation case as not having accrued on and prior to the date of the divorce, the decree would amount to a judicial compulsory assignment of compensation benefits belonging to the single individual entitled thereto. Such an assignment is prohibited by Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St., Art. 8306, sec. 3.
It has been stated in a case where the property division decreed in a divorce judgment gave the uninjured partner a 50% interest in specific compensation, payable over a period of more than double that of the time interval between the date of injury and the date of the divorce decree, that such award amounted to a judicial compulsory assignment prohibited by Art. 8306, sec. 3. Mabry v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., Tex.Civ.App. Galveston, 1950, 230 S.W.2d 572.
In view of our belief in the principles above stated we examine the case...
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Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Few
...benefits are community property to the extent that they represent disability which accrues during marriage. Piro v. Piro, 327 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Civ.App., Ft. Worth, 1959, writ dism.); Speer's Martial Rights in Texas, Vol. 1, p. 638, sec. 432; 30 T.J.2d, p. 131, sec. 74; Pickens v. Pickens, 12......
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Garrison v. Texas Commerce Bank
...that a final judgment had been rendered despite the language attempting to make the decree interlocutory. Piro v. Piro, 327 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1959, writ dism'd) is an example of a case in which a final judgment was rendered by the trial court granting a divorce and determi......
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Piro v. Piro
...therewith made a division of the community property. Appellant perfected an appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals and on July 10, 1959, 327 S.W.2d 335, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in so far as it pertained to the division of community property and affirmed that portion......
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U.S. v. Stelter, 6586
...of division regardless of the statutory prohibition forbidding any compulsory assignment of the claim. Piro v. Piro, 327 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1959, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The first point is overruled. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 Of more concern is the second point presented ......