U.S. v. Stelter, 6586

Decision Date22 June 1977
Docket NumberNo. 6586,6586
Citation553 S.W.2d 227
PartiesThe UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Dorothy M. STELTER, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals
OPINION

WARD, Justice.

This is a garnishment proceeding where summary judgment was granted against the United States as garnishee. The question to be determined is if the ex-wife in a Texas divorce, who has been awarded a portion of the military retirement pay of her ex-husband as her share of the community property, can garnish the United States under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 659. We affirm.

On November 16, 1973, Dorothy M. Stelter secured a divorce from Robert W. Stelter in the District Court in El Paso. The Court found that the parties had been married for fourteen years, during all of which time the husband had been in the military service; that he had retired after twenty years of service; and that the wife was entitled to receive 7/20ths of the husband's retirement pay as her share of the community property. The husband never complied with the judgment and the wife, in the divorce cause, instituted the present garnishment proceedings against the United States under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 659. The Government and the wife agreeing that no factual dispute was present, both moved for a summary judgment. The Court, after hearing, denied the motion filed by the United States, granted summary judgment in favor of the wife, and ordered that she recover of the garnishee 7/20ths of the monthly retirement pay due the ex-husband.

Glaring defects in the garnishment proceedings by both parties aside, the United States appeals upon only two points which are similar to the grounds it urged in its motion for summary judgment in the trial Court. It first claims that the trial Court committed error in holding that the military retirement pay was not current wages for personal services under Article 16, Sec. 28 of the Texas Constitution. 1 That Section states:

"Sec. 28. No current wages for personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment."

Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4099 states:

"No current wages for personal service shall be subject to garnishment; and where it appears upon the trial that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant for such current wages, the garnishee shall nevertheless be discharged as to such indebtedness."

It is settled that the exemption statute should be liberally construed in favor of the wage earner. To be exempt from garnishment, the money payable to the ex-husband must be due as "current wages" and also as remuneration for "personal service." For the purposes of this opinion, we might assume that military retirement pay due the ex-husband was exempt from garnishment since it met both requirements. That would not answer the present question, as the wife's portion no longer belongs to the ex-husband but has been awarded to the wife as her share of the community assets and as a vested property right. The claim on behalf of the ex-husband for exemption does not apply to her property. It is the same as if the homestead had been divided upon divorce, Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21 (1923), and is similar to that portion of the husband's workmen's compensation claim that has accrued or vested prior to divorce and is capable of division regardless of the statutory prohibition forbidding any compulsory assignment of the claim. Piro v. Piro, 327 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1959, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The first point is overruled. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1970).

Of more concern is the second point presented which is to the effect that the trial Court erred in determining that the word "alimony," as used in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 659, includes a division of military retirement pay by a Texas Court upon dissolution of the marriage. On January 1, 1975, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 659 became effective whereby the United States consented to be sued for the enforcement of any legal obligation by the...

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9 cases
  • Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 22 Enero 1979
    ...on whether the alimony that could be made the subject of garnishment included community property. Compare United States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex.Civ.App.1977), rev'd, 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.1978); Williams v. Williams, 338 So.2d 869 (Fla.App.1976), with Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d ......
  • Estate of Grimes v. Dorchester Gas Producing Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 27 Febrero 1986
    ... ... 4 well requires us to overrule appellants' points one, two, and three. That action obviates the necessity for ... ...
  • Morris v. Morris
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 28 Febrero 1995
    ...pay is a vested community property right, subject to division by the divorce court, and it is not alimony. United States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1977), reversed on other grounds, 567 S.W.2d 797 (1978). Donald's second point of error is In his third point of er......
  • Circle Dot Ranch, Inc. v. Sidwell Oil and Gas, Inc.
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    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 26 Enero 1995
    ... ...         The application of the principles addressed by the foregoing authorities leads us to the conclusion that the bare language of the express covenant of consolidation implies a ... ...
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