Piteau v. Bd. of Educ. of The City of Hartford, 18351.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 18351.,18351.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Michael PITEAUv.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

300 Conn. 667

15 A.3d 1067

161 Lab.Cas. P 61,135

265 Ed. Law Rep. 1115

Michael PITEAU

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF HARTFORD et al.

No. 18351.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 10, 2010.Decided April 19, 2011.

William R. Darcy, with whom was Barry S. Zitser, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).Ann F. Bird, Hartford, for the appellee (named defendant).J. William Gagne, Jr., West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appellees (defendant Local 566, Council 4, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL–CIO, et al.).Karen K. Buffkin, Hartford, filed a brief for the state board of labor relations as amicus curiae.ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.PALMER, J.

The plaintiff, Michael Piteau, brought this action against the defendants, the board of education of the city of Hartford (board of education), Local 566, Council 4, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL–CIO (Local 566), and Council 4, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL–CIO (Council 4), alleging that Local 566 and Council 4 ¹ had breached their duty of fair representation and that the board of education had breached its collective bargaining agreement with the unions. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after concluding that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the state board of labor relations (board of labor relations) in accordance with General Statutes §§ 7–468(d),² 7–470(b) ³ and 7–471(5) ⁴ of the Municipal Employees Relations Act (act), General Statutes § 7–460 et seq. On appeal,⁵ the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly interpreted the act as divesting the Superior Court of concurrent jurisdiction over claims alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant factual allegations ⁶ and procedural history. The plaintiff was employed by the board of education as a mechanical journeyman from 1996 until 2006. His primary responsibility was to maintain the mechanical systems at Hartford Public High School. In 2005, the board of education hired private contractors to demolish portions of the school building, including the mechanical systems, in connection with a renovation of the school. The demolition yielded valuable scrap metal, which the contractors placed in piles around the construction site. Over the course of the renovation, with the permission of the contractors, the plaintiff, together with his supervisor, Joseph Baker, and a coworker, Vincent Chesky, gathered the discarded metal, cut it into smaller pieces, and sold it to local scrap dealers. In July, 2006, following a complaint about their activities, the board of education placed the three men on paid leave pending the outcome of an investigation. When an investigator acting on behalf of the board of education first questioned Chesky, he denied any involvement in the salvaging operation and signed a statement to that effect. Subsequently, Baker resigned, and the board of education brought disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff and Chesky.

At all times relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff and Chesky were members of Local 566. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between that union and the board of education, Local 566 was the exclusive bargaining agent for employees in the job position that the plaintiff and Chesky occupied. The president of Local 566, Mark Blumenthal, represented both men at their respective predisciplinary conferences. At those meetings, the plaintiff and Chesky gave different accounts of their salvaging activities, and Chesky changed his original account altogether. Although both admitted that they had taken metal from the construction site for recycling, the plaintiff stated that they had done so during nonworking hours, whereas Chesky stated that they had done so during working hours. Chesky also stated that, in contrast to the plaintiff, he did not receive payment for the metal.

On September 13, 2006, the board of education terminated the plaintiff's employment. On September 20, 2006, Blumenthal filed a grievance with the board of education on the plaintiff's behalf. On September 22, 2006, the labor relations manager for the board of labor relations, Jill Cutler–Hodgman, drafted a statement for Chesky to sign that was highly prejudicial to the plaintiff. In that statement, which was witnessed and signed by Blumenthal, Chesky stated that, over the course of one year, he regularly had witnessed the plaintiff and Baker salvaging scrap metal from the construction site at Hartford Public High School and preparing the metal for resale during the work day. Chesky further stated that, although he knew that the plaintiff and Baker were wrong to have engaged in such activity, he occasionally had helped them collect the scrap metal. The plaintiff initially was not informed about this statement, which Chesky had provided to the board of education.

Thereafter, Cutler–Hodgman prepared a “last chance agreement” between Chesky and the board of education that provided in relevant part: “All [p]arties recognize and agree that Chesky has engaged in inappropriate and unprofessional conduct. Specifically, Chesky used extraordinarily bad judgment based on his involvement with preparing materials, including copper and brass pipes, for resale. Chesky's decision to assist other employees both during work time and on his own time preparing materials, including copper and pipes, for resale, was completely irresponsible and intolerable.” The last chance agreement also provided that “[a]ll [p]arties recognize and agree that the [aforementioned] conduct ... is completely unacceptable and inappropriate,” that “[a]ll [p]arties further agree that the [b]oard [of education] has just cause to terminate Chesky's employment,” and that, “[i]n order to provide Chesky one final opportunity to conduct himself in an appropriate manner as an employee of the [b]oard [of education], the [b]oard [of education] agrees to allow him one last chance for employment.” Under the agreement, Chesky was required to testify truthfully regarding the plaintiff's participation in the salvaging activities. Once again, Blumenthal did not advise the plaintiff of Chesky's last chance agreement, which Chesky, Blumenthal and Cutler–Hodgman, on behalf of the board of education, signed on October 5, 2006.

On October 4, 2006, Blumenthal represented the plaintiff in a grievance proceeding against the board of education. On October 24, 2006, the board of education denied the plaintiff's grievance, and the unions filed a timely demand for arbitration as provided under the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Patrick Sampson, assisted by Blumenthal, represented the unions at the arbitration proceeding before the state board of mediation and arbitration. At the commencement of that proceeding, which was neither recorded nor transcribed, Sampson moved to sequester all witnesses, including the plaintiff. Sampson's motion was granted. Consequently, the plaintiff was precluded from hearing Chesky's testimony or learning about Chesky's last chance agreement with the board of education.

Following the arbitration proceeding, the parties filed posthearing briefs. In its brief, the board of education relied heavily on Chesky's last chance agreement, arguing repeatedly that the agreement constituted an admission by the unions that the board of education had just cause to terminate the plaintiff. On September 10, 2007, the arbitration panel rendered a unanimous decision in favor of the board of education. In its decision, the panel also relied on the last chance agreement, stating in relevant part: “Testimony from Chesky reveals that the [plaintiff] and Baker conducted the salvaging operation during working hours. Chesky was then given a [l]ast [c]hance [a]greement ... [that] stated that his role in the operation was completely unacceptable and inappropriate ... and the [b]oard [of education] ha [d] just cause to terminate his employment....

* * *

“The [b]oard of [e]ducation believes it ha[s] proved ample just cause for termination. The [plaintiff] committed multiple acts of serious misconduct which warrants termination. The [u]nion has acknowledged the misconduct as warranting termination in ... Chesky's [l]ast [c]hance [a]greement. The [plaintiff] shall not be afforded progressive discipline because his acts consisted of serious misconduct.”

According to the plaintiff, he learned of Chesky's last chance agreement for the first time upon reading the arbitration panel's decision. The plaintiff also alleged that, if he had known about the agreement during the grievance and arbitration proceedings, he would have obtained private counsel to represent him in those proceedings, and he would have challenged the statements contained in the agreement, including the statement that “[a]ll parties ... agree” that the board of education had just cause to terminate Chesky for his salvaging activities.

Following the arbitration panel's decision, the plaintiff filed an unfair labor practice complaint with the board of labor relations, alleging, inter alia, that the unions had violated their duty of fair representation ⁷ under § 7–470(b)(3) ⁸ by negotiating a settlement agreement on behalf of Chesky that was highly prejudicial to the plaintiff without disclosing that fact to him. The plaintiff also alleged that the unions had processed his grievance in an entirely perfunctory and inadequate manner. The plaintiff, however, withdrew his complaint before the board of labor relations could act on it.

Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the present action against the unions and the board of education, claiming that the unions had breached their statutory duty of fair...