Pitt v. State

Decision Date23 September 2003
Docket NumberNo. 1264,1264
PartiesCharles Lee PITT v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Mark Colvin, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.

Diane E. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Argued before DAVIS, KRAUSER and BARBERA, JJ.

DAVIS, J.

On May 8 and 9, 2002, appellant Charles Lee Pitt was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County and was convicted of first degree burglary, theft over $500, and malicious destruction of property. Subsequently, on July 9, 2002, appellant was sentenced to a twenty-year term of imprisonment for first degree burglary and a concurrent sixty-day term for destruction of property. The count for theft over $500 merged into the count for first degree burglary.

Appellant noted his timely appeal on July 15, 2002, presenting four questions, which we restate as follows:

I. Did the trial court err by denying the motion to suppress appellant's statements to the police?

II. Did the trial court err by admitting into evidence State's Exhibit Number Five?

III. Is the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction for theft over $500?

IV. Did the trial court err by ordering appellant to pay $400,000 in restitution?

We answer question I in the affirmative, and questions II, III, and IV in the negative. Although we shall reverse the judgment of the trial court, we nonetheless address issues II through IV for the guidance of the lower court on remand.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In September 2001, Rosalie Rawle owned a house at 2708 Franklinville Road in Joppa. While vacationing in Florida, she received a telephone call from her neighbor, David Winni.1 Winni informed Ms. Rawle that, on September 3, 2001, he discovered that someone had broken into her house. Ms. Rawle returned to her house and discovered that some of her property was missing, including jewelry and a checkbook for an account that she owned jointly with her son, James Rawle.

James Rawle and his wife, Renata Ramsburg-Rawle, also discovered that some of their property had been stolen. The couple operated an antique business that sold jewelry and, in the early part of the summer 2001, Rawle and his wife had put some of the jewelry in a basement closet in Ms. Rawle's house. Rawle testified that the jewelry, receipts and records for the jewelry, a handgun, and a shotgun collection were missing after the burglary.

On September 19, 2001, Trooper John Wilson executed a search and seizure warrant at 3912 Red Deer Circle in Randallstown. Appellant was located in a bedroom inside the residence. Because there was an arrest warrant on file for appellant prior to the execution of the search warrant, Trooper Wilson arrested appellant.

Trooper Gary Kulik transported appellant to the State Police Barracks in Bel Air. According to Trooper Kulik's testimony, while in route to the barracks, appellant stated that he had "knowledge or information that [ ] the investigators would be interested in and that he was interested in speaking to ... someone from the State Police in regard to relaying that information to us." Trooper Kulik further testified that, in return for this information, appellant "wanted reassurance that he could get some type of deal or some type of better sentence." Rather than respond directly, Trooper Kulik encouraged appellant to "hold off on [the] information" and told him that his request for a "deal" would be relayed to the lead investigator, Trooper Wilson. Moreover, Trooper Kulik testified he advised appellant that a representative from the Harford County State's Attorney's Office would have to be involved in any type of agreement. Accordingly, when Trooper Kulik arrived at the barracks, he informed Trooper Wilson that appellant had indicated that he wanted "some kind of deal worked out" before he would cooperate.

Upon his arrival at the Bel Air Barracks, appellant was temporarily placed in a cell and then moved to a polygraph room where the officers conduct interviews. Trooper Wilson testified that he read a Miranda2 form to appellant and that appellant placed his initials next to each Miranda warning, indicating that he understood them, and then signed his name at the bottom of the page. Next, Trooper Wilson advised appellant that a significant amount of property, including jewelry, was missing. Appellant once again stated that he had information concerning the burglary and the property, but he wanted a written agreement regarding the information he would provide. Consequently, an agreement was drafted and, after re-administering the Miranda warnings, Trooper Wilson read the agreement to appellant and both parties signed the agreement.

After appellant signed the agreement, Troopers Kulik and Wilson began questioning appellant about the Franklinville Road burglary. They informed appellant that they had recovered a cellular telephone at 3912 Red Deer Circle that was purchased from Office Depot using one of the checks stolen in the burglary. The cellular telephone had been activated in appellant's name. Appellant told them that an acquaintance, Jerome Bagley, purchased the cellular telephone. According to appellant, Bagley wrote a check to pay for the cellular telephone and then gave appellant the telephone. Appellant's description of Bagley matched an Office Depot employee's description of the cellular telephone purchaser.

Additionally, appellant informed the officers that Bagley still had the checkbook of one of the burglary victims in his possession and was keeping it in Bagley's 1999 Chevrolet Malibu. Appellant then reviewed a list of jewelry that had been stolen in the burglary and, after reviewing the list, stated that Bagley had a gold watch hanging from the rear view mirror of his Malibu.

Appellant further informed the officers that he was with Bagley a second time in Office Depot and, on that occasion, Bagley bought more items with another check from the victims. According to appellant, the items were in the basement of Bagley's residence. Appellant also stated that he had traveled with Bagley to Anne Arundel County and, while there, Bagley took jewelry to pawn at a pawnshop. Appellant, however, denied knowing from where the jewelry had come and, although he admitted that he performed burglaries in the past, he denied having knowledge of who had committed this burglary.

Subsequently, appellant accompanied Troopers Kulik and Wilson to 1617 North Port Street in Baltimore City—where Bagley's vehicle was located. Trooper Wilson approached Bagley's vehicle and drew a sketch of the watch that appellant had described. Appellant then identified Bagley's residence for the officers. The officers showed the sketch to the victims and they identified the watch as one of their stolen possessions. Shortly thereafter, Trooper Wilson obtained an arrest warrant for Bagley and a search warrant for Bagley's vehicle and house.

On September 19, 2001, the search warrant was executed and Bagley was arrested and questioned by Trooper Wilson. According to Trooper Wilson's testimony, "from the information I got from Mr. Bagley it appeared that [appellant] may not have told us everything as he was required to do by the agreement. He may have knowledge concerning where the property was and additional information concerning the burglary...." Thus, the next afternoon, Trooper Wilson and Trooper Jody Ressin went to the Detention Center to talk to appellant.

Trooper Wilson testified:

I told [appellant] that we don't think he had been completely truthful with us the day before and that I felt that he hadn't completely disclosed the knowledge he had of this case as required by his contract and that we were going to request he submit to a polygraph test as required by his contract.

According to Trooper Wilson, appellant immediately responded that "he hadn't told us everything" and "he went on to say that he had committed the burglary of the [Rawle's] residence along with an accomplice." Appellant continued, stating that the victims had overstated the jewelry that was stolen, that a gun taken in the burglary had been sold in Aberdeen or Edgewood, that "he wanted to keep his earlier deal [the officers] had made with him," and that "he knew more information, but he was going to hold back and he wanted us to honor this deal...." Trooper Wilson informed appellant that he would relay the information to Michael Sanger, the Assistant State's Attorney who had signed the plea agreement.

Thereafter, Trooper Wilson telephoned Sanger and was later informed that Sanger considered appellant's contract "null and void due to him not completely disclosing the information." Sanger further stated that he wished to schedule a polygraph and told Trooper Wilson to inform appellant that the agreement had been terminated.

Appellant's statements from September 19 and 20 were admitted at trial and the jury ultimately found him guilty of first degree burglary, theft over $500, and malicious destruction of property. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION
I

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police. According to appellant, the statements that he made on September 19 and 20, 2001 are the product of an inducement and, therefore, are involuntary. Relying upon Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986), and Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 522 A.2d 917 (1987), appellant avers that, because the State rescinded the plea agreement, his statements are inadmissible per se in the State's case-in-chief. Appellant also asserts that the September 20, 2001 statement "was made without [the] benefit of Miranda warnings." The State contends that appellant's statements are admissible because he breached the plea agreement.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court will look exclusively to the record of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
25 cases
  • Stone v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 13, 2008
    ...that the owner of personal property is presumptively qualified to testify about the value of his goods, Pitt v. State, 152 Md. App. 442, 465, 832 A.2d 267 (2003), aff'd, State v. Pitt, 390 Md. 697, 891 A,2d 312 (2006). See also Coffin v. State, 230 Md. 139, 142, 186 A.2d 216 (1962). Reisman......
  • Adams v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • May 21, 2014
  • Boiardi v. Freestate
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • September 25, 2013
    ...Appeals reversed, concluding that "there was insufficient evidence to establish that Sass never intended to perform." Id. at 441, 832 A.2d at 267. The court noted that plaintiff had produced no direct evidence that defendant, at the time he entered into the contract, lacked the intention to......
  • State v. Jerrome
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • May 8, 2014
    ...the offense or the severity of the punishment, to the extent that either is dependent on the value of the property taken.Pitt v. State, 152 Md.App. 442, 832 A.2d 267, 283 (2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The decision in [758 S.E.2d 582]Richardson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App.......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT