Pitts v. County of Kern

• Citation: 49 Cal.App.4th 1430,57 Cal.Rptr.2d 471
• Decision Date: 08 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. F021678,F021678
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 49 Cal.App.4th 1430 49 Cal.App.4th 1430, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7545, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,321 Ricky Lynn PITTS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF KERN et al., Defendants and Respondents. Colleen Dill FORSYTHE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF KERN et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 471

57 Cal.Rptr.2d 471

Previously published at 49 Cal.App.4th 1430

49 Cal.App.4th 1430, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7545,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,321

Ricky Lynn PITTS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF KERN et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Colleen Dill FORSYTHE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF KERN et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. F021678.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Oct. 8, 1996.

Certified For Partial Publication ^*

Review Granted Jan. 22, 1997.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Stephen P. Gildner, Rebecca A. Wiseman and John I. Kelly, Judges. ^*

Stanley M. Becker, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

B.C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel, Lynda M. Taylor, Deputy County Counsel, Robinson, Palmer & Stanton, Robinson, Palmer & Logan and William D. Palmer, Bakersfield, for Defendants and Respondents.

OPINION

THAXTER, Associate Justice.

We hold here that an elected district attorney is entitled to absolute immunity from liability for his alleged deficiencies in training and supervising employees of his office who perform prosecutorial functions. The employees allegedly violated the plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights in interviewing witnesses for and presenting evidence in a criminal prosecution against plaintiffs which resulted in their convictions later reversed on appeal. Because of that immunity, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the district attorney and his employees.

We further hold, however, that such immunity does not extend to the county represented by the district attorney, and triable issues of material fact remain as to whether the district attorney is a policymaker for the county and whether his alleged conduct constituted an official policy or custom subjecting the county to liability under federal civil rights statutes. Because of those triable issues, we conclude the court below erred in granting the county's motion for summary judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1984, a school official at an elementary school in Bakersfield, California reported a six-year-old boy named Brian acting in a sexually explicit manner with a little girl on the playground. When questioned about his conduct, Brian told authorities he had been molested by his noncustodial mother and her husband. The ensuing investigation and trial in Kern County became known as the "Pitts case"; in 1985, seven defendants were convicted of molesting Brian, his two brothers and three female cousins, ages four through nine. The defendants were each sentenced to hundreds of years in prison. In 1990 the convictions were overturned by this court which found the conduct of the prosecutors and the trial judge constituted "prosecutorial misconduct." (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 273 Cal.Rptr. 757.) In 1991, the district attorney dismissed the case. By 1994, all of the original child witnesses who testified recanted and claimed to have been forced to testify in the manner they had.

On March 31, 1992, Ricky Lynn Pitts and Marcella Pitts (plaintiffs) filed a third amended complaint (No. 215245) against the County of Kern, Kern County Department of Human Services, Child Protective Services, Edward Jagels, individually and as District Attorney of Kern County, Larry Kleier, individually and as Sheriff of Kern County, Kern County Sheriff's Department, Andrew Gindes, Bob Fields, Brad Darling, Carol Darling, Jack Rutledge, Michael Vendrasco, Jesse Sneed and others alleging numerous civil rights violations pursuant to 42 United States Code sections 1983 and 1988 stemming from the criminal case against them reversed on appeal.

On December 3, 1992, Colleen Dill Forsythe, Grace Dill, and Gina Miller (plaintiffs) filed a fourth amended complaint (No. 218820) against essentially the same parties. These two cases were consolidated upon order of the trial court.

The trial court entered summary judgment for defendants Michael Vendrasco (Vendrasco) and Carol Darling (Darling) as they had absolute prosecutorial immunity. Defendant Edward Jagels (Jagels), an individual, was found not to be a proper defendant. Defendant Jagels, district attorney, was found to have absolute immunity. The defendant County of Kern (County) was found to have absolute immunity from liability stemming from any act for which its employees Vendrasco and Darling had absolute immunity. Defendant County was also found to have absolute immunity from liability for the actions of Jagels as district attorney. ¹

After the summary judgment rulings, County successfully moved to sever claims and for separate trial as to the Monell (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611) claims against County based on conduct of the remaining defendants--the fourth and seventh causes of action in the Pitts complaint and the second and fifth causes of action in the Dill complaint.

At trial, the court granted nonsuit for defendant Andrew Gindes (Gindes) and dismissed actions as to Sheriff Larry Kleier (Kleier) and Deputy Sheriff Jesse Sneed (Sneed). The jury returned special verdicts finding that none of the remaining defendants--Jack Rutledge (Rutledge), Bob Fields (Fields), and Brad Darling (B. Darling)--violated any constitutional right of the plaintiffs. The court thereafter granted a nonsuit motion and dismissed County as no "custom and policy" issue remained.

Plaintiffs attack various rulings of the court below, some relating to the summary judgment rulings and some relating to pretrial and trial. ²

DISCUSSION

1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUES

County, Jagels, individually and as district attorney, Vendrasco, and Darling filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that every allegation plaintiffs made against them was barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, but defendants objected to the evidence plaintiffs presented to demonstrate triable issues existed. The court rejected plaintiffs' evidence and granted the motion on the affirmative defense of absolute immunity.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The summary judgment procedure aims to discover whether there is evidence requiring the fact finding procedures of a trial. (M.B. v. City of San Diego (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 699, 703, 284 Cal.Rptr. 555.) As the reviewing court, we determine de novo whether an issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. (Redevelopment Agency v. International House of Pancakes, Inc. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1348, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 358.) In other words, we must assume the role of the trial court and reassess the merits of the motion. (Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 544, 548, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 674.) In doing so, we will consider only the facts properly before the trial court when it ruled on the motion. (North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 30, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 104.)

In carrying out our appellate function, we apply the same three-step analysis of the trial court:

" 'First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings since it is these allegations to which the motion must respond.... [p] Secondly, we determine whether the moving party's showing has [satisfied his or her burden of proof] and justif[ies] a judgment in movant's favor.... [p] When a summary judgment motion prima facie justifies a judgment, the third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue.' " (Zuckerman v. Pacific Savings Bank (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1394, 1400-1401, 232 Cal.Rptr. 458; see also Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1513, 285 Cal.Rptr. 385.)

We also note that the moving party's papers are strictly construed and those of the opposing party liberally construed. Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1618, 264 Cal.Rptr. 756.)

THE PLEADINGS

The pertinent portions of Pitts's third amended complaint and Dills's fourth amended complaint, as they apply to the summary judgment motion, allege:

1. Defendants Darling and Vendrasco intimidated, threatened and coerced witnesses and alleged victims in investigating crimes charged against plaintiffs and in the course of subsequent legal proceedings, thereby knowingly procuring and using false testimony. Darling and Vendrasco intentionally suppressed and failed to reveal exculpatory evidence discovered by defendants which deprived plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Darling interrogated several children at the request of the sheriff's department. In particular, Darling took charge of interrogating the female children because they denied being molested, and she procured false testimony from them. Darling was not a prosecutor, investigator, nor employed by the sheriff's department during this period.

Darling knew at all times the false statements which the children were induced to make would be repeated at trial. The practices used by Darling and others, of coercion, intimidation, threats, promises and bribery, were enumerated on more than 30 occasions in the case of People v. Pitts, depriving plaintiffs of their constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

2. Defendants Vendrasco and Darling conspired to create and procure false testimony by the use of threats, intimidation, coercion, force and bribery knowing the testimony would cause constitutional violations.

3. Defendants County and Jagels in their official capacities established a pattern, custom, and practice of procuring false statements and testimony by threats, promises, intimidation, force, bribery and coercion of alleged victims, thereby establishing an official policy governing the conduct of employee defendants....