Pitts v. Dist. of Columbia
Decision Date | 31 March 2016 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 14-cv-1319 (TSC) |
Citation | 177 F.Supp.3d 347 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Parties | Patrice Pitts, et al., Plaintiffs, v. District of Columbia, et al., Defendants. |
Alec George Karakatsanis, Equal Justice Under Law, Inc., Phil Telfeyan, Katherine Hubbard, Equal Justice Under Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Joseph Alfonso Gonzalez, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs also bring a Monell claim for municipal liability against the District of Columbia, asserting that the Fourth Amendment violation described in paragraph (i)(a) above was the result of a policy, pattern and custom of such conduct by the MPD, as well as the MPD's failure to properly train and supervise its officers (Count IV).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They argue that the MPD Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged a violation of their clearly established constitutional rights. They also argue that Plaintiffs cannot make out a Monell violation because they cannot point to any predicate constitutional violation.
Upon consideration of Defendants' Motion and the parties' respective submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiffs, 56-year-old Patrice Pitts and her 37-year-old son Michael Pitts,1 allege that on the evening of March 26, 2013, the heavily armed MPD Officer Defendants broke down the front door of their Southeast Washington, D.C. apartment without knocking and announcing their presence while executing a search warrant. The warrant application was based on the affidavit of MPD Officer Defendant Mark Pugh (the “Affidavit”). The events leading up to and including the execution of the search warrant are set forth below.
According to Pugh's Affidavit, on March 23, 2013 (three days before the search was executed), Pugh and two other officers were conducting a “Robbery Suppression Operation in PSAs 704, 705 and 708,” which the Affidavit describes as being “known for having large amounts of street robberies involving firearms.” (Am. Compl. Ex. 1 (“Warrant”) at 3). The Affidavit states that one officer had received information that an individual who frequented the front of Plaintiffs' apartment building at 3921 4th Street S.E. was armed with a handgun. (Id. ). The Affidavit further states that, during the operation, the officers noticed Tyrone Pitts,2 who is Patrice's uncle, and who was then 64 years old, standing on the sidewalk in front of the apartment building wearing dark clothing. (Id. ).
According to the Affidavit, when Tyrone noticed the officers' presence, he attempted to avoid eye contact and appeared unsure of where he wanted to go. (Id. ). The officers then “made contact” with Tyrone and asked him and raised both of his arms in the air. (Id. ). Pugh then conducted a protective pat-down for weapons and felt a metal object in the front of Tyrone's waistband, which turned out to be a nine-millimeter semi-automatic handgun loaded with eleven rounds of ammunition. (Id. ). Tyrone was then arrested for possessing the handgun. (Id. at 4). Record searches subsequently determined that he was not licensed to carry a pistol in the District of Columbia and had not registered any firearms or ammunition in the District. (Id. ).
Plaintiffs challenge certain of the Affidavit's assertions regarding Tyrone's arrest. Most notably, they allege that Tyrone did not spontaneously declare to the officers that they could search him for weapons, and that, “[i]n reality, [he] was forcibly stopped on the street by MPD officers and immediately frisked and searched without ever providing consent.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44).
According to the Affidavit, after his arrest, Tyrone informed MPD officers that he lived in apartment number two at 3921 4th Street S.E. (Warrant at 4). Later that day, a uniformed MPD officer visited the apartment. (Id. ). The officer was met at the door by Patrice, who—apparently unaware that her uncle was already in custody—stated that she was Tyrone's niece, and that Tyrone lived there, but was not home. (Id. ).
Plaintiffs allege that, based on this interaction between the MPD officer and Patrice, the MPD Officer Defendants “knew before their invasion into the home that [Patrice] is frail, disabled and barely able to move.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 54).
After Tyrone's arrest and the MPD's reconnaissance of the apartment where the Pitts family lived, Officer Pugh applied for a warrant to search (i) “the entire premise” of the apartment “for the seizure of additional guns, additional ammunition and other gun related items, photographs or paperwork that reflect the possession of firearms, or paperwork reflecting who inhabits the residence,” as well as (ii) “any occupants located within the premises.” (Warrant at 4).
As Plaintiffs note, Pugh's Affidavit did not cite any particularized facts about Plaintiffs' apartment that would tend to indicate that the police were likely to find guns or gun-related items there; instead, the only evidence connecting the apartment to any criminal activity was the fact that a person who lived there (Tyrone) had been arrested three days earlier for possessing a gun on the street outside the apartment. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 22). Accordingly, Pugh's warrant application was based on the foregoing recitation of the circumstances surrounding Tyrone's arrest and the MPD's reconnaissance of the apartment, as well as Pugh's (i) training from the MPD “Institute of Police Science” in the illegal possession of firearms; (ii) experience “as an officer enforcing laws against the illegal possession of firearms” and “affecting arrests of individuals illegally possessing firearms”; and (iii) “work with other veteran police officers, investigators and detectives,” all of which purportedly led Pugh to “reasonably believe[ ]” the following:
Plaintiffs allege that “Pugh's claim...
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Lane v. Dist. of Columbia
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Mwimanzi v. Wilson, Case No. 20-cv-79 (CRC)
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