Pitts v. State
| Docket Number | 908-2022 |
| Decision Date | 08 August 2023 |
| Parties | RODNEY W. PITTS v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
UNREPORTED[*]
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND[**]
Graeff, Beachley, McDonald, Robert N. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
On October 3, 1997, a jury, sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, convicted appellant, Rodney W. Pitts, of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and related weapons offenses.[1] The charges arose from a double homicide committed in December 1995. On February 5, 1998, the court sentenced Pitts to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, a consecutive 30-year term for second-degree murder, and an aggregate three-year concurrent term for the remaining offenses.
On May 18, 2022, Pitts, representing himself, filed a petition for a substance abuse evaluation and commitment to an addiction treatment facility pursuant to Maryland Code , §§ 8-505 and 8-507 of the Health - General Article ("HG"). In that petition, Pitts attributed his purported drug and alcohol addictions to a history of childhood trauma. Pitts further advised the court of his academic achievements and other accomplishments while incarcerated. On June 23, 2022, the court denied Pitts's petition without a hearing, reasoning: "Since [Pitts] is serving a sentence for a crime of violence and is not eligible for parole, the [c]ourt has no authority to order an evaluation or treatment as requested."[2]
On appeal, Pitts presents a single question for our review, which we rephrase as follows:
Did the circuit court violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws when it concluded that it had no authority to consider Pitts's petition for a substance abuse commitment pursuant to the 2018 amendments to HG § 8-507?[3]
We answer this question in the affirmative and will, therefore, reverse and remand with instructions that the circuit court consider the merits of Pitts's petition.[4]
"When the issue before us requires the interpretation and application of Maryland law, we 'must determine whether the [circuit] court's conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review.'" Dietrich v. State, 235 Md.App. 92, 97 (2017) (quoting Dep't of Pub. Safety &Corr. Servs. v Doe, 439 Md. 201, 219 (2014)).
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution sets forth the federal prohibition against ex post facto laws, and provides: "No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law[.]" U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. The Maryland counterpart to the federal Ex Post Facto Clause is found in Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which similarly states: "That retrospective Laws, punishing acts committed before the existence of such Laws, and by them only declared criminal are oppressive, unjust and incompatible with liberty; wherefore, no ex post facto Law ought to be made; nor any retrospective oath or restriction be imposed, or required." Md. Decl. of Rts., art. 17. The Supreme Court of Maryland has held that "Maryland's ex post facto clause has been viewed generally to have the 'same meaning' as its federal counterpart."[5] State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 26 (2004) (quoting Watkins v. Dep't of Pub. Safety &Corr. Servs., 377 Md. 34, 48 (2003)). Thus, the two constitutional provisions have generally been construed in pari materia. See e.g., Long v. Dep't of Public Safety &Corr. Servs., 1, 15-19 (2016). Accordingly, consideration of federal case law is appropriate.
"By enacting the Ex Post Facto Clause, 'the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect.'" Id. (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)). The prohibition contained therein likewise "restricts governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 174 (1992) (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29). "In accord with these purposes, . . . two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it." Secretary, Dep't of Pub. Safety &Corr. Servs. v. Demby, 390 Md. 580, 609 (2006) (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29).
In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798), the United States Supreme Court set forth the following four categories of laws that violate the ex post facto proscription:
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
Id. at 390 (emphasis added). The third is the only Calder category potentially pertinent to the case at bar. In Hill v. State, 247 Md.App. 377 (2020), we articulated the following test with respect to that third breed of ex post facto law: "Does the change in law create a 'significant risk' of increasing the punishment attached to the crimes?" Id. at 392 .
"[A]n increase in the possible penalty is ex post facto regardless of the length of the sentence actually imposed, since the measure of punishment prescribed by the later statute is more severe than that of the earlier." Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937) (citations omitted). Whether a change in law creates a "'sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment' . . . is 'a matter of degree'; the test cannot be reduced to a 'single formula.'" Peugh, 569 U.S. at 539 (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 509). On the one hand, a law need not "increase the maximum sentence for which a defendant is eligible in order to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause." Id. On the other, "mere speculation or conjecture that a change in law will retrospectively increase the punishment for a crime will not suffice." Id. In determining "[w]hether a retrospective . . . statute ameliorates or worsens conditions imposed by its predecessor . . . [,] [t]he inquiry looks to the challenged provision, and not to any special circumstances that may mitigate its effect on the particular individual." Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33 (citations omitted).
Relying on our opinion in Hill v. State, 247 Md.App. 377 (2020), Pitts contends that the circuit court's retroactive application of the 2018 amendments to HG § 8-507 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution and Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Because those amendments prohibit violent offenders from being committed pursuant to HG § 8-507 until they are eligible for parole, Pitts claims that "his prison term has been prolonged" by the application thereof.
In Hill, we addressed whether the retroactive application of the 2018 amendments to HG § 8-507 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 389-402. Hill was convicted of first-degree assault and related firearm offenses in 2011. Id. at 380. The court sentenced him to a total term of twenty-five years' imprisonment. Id. On March 4, 2019, Hill filed a petition pursuant to HG § 8-507, seeking commitment to a substance abuse treatment facility. Id. On May 10, 2019, the court granted Hill's petition "pending availability of a bed." Id. at 381. Shortly thereafter, however the Department advised the court that "as the result of amendments to HG § 8-507, Hill would not be eligible for the treatment program 'until parole eligibility after May 10, 2024.'" Id.
At the time of Hill's conviction, HG § 8-507 provided, in pertinent part:
Id. at 381-82; see also 2009 Md. Laws, ch. 720. Effective October 1, 2018- approximately five months before Hill filed his petition-the General Assembly amended HG § 8-507(a) to prohibit courts from committing violent offenders for drug and/or alcohol treatment until they were eligible for parole. Hill, 247 Md.App. at 382. As amended, that subsection provided (and continues to provide):
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