Pitts v. State

• Decision Date: 05 June 2012
• Docket Number: Sept. Term, 2010.,No. 2791,2791
• Parties: Warren PITTS, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

205 Md.App. 477

45 A.3d 872

Warren PITTS, Jr.

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 2791, Sept. Term, 2010.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 5, 2012.

Brian L. Zavin (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.

Mary Ann Ince (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.

Panel: KRAUSER, C.J., WRIGHT, JAMES A. KENNEY, III, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

WRIGHT, J.

Appellant, Warren James Pitts, Jr., appeals from the November 30, 2010 decision of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County, denying Pitts's motion to dismiss the criminal charges pending against him in that court based upon a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), codified at Maryland Code (1999, 2008 Repl. Vol.) §§ 8–401 to 8–417 of the Correctional Services Article (“Corr. Servs.”). Subsequent to the court's denial of his motion to dismiss, Pitts was tried in the circuit court on January 28, 2011. Pursuant to an agreed statement of facts, the court found Pitts guilty of fourth degree burglary and theft of property valued at under $500.¹ Pitts was sentenced to a period of incarceration of three years, with all but nine months suspended followed by one year of supervised probation. Pitts was released on bond pending the outcome of this appeal.

In his timely appeal, Pitts raises a single question for our review:

Is the Interstate Agreement on Detainers violated where the State withdraws a detainer but does not dismiss the underlying charges and does not bring the defendant to trial within the required 180–day period?

We conclude that the State's actions in the instant case constituted a violation of the provisions of the IAD. Thus, the circuit court's decision denying Pitts's motion to dismiss the charges against him constituted an erroneous application of the statutory provisions of the IAD to the undisputed facts that were before the court. We shall, therefore, reverse the decision of the circuit court and vacate Pitts's convictions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are undisputed. In the early morning hours on March 19, 2002, police responded to an alarm at the Nike Factory Store in Queenstown, MD. The store window appeared to have been broken with a screwdriver. Less than $300 in merchandise was missing. Pitts's DNA was later determined to be consistent with blood left at the scene of the break-in.² On February 2, 2007, the State charged Pitts in Case No. 004M00014326 with second-degree burglary, theft of property valued at over $500, malicious destruction of property valued at over $500, and lesser offenses.

At the time the Maryland charges were instituted, Pitts was incarcerated in the State of Virginia for offenses he had committed there. On November 13, 2007, Pitts was officially advised that a detainer had been filed against him as a result of the charges pending in Queen Anne's County, Maryland. On November 15, 2007, Pitts met with corrections officials in Virginia and elected to invoke his right to a speedy disposition of the Maryland charges under the IAD. On December 7, 2007, the Circuit Court for Queen Anne's County received the appropriate documentation from Pitts informing them of his desire to be tried within 180 days as per the IAD.³

On March 27, 2008, the State's Attorney for Queen Anne's County informed the Virginia Department of Corrections via letter that he had “decided not to extradite Mr. Pitts from Virginia” and requested that Pitts “be released from your custody in reference to our charges.” The Virginia Department of Corrections responded on April 3, 2008, informing the State's Attorney that the detainer against Pitts had been removed. Pitts subsequently served the rest of his term of incarceration in Virginia.

Almost immediately after his release, on June 30, 2010, Pitts was arrested in Queen Anne's County pursuant to the warrant originally issued as a result of the charges in District Court Case No. 004M00014326. On September 7, 2010, Pitts moved to dismiss the charges against him pursuant to the requirements of the IAD. On September 22, 2010, the State charged Pitts via criminal information with the same offenses from the 2007 indictment in Case No. 17–K–10–7553. Pitts's attorney filed another motion to dismiss the charges on September 27, 2010.

At oral argument on Pitts's motion to dismiss, conducted on November 30, 2010, Pitts's attorney asserted that the State of Maryland violated the IAD by failing to bring Pitts to trial within 180 days of his invocation of his rights. The State responded by arguing that “the fact that the State withdrew the detainer, basically, stops the time period [under the IAD].” Pitts's attorney countered that the State could not circumvent the IAD by removing the detainer against Pitts without dismissing the charges giving rise to the detainer. Pitts's attorney further contended that Pitts suffered prejudice in that, due to the delay in prosecuting him in Maryland, there was no possibility that his Maryland sentence would be made concurrent to the sentence he served in Virginia.

The circuit court denied Pitts's motion to dismiss, stating:

Well, I certainly don't see the due process issues. He's still got due process. We are willing to try him if he just shows up. But in terms of the detainer issue, as I view it, its [sic] a detainer. It has to be a detainer, so, consequently, the timeframe that was involved here, did not run, so I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss for all the reasons stated by the State.

As previously noted, Pitts was tried, convicted, and sentenced on January 28, 2011. The instant appeal was timely filed on January 28, 2011. Additional facts will be provided as necessary to support the analysis of the issues.

ANALYSIS

The IAD is a congressionally sanctioned compact among forty-eight states,⁴ the Federal Government, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia, with the purpose of establishing cooperative procedures to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of any untried charges, indictments, informations, or complaints that provide the basis for detainers lodged by another jurisdiction against a prisoner incarcerated in a member state.⁵ Corr. Servs. § 8–403; See State v. Pair, 416 Md. 157, 161–62, 5 A.3d 1090 (2010) (“In short, the purpose of the IAD is to facilitate speedy disposition of charges underlying detainers.”); Stone v. State, 344 Md. 97, 106, 685 A.2d 441 (1996) (“The purpose of the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers] is to encourage the expeditious disposition of charges and to establish cooperative procedures among member parties to facilitate such resolution.” (Citing United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978)); State v. Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 679, 574 A.2d 918 (1990)).

Underlying the official purpose of the IAD is the recognition that “charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations,or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.” ⁶ Corr. Servs. § 8–403. Timely resolution of outstanding claims also protects against “ ‘staleness and difficulty of proof.’ ” See Jefferson, 319 Md. at 685, 574 A.2d 918 (quoting Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 309, 455 A.2d 973 (1983)).

Article III of the IAD, codified in Maryland as Corr. Servs. § 8–405, “gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right to demand the speedy disposition of any untried indictment, information or complaint that is the basis of a detainer lodged against him by another State.” Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 718–19, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The present case involves Pitts's request, pursuant to § 8–405, for a speedy disposition of the charges outstanding against him in Maryland during his period of incarceration in Virginia.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland has summarized the procedures utilized to implement the IAD, stating:

The interstate transfer process begins when the “receiving” state lodges a detainer with the warden “or other official” of the institution where the prisoner in question is currently imprisoned, in what is referred to as the custodial or “sending” state. See§ 8–405(b). The warden or other authority in the sending state is then obligated to inform the inmate of the detainer's source and contents, and of the inmate's right, under the IAD, to request final disposition of the charges on which the detainer is based. See§ 8–405(c).

To exercise the right of speedy disposition, the inmate must file a request for IAD relief with the warden, who must forward the request to appropriate authorities in the receiving state. See§ 8–405(d). This document operates as a request by the prisoner for final disposition of all untried charges underlying the detainer and is deemed to be a waiver of extradition. See§ 8–405(d); Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351 .

Once the receiving state receives the request, the IAD requires that jurisdiction to bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days, unless one of two provisions of the IAD is invoked.⁷ ... If neither of these tolling provisions is properly invoked, then the receiving state's failure to comply with the 180–day provision requires dismissal of the charges, with prejudice. See§ 8–407(c).

Pair, 416 Md. at 162–64, 5 A.3d 1090 (footnotes omitted). The requirement that the charges be dismissed with prejudice should the receiving state fail to bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days is statutorily mandated in Corr. Servs. § 8–407(c), providing “in the event that an action ... is not brought to trial within [the relevant period], the appropriate court ... shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” See also Carchman, 473 U.S. at 730, 105 S.Ct. 3401 (“Article III enables a prisoner to require the...