State v. Pair
Decision Date | 07 October 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 95, Sept. Term, 2009.,95, Sept. Term, 2009. |
Citation | 416 Md. 157,5 A.3d 1090 |
Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Caleb Micha PAIR. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Mary Ann Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for appellant.
Brian M. Saccenti, Asst. Public Defender (Elizabeth L. Julian, Acting Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for appellee.
Argued before BELL, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, MURPHY, ADKINS and BARBERA, JJ.
This case calls upon us to construe the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"), codified at Maryland Code , §§ 8-401 to 8-417 of the Correctional Services Article.1 In particular, we are asked to determine whether theCircuit Court for Cecil County correctly interpreted the IAD to require dismissal of the criminal charges against Appellee, Caleb Micha Pair, on the ground that Appellant, the State of Maryland ("the State"), failed to comply with the 180-day speedy trial period set forth in the IAD. The State appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Court of Special Appeals. We issued a writ of certiorari before briefing and argument in that court. For the following reasons, we affirm the Circuit Court's judgment of dismissal.
The IAD, to which Maryland became a signatory in 1965, is a congressionally sanctioned compact among forty-eight states, the Federal Government, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. Drafted in 1956 by the Council of State Governments, the IAD has its origins in a report by a group of federal, state, and private entities (the "Joint Committee on Detainers") highlighting the significant problems arising from the use of detainers. The IAD is based on a legislative finding that " 'charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.' " United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) ( ). The Supreme Court explained in Carchman v. Nash:
The inmate who has a detainer against him is filled with anxiety and apprehension and frequently does not respond to a training program. He often must be kept in close custody, which bars him from treatment such as trustyships, moderations of custody and opportunity for transfer to farms and work camps. In many jurisdictions he is not eligible for parole; there is little hope for his release after an optimum period of training and treatment, when he is ready for return to society with an excellent possibility that he will not offend again. Instead, he often becomes embittered with continued institutionalization and the objective of the correctional system is defeated.
473 U.S. 716, 720, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985) (quoting Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, p. 74 (1956)). See also generally Christopher D. Serf, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Nonconstitutional Errors: The Cognizability of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 83 Colum. L.Rev. 975, 978 (1983) ( ).
The IAD consists of nine articles, the first of which sets forth its policy and purpose:
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers [[2 based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this Agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of suchcharges and determination of the properstatus of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this Agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.
Article I (§ 8-403). In short, the purpose of the IAD is to facilitate speedy disposition of charges underlying detainers.
The IAD sets forth two procedures designed to effectuate its purpose. First, Article IV of the IAD (§ 8-406) "enables a participating State to gain custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction, in order to try him on criminal charges[,]" Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 341, 114 S.Ct. 2291, 129 L.Ed.2d 277 (1994), and, second, Article III (§ 8-405) "gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right to demand the speedy disposition of any untried indictment, information or complaint that is the basis of a detainer lodged against him by another State[,]" Carchman, 473 U.S. at 718-19, 105 S.Ct. 3401 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The present case involves a prisoner's request, pursuant to § 8-405, for a speedy disposition of outstanding charges.
The interstate transfer process begins when the "receiving" state lodges a detainer with the warden "or other official" of the institution where the prisoner in question is currently imprisoned, in what is referred to as the custodial or "sending" state. See § 8-405(b). The warden or other authority in the sending state is then obligated to inform the inmate of the detainer's source and contents, and of the inmate's right, under the IAD, to request final disposition of the charges on which the detainer is based. See § 8-405(c).
To exercise the right of speedy disposition, the inmate must file a request for IAD relief with the warden, who must forward the request to appropriate authorities in the receiving state. See § 8-405(d). This document operates as a requestby the prisoner for final disposition of all untried charges underlying the detainer and is deemed to be a waiver of extradition. See § 8-405(d); Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351, 98 S.Ct. 1834.
Once the receiving state receives the request,3 the IAD requires that jurisdiction to bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days, unless one of two provisions of the IAD is invoked. The first of these provides that a court in the receiving state may issue a continuance "for good cause shown in open court," so long as the continuanceis "necessary and reasonable" and "the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel [is] present." § 8-405(a).4 The second provides that the 180-day requirement"shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter." § 8-408(a) (emphasis added).5 If neither of these tolling provisions is properly invoked, then the receiving state's failure to comply with the 180-day provision requires dismissal of the charges, with prejudice. See § 8-407(c). 6
Because the purpose of the IAD is to help effectuate the rehabilitative process for those who are incarcerated, it applies only to individuals who have "entered upon a term of imprisonment." § 8-405(a). As we shall discuss in more detail, infra, the IAD has been interpreted not to apply to individuals in pre-trial confinement who are awaiting the disposition of charges brought by the state in which they are detained. See, e.g., Painter v. State, 157 Md.App. 1, 17, 848 A.2d 692, 701 (2004) (collecting cases).
Appellee was convicted of robbery by a Delaware state court in August 2005, and began serving the sentence for that crime at a correctional facility in that state. Just over one month after the Delaware robbery conviction, Appellee was indicted in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland, on an unrelated charge of armed robbery. On May 18, 2006, the State lodged a detainer with the proper authority in Delaware, a signatory to the IAD.
Appellee timely filed a request under the IAD for disposition of the charges. The State received that request on July 26, 2007, and offered to take temporary custody of Appellee until final disposition of the charges. On September 6, 2007, Delaware refused the offer because, meanwhile, Delawarehad charged Appellee with assault and related offenses arising out of a March 2007 incident allegedly involving Appellee and a correctional officer at the institution where Appellee was housed.
The following day, September 7, 2007, an Assistant State's Attorney for Cecil County filed in the Circuit Court for Cecil County a motion for continuance of trial on the Maryland charges until resolution of the pending Delaware charges. We have mentioned that the IAD requires continuances to be granted upon "good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present[.]" § 8-405(a). The Circuit Court granted the motion four days later, without conducting a hearing.
On May 6, 2008, Appellee was acquitted of all the Delaware charges. Delaware, however, did not inform the Cecil County State's Attorney Office of the acquittal. Indeed, the State's Attorney's Office did not learn of the outcome of the Delaware proceedings until July 24, 2008, when it received Appellee's second request for IAD relief. Following that, the State accepted temporary custody of Appellee and set a trial date of October 15, 2008, for disposition of the pending Maryland charges.
On that date, Appellee, represented by counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the charges, citing the State's failure to prosecute him within 180 days of July 26, 2007, the date on which the State received his initial request. Appellee argued that, although Delaware had informed the State that it was unwilling to send Appellee to Maryland for trial, Delaware's denial of the State's request for temporary transfer did not abrogate the State's responsibilities under the IAD.
The State offered three...
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