Place v. California Webbing Industries Inc., No. 00-365-L.
| Decision Date | 03 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-365-L. |
| Citation | 249 F.Supp.2d 157 |
| Parties | Michelle S. PLACE, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA WEBBING INDUTRIES, INC., d/b/a Elizabeth Webbing Mills Co, Inc., and Jeffrey Sparr, Eliot Lifland and George West, individually and in their capacities as officers and/or shareholders of Elizabeth Webbing Mills Co., Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Andrew H. Berg, Catherine A. Sammartino, Sammartino & Berg, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.
Thomas W. Budd, Michael J. Volpe, Scott M. Wich, Clifton Budd & DeMaria, New York City, Robert Clark Corrente, Joseph D. Whelan, Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, Michael A. Gamboli, Lisa M. Martinelli, Partridge, Snow & Hahn LLP, Providence, RI, for Defendants.
Defendants Eliot Lifland and George West have moved pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 for summary judgment on plaintiff Michelle Place's claim that they discriminated against her in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws section 42-112-1. Because all conduct that could have constituted discrimination occurred outside of the applicable limitations period, the Court grants defendant West's motion. However, the Court declines to rule upon Lifland's motion while the automatic stay imposed as a result of his bankruptcy petition remains in place.
The "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits," see Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c), reveal the following undisputed facts.
Defendant California Webbing Industries d.b.a. Elizabeth Webbing Mills Co., Inc. ("EWEB") was a textile manufacturer which maintained a place of business in Central Falls, Rhode Island. Plaintiff Michelle Place joined EWEB as a sales coordinator in January of 1994, and worked there until approximately June 21, 1999.1 During that span, she alleges that she was the victim of numerous incidents of sexual harassment, ranging in seriousness from offensive comments made to her or in her presence, to a sexual assault by her supervisor, Jeffrey Sparr, that purportedly occurred in the waning days of her tenure.2 She also complains that EWEB discriminated against her on the basis of gender by consistently paying her less than similarly situated male employees, and that the cumulative effect of those discriminatory episodes was her constructive discharge.
Eliot Lifland was the president, chief executive officer, and chairman of the board of directors of EWEB from sometime in 1991 through, approximately, January of 1998. Subsequent to January of 1998, Lifland continued to serve the company, in a reduced capacity, as chairman of the board. While these motions were pending, Lifland filed a Suggestion of Bankruptcy stating that on January 17, 2003 he had filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
George West was the CEO of EWEB from January 21, 1999 until March of 2001, brought on to help resuscitate the struggling firm. With West at the helm EWEB filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, and his departure coincided with the conversion of EWEB's case to Chapter 7, where it currently resides.
At some unspecified time, Place filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights ("RICHR") against EWEB and Sparr. Those bodies issued Notices of Right to Sue. Neither Lifland nor West was ever the subject of such a charge. Place filed a complaint in this Court on July 26, 2000, naming not only EWEB and Sparr, but Lifland and West as well. The complaint has been amended twice subsequently.
The third amended complaint, over nine counts, alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000)("Title VII"), the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq. (2000) ("FEPA") and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 (1998)("RICRA"). Place also made claims sounding in tort against Sparr.
Most relevant for present purposes, counts VIII and IX accuse Lifland and West, respectively, of violating RICRA. Those defendants have moved for summary judgment.
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code stays the commencement, continuation or enforcement of all judicial proceedings against a debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000). Exempted from that prohibition are, inter alia, purely ministerial acts by a court, for instance recording an entry on a docket in response to a proper judicial order. See Soares v. Brockton Credit Union, 107 F.3d 969, 973-974 (1st Cir.1997). Any act that requires the exercise of judicial discretion, however, and that occurs after a debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition, is void. Id. at 974, 976. The preceding is true whether or not the decision that is stayed would have favored the debtor. See Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1990).
Clearly, then, in light of the foregoing recitation, this Court is without authority to pass on Lifland's motion for summary judgment until either his bankruptcy case is resolved, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2), or the bankruptcy court lifts the stay. See id. § 362(d)-(f).
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions: The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
If a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment must be denied. A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit. See Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). "A dispute as to a material fact is genuine `if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Id. The Court must view all evidence and related inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 1997).
RICRA prohibits, among other things, sex discrimination in a wide range of commercial settings, including the formation and performance of employment contracts.3 The Rhode Island legislature enacted RICRA as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1990. Owing to its relative youth and the availability of more specific remedies for civil rights violations, the statute has not spawned an abundance of published case law, and its contours are still somewhat opaque.
None of the parties has identified in its moving papers the statute of limitations applicable to RICRA claims.4 Upon prompting at oral argument, Lifland's counsel suggested that Rhode Island's general 10 year limitations period for civil actions, presumably referring to R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-l-13(a)(1997), might be appropriate. Place's attorney countered that RICRA does not mandate the imposition of any limitations period. Neither answer is satisfactory.
Obviously, RICRA itself is silent as to the relevant statute of limitations. Rhode Island's highest court has been equally taciturn. Very recently, however, Judge Smith of this district ruled that FEPA furnished the limitations period for employment discrimination claims under RCRA. See Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 253 F.Supp.2d 226 (D.R.I.2003). Rathbun's analysis is invaluable.
As a prerequisite to bringing suit, FEPA complainants must file a charge of discrimination with the RICHR within one year of the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory practice. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-17 (2000). The relatively brief limitations period, common to antidiscrimination statutes, protects the accused by guaranteeing that they receive sufficient notice of the alleged violations to adequately investigate the claims while those claims are still reasonably susceptible to investigation. See Roadivay Express, Inc. v. Rhode Island Comm'n for Human Rights, 416 A.2d 673, 676 (R.I. 1980); Rathbun, 253 F.Supp.2d at 231 ().
In Rathbun, the plaintiff made separate but virtually indistinguishable discrimination claims under FEPA and RICRA. On defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court considered adopting the state's three year limitations period for personal injury actions, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-l-14(b)(1997), but reasoned that doing so would render FEPA's shorter limitations period meaningless. See Rathbun, 253 F.Supp.2d at 231. Noting the sound policies underlying the imposition of an abbreviated period in employment discrimination cases, and the recognition and affirmation of those policies by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Judge Smith refused to permit an end run around FEPA by means of invoking RICRA. See Rathbun, 253 F.Supp.2d at 231-33.
Rathbun's holding resonates in the present circumstances as well. Place has repackaged employment discrimination claims against Lifland and West as state civil rights claims, which is her prerogative.5 However, preserving those RICRA claims longer than identical claims under FEPA would do unwarranted violence to a statutory framework that, notably, predated RICRA. Cf. Langdeau v. Narragansett Ins. Co., 94 R.I. 128, 179 A.2d 110, 113 (1962)("We must assume that the Legislature in enacting the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act knew of the existence of its prior special legislation on the same subject matter ... and did not intend to disturb it ....") (citation omitted); Loretta Realty Corp. v. Massachusetts...
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