Plaintiff v. Bd. Of Educ. S.

• Citation: 80 W.Va. 648
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Decision Date: 18 September 1917
• Parties: Dooley et als. v. Board of Education et als.

80 W.Va. 648

Dooley et als.

v.Board of Education et als.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted September 7, 1917.

Decided September 18, 1917.

1. Schools and School Districts Board of Education Powers.

The board of education of a school district is a corporation created by statute with functions of a public nature expressly given, and no other. It can exercise only such power as is expressly conferred or fairly arises by necessary implication, and only in the mode prescribed or authorized by the statute, (p. 650).

2. Same Disposition of School Property Statute.

Such board of education, after determining that some of its property is no longer needed for school purposes, can dispose of such property only in the manner prescribed by § 10 of ch. 45 of the Code, that is to say, by selling the same at public auction to the highest bidder, after due notice of the time, terms and place of such sale. (p. 650).

3. Same Board of Education Disposition of Property Injunction.

A tax payer of the district may enjoin a board of education from disposing of any of its property in a manner other than that provided by said section 10 of ch. 45 of the Code; and in case a conveyance has been made therefor may maintain a suit to enjoin the grantee in such conveyance from taking possession of said property, and to set aside such conveyance. (p. 651).

Appeal from Circuit Court of Kanawha County.

Suit for injunction by W. R. Dooley and others against the Board of Education of Cabin Creek District and A. C. Lawrence, with cross-bill by defendant Lawrence. Decree for plaintiffs against defendant Lawrence denying the relief sought by his cross-bill, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Cato & Bledsoe and M. F. Stiles, for appellants.

Price, Smith, Spilman & Clay, for appellees.

Ritz, Judge:

The defendant board of education after consideration decided to abandon two district schools located respectively at Miami and Ronda, and to construct a consolidated graded school in lieu thereof at Sharon, a village between Miami and Honda. The board owned a lot at Miami containing onehalf acre. It selected a site at Sharon for its graded school containing about two acres. It appeals that a man by the name of Kittenger had a contract to purchase this two-acre site, which was afterward turned over to the defendant A. C. Lawrence. The half acre lot owned by the board at Miami is surrounded by lands of the Shonk Land Company, and is presumed to be underlaid with mineral oil or gas. Such negotiations were had between the board and the defendant A. C. Lawrence that he agreed to transfer to the board the two-acre lot at Sharon, for which he had paid five hundred and twenty-five dollars, and pay the board five hundred dollars in cash, for the consideration that the board would transfer to him in exchange its lot at Miami. A deed was executed by Lawrence conveying the two-acre lot to the board, and the board executed a deed conveying the half-acre lot to Lawrence. This suit was then instituted by tax payers to enjoin Lawrence from taking possession of the school house lot at Miami, and to cancel the deed made by the board of education to Lawrence, upon the ground that the board had not complied with the provisions of law permitting it to make disposition of abandoned property; and further, because the transaction between the board of education and said Lawrence was a fraud upon the tax payers of said district, in that the transaction was a secret one between the board and Lawrence, and resulted in Lawrence getting the Miami property valued at from five to ten thousand dollars for a consideration of one thousand and twenty-five dollars. The board of education and Lawrence both answered the bill contending that the transaction was in accordance with law, and that there was no fraud therein; that the Sharon lot purchased by Lawrence at five hundred and twenty-five dollars, and the additional sum of five hundred dollars in cash, was an adequate and full consideration for the Miami lot. The court below enjoined the defendant Lawrence from taking possession of the lot, and on motion refused to dissolve the ininjunction, and from that decree an appeal was prosecuted to this court. Subsequently the defendant Lawrence filed a cross bill in the cause alleging that the Shonk Land Company owned the land surrounding this half-acre lot at Miami, and was preparing to drill wells for oil and gas in close proximity thereto so as to drain any oil or gas which might be thereunder, and praying for the appointment of a receiver to drill for the oil and gas upon said lot pending the determination of this litigation. The relief prayed for was refused by the lower court and Lawrence appealed to this court from that decree.

The board of education of a school district is a corporation created by statute with functions of a public nature expressly given and no other. It...