Willitts v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston

• Decision Date: 18 November 1991
• Citation: 411 Mass. 202,581 N.E.2d 475
• Parties: , 70 Ed. Law Rep. 1207 Leslee A. WILLITTS v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BOSTON et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 475

581 N.E.2d 475

411 Mass. 202, 70 Ed. Law Rep. 1207

Leslee A. WILLITTS v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF BOSTON et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Middlesex.

Argued Sept. 9, 1991.

Decided Nov. 18, 1991.

James F. Lamond, Newton, for plaintiff.

Richard W. Murphy (Thomas J. Hobin, Jr., Jon R. Maddox, with him), Braintree, for defendants.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and NOLAN, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

GREANEY, Justice.

The plaintiff, Leslee A. Willitts, brought this action in the Superior Court against the defendants, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston and St. Tarcisius School (school), claiming that the school had unlawfully terminated her employment. Her complaint sought declaratory relief under G.L. c. 231A (1990 ed.), and damages on the basis of alleged breach of contract, termination of employment in disregard of public policy, and violation of the State Civil Rights Act, G.L. c. 12, § 11I (1990 ed.). Both the plaintiff and the defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (b), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). A judge of the Superior Court allowed the defendant's motion, and judgment entered for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. We transferred the case to this court on our own motion. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

Summary judgment "shall be rendered ... [if] there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Community Nat'l Bank v. Dawes, 369 Mass. 550, 553, 340 N.E.2d 877 (1976). In setting out the facts from the documents, affidavits and depositions in the record, we resolve any conflicts in the summary judgment materials, and we make all logically permissible inferences, in the plaintiff's favor. Coveney v. President & Trustees of the College of the Holy Cross, 388 Mass. 16, 17, 445 N.E.2d 136 (1983).

St. Tarcisius School is an elementary school affiliated with Saint Tarcisius Church of Framingham, a Roman Catholic church. The plaintiff worked there as a kindergarten teacher from September, 1980, until June, 1987. Her employment was governed by yearly written contracts, each covering one school-year term. Each contract set forth the terms of employment for the upcoming school year, including beginning and ending dates, and contained signature lines for the teacher, the principal of the school, and the parish pastor. The contract incorporated by reference the "Regulations and directives of the Archdiocese Department of Education," from the Policy Book for Catholic Schools (Directives), a guide to the administration of parish schools published by the archdiocese of Boston. The school's practice for renewing the contracts of its teaching staff was to conduct a yearly performance review in the spring and at that time to present the teacher with a contract for the upcoming school year.

In keeping with this procedure, the plaintiff met with the principal of the school, Sister Rita Welch, on March 31, 1987, to receive her annual performance review and her contract for the 1987-1988 school year. Her performance review was uniformly positive. During the meeting, she signed the contract, which had already been signed by Father Alfred Almonte, the pastor of the church, and returned it to Sister Welch. The plaintiff mentioned to Sister Welch that she had applied for a teaching position in the Framingham public schools, but had not received an offer as of that time and was therefore not pursuing any other positions. In response to this disclosure Sister Welch said that she could not sign the contract under the circumstances and told the plaintiff that she had until May 31 to decide whether or not to return to the school. The plaintiff told Sister Welch that she had already decided to stay at St. Tarcisius, and she left the meeting with the understanding that she would meet again with Sister Welch before May 31 to reaffirm her intention to remain at St. Tarcisius for the next school year.

While employed at St. Tarcisius, the plaintiff had attended meetings of the Boston Archdiocesan Teachers' Association, which represented teachers at some of the Archdiocesan high schools in collective bargaining. She became interested in forming a teachers' association at her school in order to address issues of concern to the faculty there. On May 22, 1987, she posted a notice in the teachers' lounge at the school, calling for a meeting of the teachers to discuss various matters, including collective bargaining. The notice included statements from authorities in the Roman Catholic Church in support of the rights of workers to organize and to bargain collectively. On the same date, the plaintiff distributed a memorandum to the teachers announcing the date and time of the meeting and stating as its objective "the airing of views, ideas and concerns" toward the end of "establishing direction towards a 'just' teaching atmosphere." ²

After learning of the notice that the plaintiff had posted in the teachers' lounge, Sister Welch and Father Almonte called a meeting of all the teachers on May 29, 1987, to discuss it. At that meeting, Father Almonte referred to problems that another school was experiencing because of union organization, and he declined Willitts' offer to arrange a meeting with a group of concerned teachers. In response to the plaintiff's comment that there were "discrepancies" in the working conditions at the school which in her opinion should be dealt with, Father Almonte said that her proposed topics of discussion all involved money, and that the school was at its financial limit. He told the teachers that if they were unhappy at the school, they should leave. He offered to release any teacher who wished to go, and he gave the teachers one week to reach a decision. At the end of the meeting, the plaintiff told Sister Welch that since she had already signed her contract for the forthcoming school year, she had already made up her mind. Sister Welch informed her that she (Welch) would not sign the contract "under these conditions."

At a subsequent meeting on June 8, 1987, Sister Welch criticized the plaintiff for her attempt to organize the teachers. She offered to renew the plaintiff's contract, but only on the condition that the plaintiff refrain from such efforts in the future. When the plaintiff refused to agree to that condition, Sister Welch, on behalf of the school, declined to renew her contract, which expired by its terms on June 30, 1987.

Following the school's decision, the plaintiff requested both the National Labor Relations Board (board) and the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission (commission) to pursue an unfair labor practice charge on her behalf. The board declined to do so on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction over the school. ³ The commission also dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the ground that, as a professional employee of a nonprofit institution, she was not covered by G.L. c. 150A, § 2, which protects the rights of workers to organize and to bargain collectively. No appeal was taken by the plaintiff from either of these decisions and her complaint to the Superior Court followed.

1. Breach of contract. ⁴ The plaintiff advances two theories in support of her contention that, despite Sister Welch's refusal to sign the contract, she held a valid employment contract for the 1987-1988 school year. She first argues that her contract with the school for 1986-1987 was automatically renewed for the following year by the school's failure to follow its own provisions for the notification of teachers whose contracts are not to be renewed.

Section 4420(3) of the Directives, which are incorporated by reference into the school's contracts with its teachers, specifies that "[t]he teacher should be informed prior to February 15 that because of unsatisfactory performance, there is a possibility that the contract might not be renewed. The teachers should be formally notified of a decision prior to April 15, so that opportunities to seek other employment will not be lost." Relying on this provision, the plaintiff argues that the school's failure to follow its own notice provisions resulted in the automatic renewal of her contract for the following school year, and that the school committed a breach of this contract by terminating her employment. We reject this claim.

First, neither the contract itself nor the Directives state that failure by the school to follow the provisions of § 4420(2) results in automatic renewal of a teacher's contract. ⁵ Furthermore, the word "should," as used in that provision of the Directives, is merely advisory rather than mandatory language; ⁶ its purpose is to facilitate whenever possible the employment search of a teacher whose contract the school does not intend to renew. ⁷ To interpret this provision of the Directives as the plaintiff does would render the school powerless to avoid rehiring a teacher where the basis for the decision not to rehire arose, as it did in this case, after April 15. Such an interpretation would contradict the letter of the contract, which contained definite beginning and ending dates, and which stated "[t]his agreement expires on June 30, 1987 unless definitely renewed." "The intent of the parties must be gathered from a fair construction of the contract as a whole and not by special emphasis upon any one part." Crimmins & Peirce Co. v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp., 282 Mass. 367, 375, 185 N.E. 383 (1933). Ucello v. Cosentino, 354 Mass. 48, 51, 235 N.E.2d 44 (1968). Lydon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 Mass.App.Ct. 771, 359 N.E.2d 316 (1977). We therefore reject the plaintiff's argument that a contract was formed automatically when, on April 15, the school failed to notify the plaintiff that her contract was not to be renewed. ⁸ "Expectations and negotiations fall far short of a binding agreement." Brighton Packing Co. v. Butchers' Slaughtering & Melting Ass'n, 211 Mass. 398, 405, 97 N.E. 780 (1912...