Planning and Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources

• Decision Date: 22 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. S058929,S058929
• Citation: 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 635,949 P.2d 488,17 Cal.4th 264
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 949 P.2d 488, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 562, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 740 PLANNING AND CONSERVATION LEAGUE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES et al., Defendants and Respondents

Page 635

70 Cal.Rptr.2d 635

17 Cal.4th 264, 949 P.2d 488, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 562,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 740

PLANNING AND CONSERVATION LEAGUE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S058929.

Supreme Court of California

Jan. 22, 1998.

Rehearing Denied March 11, 1998.

Antonio Rossman, San Francisco, and Roger B. Moore, Oakland, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Thomas J. Graff, San Francisco as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles W. Getz IV, Assistant Attorney General, Marian E. Moe, Deputy Attorney General, Michael N. Nordstrom, Jennifer A. Lee, Corcoran, Emily J. Cote, Mountain View, Anthony C. Bennetti, San Jose, Brunick, Alvarez & Battersby, San Bernardino, Jeffery L. Caufield, San Diego, William J. Brunick, San Bernardino, Hanson, Bridgett, Marcus, Vlahos & Rudy, Ray E. McDevitt, Stephen B. Peck, San Francisco, McCormick, Kidman & Behrens, Russell G. Behrens, David D. Boyer, Costa Mesa, Best, Best & Krieger, Gregory K. Wilkinson, Eric L. Garner, Riverside, Hatch and Parent, Susan F. Petrovich, Stanley M. Roden, Santa Barbara, Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard, Clifford W. Schulz, Robin Leslie Stewart, Sacramento, O'Melveny & Myers, Robert S. Draper, Lemieux & O'Neill and Tari L. Cody, Westlake Village, for Defendants and Respondents.

WERDEGAR, Justice.

The Code of Civil Procedure ¹ provides, in sections 860 to 870, a set of accelerated in rem procedures for determining the validity of certain bonds, assessments and other agreements entered into by public agencies. Among the shortened time periods specified is a 30-day period for appealing from the "judgment" in a validation action. (§ 870, subd. (b).) This 30-day period constitutes an exception from the normal time for filing an appeal specified in California Rules of Court, rule 2(a) ² (the earlier of 60 days after notice of entry or 180 days after entry of judgment), and is expressly recognized as an exception in rule 2(a). Entry of "judgment" in rule 2(a) includes entry of an appealable order; the same time periods, therefore, ordinarily apply whether the appeal is from a final judgment or an appealable order. (Rules 2(d), 40(g).) Section 870, however, fails expressly to state that the shortened time for appealing the "judgment" in a validation action applies, as well, to appealable orders. The question thus arises, and must be answered in this case, whether the notice of appeal from an appealable order in a validation action must be filed within the 30 days provided by section 870 or may be filed anytime within the longer period set forth in rule 2(a). For reasons explained below, we conclude the former reading of section 870, applying the shortened period to appealable orders as well as to judgments per se, best comports with the probable intent of the Legislature.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying this lawsuit, and the merits of the appeal, are immaterial to the narrow procedural issue before us. Suffice it to say that plaintiffs' ³ amended complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) and the Central Coast Water Authority (CCWA) with regard to a 1994 agreement executed by defendants and others, known as the Monterey Agreement, which, when implemented in December 1995, altered DWR's allocation of water from the California Water Project to various local water agencies. In addition to causes of action alleging violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), plaintiffs alleged that DWR's amendment of water supply contracts, pursuant to the Monterey Agreement, violated the nonalienation mandate of Water Code section 11464. On that cause of action, plaintiffs sought a judgment "invalidating all the water supply contract amendments and the Kern Water Bank Contract, as executed on December 13, 1995."

Plaintiffs served the summons and complaint on DWR and CCWA by delivery and mailing on January 4, 1996. A revised summons KCWA moved to quash service of summons on the ground that it is a public agency and, therefore, under section 863, it had to be individually and formally served according to the procedures in sections 415.10 or 415.30. Several other water contractors, including the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), subsequently filed identical motions incorporating KCWA's arguments. In addition, defendants (DWR and CCWA) moved for summary adjudication of the invalidation cause of action on the grounds that section 863 required plaintiffs to name and serve MWD and KCWA as defendants, that they were indispensable parties to the action, and that they could not be joined because the statute of limitations (60 days) had passed.

                [949 P.2d 491] was issued March 27, 1996, addressed to DWR and "all persons interested in the Matter of the Monterey Amendments to State Water Supply Contracts."   Plaintiffs [17 Cal.4th 268] mailed the revised summons to 28 state water contractors, including the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA), and published it in the Sacramento Daily Recorder
                

The superior court granted the motion for summary adjudication by order filed June 10, 1996, and granted the motions to quash service of summons by order filed June 18, 1996. Notice of entry of the order quashing service was served on June 24. On June 20, the superior court also ruled in defendants' favor on the CEQA causes of action, which had been previously submitted. On August 15, the court, having resolved all causes of action in defendants' favor, entered final judgment for defendants. Notice of the entry of judgment was served on August 19, 1996.

On August 20, 1996, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. They appealed from the final judgment and from "the order quashing service of summons on the specially moving parties." (See § 904.1, subd. (a)(3) [order quashing service of summons is appealable].) KCWA, joined by a number of other water contractors who had also moved to quash service of summons, moved to dismiss the appeal as to the order quashing service, on the ground that section 870' § 30-day period governed appeals in validation actions and that the August 20 notice of appeal was untimely as to the order quashing service, notice of entry of which was served June 24.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, dismissing the appeal from the order quashing service "on the grounds that it is untimely filed." We granted plaintiffs' petition for review to resolve the question of timeliness.

DISCUSSION

Chapter 9 of title 10 of part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter sometimes chapter 9), consisting of sections 860 through 870, was first enacted in 1961, with the purpose of consolidating and harmonizing the various existing statutes providing special procedures for actions by cities, counties and public agencies to establish the validity of their bonds and assessments. (City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335, 340, 85 Cal.Rptr. 149, 466 P.2d 693.) Chapter 9 does not specify the matters to which it applies; rather, the chapter's procedures apply to "any matter which under any other law is authorized to be determined pursuant to this chapter." (§ 860.) In addition to a variety of statutes authorizing specific types of actions under chapter 9 (e.g., Gov.Code, §§ 50669.6, 53359; Wat.Code, § 35855; Pub. Resources Code, §§ 26037, 32208), Government Code sections 53511 and 17700 provide that any local or state agency may bring an action, pursuant to chapter 9, to determine the validity of its "bonds, warrants, contracts, obligations or evidences of indebtedness." (But see City of Ontario v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 343-345, 85 Cal.Rptr. 149, 466 P.2d 693 [questioning whether Government Code section 53511 was intended to subject all actions challenging local agency "contracts" to chapter 9's procedures].) Section 863 provides for actions, such as the present one, by "interested person[s]" challenging the validity of agency actions that are subject to chapter 9.

Section 870, the part of chapter 9 with which we are directly concerned here, provides in part: "(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law including ... any rule of court, no appeal shall be allowed from any judgment entered pursuant to this chapter unless a notice of appeal is filed within 30 days after the notice of entry of the judgment The ordinary time for filing an appeal from the superior court is stated in rule 2(a), which provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 870 or other statute or rule 3, a notice of appeal from a judgment shall be filed on or before the earliest of the following dates: (1) 60 days after the date of mailing by the clerk of the court of a document entitled 'notice of entry' of judgment; (2) 60 days after the date of service of a document entitled 'notice of entry' of judgment by any party upon the party filing the notice of appeal, or by the party filing the notice of appeal; or (3) 180 days after the date of entry of the judgment."

[949 P.2d 492] or, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment if there is no answering party."

Rule 2(d) states: "As used in subdivisions (a) and (c) of this rule, 'judgment' means 'appealable order' if the appeal is from an appealable order." To similar effect, rule 40(g) provides that, in the appellate rules, unless the context or subject matter requires otherwise, " 'Judgment' includes any judgment, order or decree from which an appeal lies."

Neither rule 2 nor section 870 states explicitly what time period applies to the appeal from an appealable order in a validation action. Section 870 provides a shortened period for appeal from the "judgment" in such an action, notwithstanding the ordinary time periods in rule 2, but without making clear whether "judgment" in ...