la Plante v. State Bd. of Pub. Rds.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1926
• Docket Number: Nos. 556, 557.,s. 556, 557.
• Citation: 131 A. 641
• Parties: LA PLANTE v. STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC ROADS. STATE v. LA PLANTE.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

131 A. 641

LA PLANTE

v. STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC ROADS.

STATE

v. LA PLANTE.

Nos. 556, 557.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 15, 1926.

Julian La Plante was deprived of his license to operate a motor vehicle on public highways by the state board of public roads, and he appealed to superior court. He was charged by criminal complaint in district court for refusing to surrender suspended license. The causes were certified to the Supreme Court on constitutional questions, and were heard together. Decision certified, and papers sent back for further proceedings.

Alberic A. Archambault, of Providence, for La Plante.

Charles P. Sisson, Atty. Gen., for State and State Board of Public Roads.

RATHBUN, J. In the first of the above causes the petitioner appealed to the superior court from an order of the state board of public roads, entered by authority of section 6, chapter 98, General Laws 1923, as amended by section 5, chapter 670, Public Laws 1925, suspending his license to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways. The second cause is a criminal complaint brought in a district court against said petitioner charging him with refusing to surrender the suspended license as provided by said section as amended. The constitutionality of said section 6, as amended by said section 5, having been brought in question upon the record before trial, the causes were certified by said courts respectively to this court for determination of the constitutional question. The causes were heard together.

It appears that the automobile of said La Plante, while being operated by him upon a public highway in the town of Hopkinton, collided with another automobile; that he thereafter appeared before the district court of the Third judicial district, and pleaded nolo contendere to a complaint charging him with operating upon the public highways of said town a motor vehicle with defective brakes, and that he appealed from the decision and sentence of said court to the superior court for Washington county; that thereafter said board, after investigating the facts connected with the collision, suspended his said license without giving him a hearing, and demanded a return of the license. La Plante refused to return his license, and by letter demanded that the board grant him a hearing within 10 days. The board, in reply to said letter, stated that the law did not require the holding of a hearing within 10 days, but that, when the license was returned, they would be glad to take up the matter of reinstatement.

Said section 6, as amended by said section 5, provides in part as follows:

"The board may cancel, suspend or revoke any license issued under this section for any cause it may deem sufficient."

The statute contains no provision requiring a hearing before canceling, suspending, or revoking a license. It was clearly the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in said section 5, to authorize the board to act without giving the licensee a hearing before or after entering an order canceling, suspending, or revoking his license. Said section 6, before it was amended by said section 5, required the board to give the licensee a hearing before suspending or revoking his license. See Tanguay v. State Board of Public Roads (R. I.) 125 A. 293. Before said section 6 was amended by said section 5, the provision next above quoted was as follows:

"The board may, after a hearing of which at least three days' notice in writing has been given to the licensee, for any cause it may deem sufficient, enter an order suspending or revoking the license of any person to whom a license has been issued under this chapter."

The question raised is whether said section 6, as amended by said section 5, is void for being in violation of article 14, § 1, of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and of article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the state of Rhode Island. Said section 1 of the federal Constitution, so far as applicable, is as follows:

"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

The provision of said section 10 of the state Constitution relied upon is as follows:

"Nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."

It has been held that the two phrases "due process of law" and "law of the land" mean the same. State v. Beswick, 13 R. I. at page 218, 43 Am. Rep. 26; Lowrey v. Mayor of Central Falls, 23 R. I. at page 357, 50 A. 639.

Whether the statute is reasonable or unreasonable is a question of legislative policy with which the court has no concern. If a statute is repugnant to no constitutional provision, it is the duty of the court to uphold the validity of the act without regard to the question of reasonableness (Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I. 230, 21 A. 539, 12 L. R. A. 57), and it is always presumed that an act of the Legislature is constitutional until the contrary clearly appears. In re Matter of Dorrance Street, 4 R. I. 230.

La Plante contends that the suspension of his license, without giving him an opportunity to be heard, deprived him of his property without due process of law or the law of the land, and the question arises whether a license to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways is property within the constitutional inhibition. Counsel cites no authority in support of his contention that such a license is property. The terms of the license provided that it should remain in force for the...