Plante v. Town of Grafton

• Citation: 775 N.E.2d 1254,56 Mass. App. Ct. 213
• Decision Date: 07 October 2002
• Docket Number: No. 00-P-1138.,00-P-1138.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
• Parties: Edmond H. PLANTE<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. TOWN OF GRAFTON & others.

775 N.E.2d 1254

56 Mass. App. Ct. 213

Edmond H. PLANTE¹ v. TOWN OF GRAFTON & others.

No. 00-P-1138.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued April 10, 2002.

Decided October 7, 2002.

Nisha Koshy Cocchiarella for the plaintiff.

Louis M. Ciavarra, Worcester, for Robert N. Hennessey & another.

Thomas P. Lane, Jr., Boston, for town of Grafton.

Present: LENK, KASS, & MILLS, JJ.

KASS, J.

Under G.L. c. 61A, § 14, a municipality has a right of first refusal to buy land that is being taken out of agricultural or horticultural use, if the municipality has so classified that land under c. 61A. The question this case presents is whether a city or town may be forced by owners who propose to take two or more parcels out of agricultural or horticultural use to buy all of those parcels or whether the municipality may choose to acquire fewer than all of the lots the owners propose to remove from agricultural or horticultural use. We decide that, at least on the peculiar facts of this case, owners may not put their parcels to the municipality under § 14 on an all or nothing basis. A judge of the Superior Court, who heard the case without a jury, came to the same conclusion. The case had come before her as a declaratory judgment action.

1. Facts. In 1997, Robert N. Hennessey applied to the assessors of Grafton to have 124.25 acres of land he owned on Adams Road (we shall call it "Parcel I") classified under G.L. c. 61A, § 6, as agricultural or horticultural land.² Keith Downer, as trustee for the Sun Valley Funding Trust (of which Hennessey was the sole beneficiary), on January 23, 1998, did the same as to 50 acres on Old Westboro Road (we shall call that land "Parcel II"). The assessors approved the classifications requested and Hennessey and Downer became eligible to harvest the concomitant tax benefits that the statute confers. See G.L. c. 61A, §§ 4, 6. See generally Mann v. Assessors of Wareham, 387 Mass. 35, 40-42, 438 N.E.2d 826 (1982).

Under § 14 of c. 61A, should the owners of land so classified propose to discontinue using it for the classified purpose, they must: (a) if the change of use is to come about by reason of a sale of the land, afford the city or town in which the land is located a 120-day option to buy the land on such terms as are contained in a bona fide purchase offer made to the owner; or (b) if a change of use by the owner, rather than a sale, is involved, afford the city or town a 120-day option to buy the land for its fair market value as determined by impartial appraisal.³

On May 1, 1998, Hennessey and Downer entered into a purchase and sale agreement with Edmond H. Plante to sell to him Parcel I and Parcel II; Hennessey to sell the 124.25-acre Parcel I and Downer to sell the 50-acre Parcel II. The two parcels are not contiguous. The agreement provided that Parcel II would be sold first, the closing to occur on July 15, 1998. The purchase price for Parcel II was $1,000,000, to be paid by an initial deposit of $5,000, $295,000 in cash at the closing, and the balance by a purchase money mortgage note of $700,000. The principal on the note was to be paid in installments of $350,000 on December 31, 1998, and June 30, 1999. As to Hennessey's Parcel I, the closing date was December 31, 1999, eighteen months later. The price was $1,500,000, to be paid by an initial deposit of $1,000, and $349,000 in cash at the closing, the balance by a purchase money mortgage note of $1,150,000. The principal on the note was to be paid in $350,000 installments on June 30, 2000, December 31, 2000, and June 30, 2001. A final payment of $100,000 was due on December 31, 2001. There were, thus, separate sellers, separate closing dates, and disparate financial terms.

Section 25.0 of the purchase and sale agreement provided: "The parties agree that[,] subject to the terms and conditions of this agreement, the Buyer is obligated to complete the purchase of both Parcel I and Parcel II and is not able to buy one and not the other."⁴ There was also a provision in the agreement, § 17(c), that conditioned the obligations of the buyer on the sellers obtaining from the town a release of its statutory right of first refusal.

The sellers gave to the town the requisite notice that they intended to sell their respective properties to a buyer who would use the land to build single family houses, i.e., for other than agricultural or horticultural purposes.⁵ In their notice, the sellers informed the town that, "By the terms of his offer, [the buyer] is required to purchase both properties and may not purchase one or the other." After a special town meeting, the town elected to exercise its option under G.L. c. 61A, § 14, as to Parcel I, and waived it as to Parcel II. That waiver, under the provisions of § 14, had the effect of releasing Parcel II from its restricted use.

Plante, the buyer, was unwilling to buy only Parcel II, the 50-acre property. He was insistent that the sellers bring an action against the town to require it to exercise its right of first refusal on an all-or-nothing basis. The sellers declined so to do and sent Plante a check for $6,000, the aggregate of the two deposits he had paid. Plante, through counsel, sent the check back. The sellers gave a formal notice of tender; they would present the deed to Parcel II on April 5, 1999, in accordance with the purchase and sale agreement. This the sellers followed with a formal tender at the Worcester District Registry of Deeds at 10:00 A.M. on the designated date.

Plante did not show up. He had already filed a complaint against the sellers for specific performance, a gambit that succeeded in securing a notice of lis pendens against both properties. Some three weeks later, Plante filed an amended complaint that added the town of Grafton as a defendant and requested a declaratory judgment that "Grafton has failed to exercise its right of first refusal properly pursuant to G.L. c. 61A" and that the sellers were required to make specific performance. In addition to the all-or-nothing right of first refusal issue, the answer of the sellers placed before the court the question whether Plante had committed a breach of the purchase and sale agreement which entitled the sellers to keep his deposit as liquidated damages.

2. Validity of town's exercise of rights under G.L. c. 61A, 14. Chapter 61A came into the General Laws in the wake of art. 99 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, approved and ratified in 1972. Article 99 permitted assessing at its current use value, rather than highest and best use value, land that was being used for agricultural or horticultural purposes. See Mann v. Assessors of Wareham, 387 Mass. at 40, 438 N.E.2d 826.It is probably dispositive that Hennessey and Downer, who owned separate parcels, applied separately to have them classified as horticultural under c. 61A.⁶ In consideration of the tax benefit that such a classification bestows upon the landowner, § 14 confers upon the municipality the right to keep the land from being developed. As to each grant of an application for agricultural or horticultural status, there is a refusal option in favor of the municipality. Ordinarily, a seller may not defeat a right of first refusal by confronting the optionee with terms that include acquisition of land in addition to that covered by the right. Illustrative cases include Pantry Pride Enterprises, Inc. v. Stop & Shop Cos., 806 F.2d 1227, 1229 (4th Cir.1986); Gyurkey v. Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 667-668, 651 P.2d 928 (1982); Myers v. Lovetinsky, 189 N.W.2d 571, 575 (Iowa 1971); Straley v. Osborne, 262 Md. 514, 524, 278 A.2d 64 (1971); C & B Wholesale Stationery v. S. De Bella Dresses, Inc., 43 A.D.2d 579, 580, 349 N.Y.S.2d 751 (1973). The rationale of those cases is that permitting a seller so to do allows the seller, as optionor — as here — a too easy means to defeat the rights of the holder of the option right.

It is an additional consideration that there inheres in art. 99 of the Massachusetts Constitution and the implementing statute, G.L. c. 61A, a public policy to encourage agriculture and horticulture in the Commonwealth and to keep land free of construction not related to agricultural or horticultural purposes. That policy may not be defeated through the contrivance of bundling landowners and lots so as to confront a municipality with the choice of surrendering all its rights to keep land free of construction development or imposing on it more expenditure for land than it can prudently tolerate.

Final reinforcement for our view of the case flows from the repeated emphasis in the purchase and sale agreement on the separateness of the two tracts: (a) they are separately owned; (b) there are different prices and financing terms for each tract; and (c) there are separate closing dates —...