Plata v. Brown

• Decision Date: 28 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–15466.,13–15466.
• Citation: 754 F.3d 1070
• Parties: Marciano PLATA; Otis Shaw; Ray Stoderd; Joseph Long; Leslie Rhoades; Gilbert Aviles; Paul Decasas; Steven Bautista; Raymond Johns; Elijah J. Sandoval; Gary Alan Smith; Clifford Myelle; Dondi Van Horn, Plaintiffs–Appellees, Medical Development International, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Edmund G. BROWN, Jr., Governor of the State of California; Jeffrey A. Beard, Dr., Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; Ana J. Matosantos, Director of the Department of Finance, Defendants–Appellants, J. Clark Kelso, Receiver–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

754 F.3d 1070

Marciano PLATA; Otis Shaw; Ray Stoderd; Joseph Long; Leslie Rhoades; Gilbert Aviles; Paul Decasas; Steven Bautista; Raymond Johns; Elijah J. Sandoval; Gary Alan Smith; Clifford Myelle; Dondi Van Horn, Plaintiffs–Appellees,Medical Development International, Petitioner–Appellee,

v. Edmund G. BROWN, Jr., Governor of the State of California; Jeffrey A. Beard, Dr., Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation; Ana J. Matosantos, Director of the Department of Finance, Defendants–Appellants,J. Clark Kelso, Receiver–Appellee.

No. 13–15466.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 11, 2013.

Filed May 28, 2014.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Jonathan L. Wolff, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Jose A. Zelidon–Zepeda (argued), Deputy Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants–Appellants.

Donald Specter, Rebekah Evenson, Kelly Knapp (argued), Prison Law Office, Berkeley, CA, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Thelton E. Henderson, Senior District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:01–cv–01351–TEH.

Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER and JAY S. BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and RALPH R. BEISTLINE, Chief District Judge.^*

Opinion by Judge SCHROEDER; Dissent by Judge BYBEE.

OPINION

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

We deal with still another phase of litigation aimed at curing egregious constitutional violations in the operation of the California prison system. The Supreme Court in 2011 said the violations “remain uncorrected” after having “persisted for years.” Brown v. Plata, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1922, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011). The Court there affirmed a three judge district court order releasing prisoners in accordance with the strictures of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).

California prisons have been operating under a receivership since 2006 to comply with consent decrees. This appeal involves provisions of the PLRA relating to the termination of such decrees. Congress, concerned by what it viewed as unnecessary delays in bringing prison litigation to an end, provided that prison litigation defendants could move to terminate injunctive relief after two years, and that the injunction order would be subject to an automatic stay if the district court took more than thirty days to decide the motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i), (e)(2).

After the Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge court decision concerning the release orders in this case, the three-judge court in early 2013 asked the State when it intended to file a motion to terminate. The district court had appointed experts to evaluate the prisons' progress and had established a schedule for reporting.

The State, anxious to end the entire litigation, responded to the three-judge court in February 2013 that it hoped to be able to file a motion to terminate the injunctive relief within a few months. Plaintiffs indicated their need to file an informed response to any such motion, so the district court granted Plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery. The court ordered the State to disclose its expert witnesses and their reports at least 120 days before it filed a motion to terminate relief. This would provide Plaintiffs and the court with the ability to understand and evaluate the basis for the motion.

The State filed a notice of appeal seeking our court's review of that order. The State contends that the order violates the PLRA by delaying its ability to move for termination and thus delaying the automatic stay that would follow after thirty days elapsed without a district court decision on the motion. See18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1), (e)(2). It is apparent from the record, however, that the order is a scheduling order to coordinate the filing of a termination motion with discovery disclosures. It was crafted to fit the State's own time line for seeking termination. While the PLRA authorizes the filing of a termination motion after two years, the State has not yet filed or attempted to file a motion to terminate. It is the nature of the litigation, not the district court's order, that prevented the State from filing a motion earlier.

It follows that the district court's order does not affect the availability of the automatic stay, since it would only be triggered thirty days after the filing of the motion, and then only if the district court failed to reach a decision within that time period. The district court has violated no statutory time limits.

The appropriateness of the order in this case becomes apparent with an understanding of the background of the PLRA and the historic complexity of this litigation. A time line of this litigation is attached as Appendix A.

With respect to appellate jurisdiction, we conclude that the order itself is not appealable, but the issues are sufficiently significant to warrant review by mandamus. We ultimately deny relief.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Congress enacted the PLRA in order to expedite prison litigation and place control over prisons back into the hands of state and local officials. See 141 Cong. Rec. S14418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 Cong. Rec. S14317 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham). To address what Congress perceived as judicial micro-management of the nation's prisons, see Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 996–97 (9th Cir.2000), the PLRA established standards for the entry, enforcement, and termination of remedial relief in prison litigation, Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 331, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000).

Under the PLRA, a defendant in prison litigation may move to terminate any prospective relief two years after the date the court approved the relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i). The court must “promptly rule” on a motion to terminate, and mandamus shall lie where the court fails to do so. Id. § 3626(e)(1). In addition, a motion pursuant to the PLRA to terminate prospective relief operates as an automatic stay of the relief, beginning thirty days after the motion is filed and ending on the date the court rules on the motion. Id. § 3626(e)(2). The automatic stay may be postponed for up to sixty days for good cause, which does not include congestion of the court's calendar. Id. § 3626(e)(3).

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2001, Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of California prisoners alleging that defects in the prison healthcare system violated the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir.2010). Early in the litigation, the parties entered into two consent decrees. The first, in 2002, required the State to implement various remedial measures to ensure the provision of constitutionally adequate healthcare in California prisons. Id. When little progress had been made by 2004, the parties entered into an additional consent decree designed to ensure the competency of medical staff and establish appropriate procedures for identifying and treating high-risk patients. Id.

When no prison had successfully implemented these remedial measures by 2005, the district court issued an order to show cause as to why the State should not be held in contempt and why the court should not appoint a receiver to manage prison healthcare. Id. The court found that the State had “repeatedly delayed [its] progress and ultimately failed to achieve even a semblance of compliance” with the consent decrees. In early 2006, the court appointed a receiver. Id. at 1092.

In 2007, the district court granted Plaintiffs' motion to convene a three judge court to address whether a prisoner release order was warranted. Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1922; see also18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (PLRA provisions governing prisoner release orders). The three judge court issued a prisoner release order after making the requisite findings under the PLRA, and the Supreme Court affirmed that order in 2011. Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. at 1923.

In early 2012, the district court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding post-receivership planning. Several months later, the district court entered an order setting forth a receivership transition plan, which included a requirement that court-appointed experts evaluate the state of medical care at each prison.

On January 29, 2013, the three judge court directed the State to answer whether it intended to file a motion to terminate prospective relief in Plata and, if so, when it intended to file such a motion. Several weeks earlier, the State had moved to terminate prospective relief in Coleman v. Brown, a related class action concerning mental healthcare in California prisons. The State had not indicated whether it would file a similar motion in Plata.

In its response filed February 12, 2013, the State represented that it would move to terminate relief if the court-appointed experts “fail to conduct an appropriate or timely evaluation of the prison medical care system,” and that it would be ready to do so “in a few months.” Concerned that they would not have sufficient time to prepare a response to the State's motion before the PLRA's automatic stay took effect, Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to reopen discovery, and the court granted it.

The district court then entered the order on review here. The court found that it would be “fundamentally unfair” to allow the State an unlimited amount of time to prepare its motion to terminate, while providing Plaintiffs only the limited time allowed by the PLRA's automatic stay provision to prepare an adequate opposition. Citing the complexity of the case, the need for detailed factual inquiry to determine whether the case should be terminated, the restrictions of the PLRA's automatic stay provision, and the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A)-(C), the court ordered the State to disclose...