Plunkett v. Hopley
| Decision Date | 24 September 1929 |
| Docket Number | No. 39674.,39674. |
| Citation | 208 Iowa 1042,226 N.W. 772 |
| Parties | PLUNKETT v. HOPLEY. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Cass County; H. J. Mantz, Judge.
Action on promissory note. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, verdict was directed in favor of defendant, and from the judgment thereon plaintiff appeals. Reversed.
E. M. Willard, of Atlantic, for appellant.
Swan, Martin & Martin, of Atlantic, for appellee.
[1] The note sued on is in ordinary form, dated and payable at Atlantic, Iowa, names plaintiff (J. R. Plunkett) as payee, and is signed by the defendant. Defendant, admitting he signed the note, alleges that it was given for a policy of insurance upon his life, was secured by misrepresentation, on discovering which he rescinded the contract. The only evidence in the case is the note and plaintiff's statement in testimony that it was given for premium on a life insurance policy issued and delivered to defendant. Defendant moved for, and obtained, a directed verdict on the ground that the note was given for insurance and did not show that fact on its face. He says here that his “sole and only contention” “is that the evidence having shown that said note was given for life insurance and as shown by the note itself * * * said note did not have on its face that it was given for insurance and, therefore, was not collectible under the laws of the state of Iowa.” He relies on section 8958, Code 1927: “All notes taken for policies of insurance in any company doing business in the state shall state upon their face that they have been taken for insurance, and shall not be collectible unless the company and its agents have fully complied with the laws of the state relative to insurance.” The history of this legislation may be traced in Laws 12th Gen. Assem. c. 138, § 25, Code 1873, § 1146, Code 1897, § 1726. We think it evident that the statute does not say or mean that a note taken for insurance shall be void or uncollectible if it does not state on its face that it is taken for insurance. The requirement that such notes shall so state is as to the point now under consideration “to discourage unauthorized companies from doing business in this state” (Cook v. Weirman, 51 Iowa, 561, 562, 2 N. W. 386, 388) to protect the assured against liability because of negotiation to holders in the course of notes given to unauthorized companies, and to give to prospective purchasers of such notes notice of defense for such possible illegality. Compliance “with the laws of the state relative to insurance” has reference to the Iowa laws regulating such insurance of which the provision in question was made a part by the Code of 1873. The provision could not have been intended so wholly purposeless as the making a note given for insurance void simply because it does not say it was given for insurance.
[2] Though the defense is not further pressed, yet we think it incumbent upon us to say that the word “unless” as used in the statute means “if it be not that,” or “if it be not a fact that,” or “without the case that” (Cent. Dict. “Unless,” March Thesaurus 195, 677, Webster New Int. Dict. “Unless”), rather than “except.” We think the statute is not intended to prescribe a general rule of uncollectibility of insurance notes with exception in the case of an affirmative showing by plaintiff of full compliance with the insurance laws. The presumption of law is of legality of conduct rather than illegality, and this applies to the business of corporations foreign as well as domestic. 22 C. J. 107, 108; 14a C. J. 1358, 1385; Mt. Arbor Nurseries v. Gurney S. & N. Co., 46 S. D. 234, 191 N. W. 835;McIntosh Livestock Co. v. Buffington, 116 Or. 399, 241 P. 393; 12 R. C. L. 101; Northrup v. A. G. Wills Lumber Co., 65 Kan. 769, 70 P. 879;Meaker Galvanizing Co. v. Charles E. McInnes & Co., 272 Pa. 561, 116 A. 400;McClarran v. Longdin-Brugger Co., 24 Ohio App. 434, 157 N. E. 828;Langworthy v. Garding, 74 Minn. 325, 77 N. W. 207;Missouri Pac. Railroad Co. v. Prude, 265 U. S. 99, 101, 44 S. Ct. 450, 68 L. Ed. 919, 928. See McKinley, etc., Co. v. Gordon, 113 Iowa, 481, 484, 85 N. W. 816. We are of the opinion that it was not the intention of the Legislature in the case of notes given for insurance to reverse this presumption.
Reversed.
KINDIG, EVANS, WAGNER, FAVILLE, GRIMM, and DE GRAFF, JJ., concur.
The opinion of the majority in this case, as I view it, is the exact negative of the plain, unambiguous language of section 8958, Code of 1927, and of the obvious intent of the Legislature. The statement in the opinion quoted from Cook v. Weirman, 51 Iowa, 561, 2 N. W. 386, 388, that the purpose of the statute is “to discourage unauthorized companies from doing business in this state” is without contrary significance. Conceding this to be the purpose, how does it conceivably affect the statute? The court held in the cited case that the omission of the words “for insurance,” or other equivalent language, does not affect...
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