Pluwak v. Lindberg
| Citation | 268 Minn. 524,130 N.W.2d 134 |
| Decision Date | 03 July 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 39206,39206 |
| Parties | Paul PLUWAK, Appellant, v. Ernest T. LINDBERG, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Respondent, and Anthony TRUPIANO, Third-Party Defendant |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Proximate cause, like negligence and contributory negligence, is a fact question
which ordinarily must be left to the jury, and it is only where different minds can reasonably arrive at only one result that the fact issues become questions of law.
2. Even where there is a finding of negligence, proximate cause usually presents a jury issue.
3. In a rear-end collision, where it appears that the negligence of the driver of the following car consisted of failure to observe the lead car, a finding of negligence on the part of the driver of the following car does not necessarily establish that it was the proximate cause of a rear-end collision which resulted when the driver of a third car approaching from the opposite direction unexpectedly turned in front of the lead car, causing its driver to stop suddenly without adequate warning to the driver of the following car.
4. Where a car approaching from the opposite direction suddenly turns in front of a lead car, causing the driver to suddenly stop without adequate warning to a following car, resulting in a rear-end collision, the unexpected action of the driver of the third car could constitute an intervening cause to the negligence of the driver of the following car in failing to observe the automobile ahead of him.
5. Where the jury could find the concurrent negligence of two actors responsible for a collision, it is better to use the word 'a' proximate cause in defining what that term means than 'the' proximate cause, but in this case the word 'the' proximate cause was used in stating the claims of the parties, and in the instructions to the jury it was clearly pointed out that the concurrent negligence of two actors could lead to liability on the part of either; hence, it was not reversible error to use the word 'the' proximate cause in the manner in which it was used. The instructions to the jury must be read as a whole in determining the impact they had upon the jury.
Daniel B. Gallagher, Waseca, for appellant.
Tyrrell, Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, Raymond W. Fitch, St. Paul, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order of the trial court denying plaintiff's motion for an amendment of the jury's special verdict and the entry of judgment in his favor or for a new trial.
The action arose out of a rear-end collision. On November 10, 1961, at about 5:20 p.m., plaintiff and defendant were driving their cars north on Highway No. 65. It was then dark and they were driving with lights on. The pavement of the highway was dry. Both parties estimate their speed at about 50 miles per hour. As plaintiff proceeded north ahead of defendant, he noticed a car approaching from the opposite direction, which appeared to be standing in the southbound lane with its left-turn signal lights blinking. He was about 500 feet from this car when he first noticed it. His own testimony as to what he then did is as follows:
'A. * * * I was driving from south towards north, approximately--I was approximately about--and I saw probably approximately 500 feet, a car standing here, going this way.
'Q. * * * Was that car stopped?
'A. Stopped. Stopped, blinking, with the left--with his left light, headlight blinking to make a left turn. So I became precautious. I took precautious measures as far as I took off from the acceleration because I didn't know what he would do when I was approaching at approximately 150 miles--
'Q. You mean feet?
'A. Feet, excuse me. 150 feet, and I saw he just started to turn, moving slowly across my lane. There was no signs, lights, nothing. I mean the signs--signals.
'Q. Did you apply your brakes then?
On cross-examination, he testified:
'Q. * * * In other words, when you were just a little bit more than 150 feet away from Trupiano and the driveway, you thought he was going to wait for you to go by, isn't that true?
'A. He was obliged to wait.
'Q. All right.
'A. And I thought--
'Q. You thought he would obey the law?
'A. Yes.
'Q. All right. And then when you were approximately 150 feet away he started his turn and you then applied your brakes for the first time?
'A. For the first time.
'Q. And you applied them hard, correct?
'A. Yes, as hard as I could.
'Q. You had power brakes on your car?
'A. Yes, I did.
'Q. And you applied your brakes as hard as you could to try to bring your car to a stop?
'A. To stop.
'Q. * * * And is it correct that you brought your vehicle--you reduced your speed suddenly as you were proceeding along so as not to collide with Trupiano making his turn?
'A. Yes.
'Q. In front of you?
'A. That was the reason--
'Q. All right. As a matter of fact, you chose not to collide with him?
'A. Yes.
'Q. And with him turning in front of you, you had to slam on your brakes as quick as you could?
'A. Yes.
'Q. And as hard as you could?
'A. Yes.
'Q. And try to bring your car to a stop?
The car approaching from the north which turned in front of plaintiff's automobile was driven by one Trupiano. It turned left into a private driveway of a trailer court. There was nothing on the highway to indicate such driveway except the driveway itself. Plaintiff did not join Trupiano as a defendant in this action. Defendant attempted to bring him in as a third-party defendant but apparently was unsuccessful in perfecting service upon him so the case was dismissed as to Trupiano. He was not called as a witness at the trial.
Plaintiff's car was equipped with power brakes; defendant's was not. Defendant testified that he did not see plaintiff until he noticed the brake lights go on, and he was then 100 feet behind him. He attempted to stop his car but was unable to do so before colliding with plaintiff. Neither car collided with Trupiano, who had managed to enter the driveway before the collision. The collision occurred when plaintiff was some 15 to 30 feet south of the driveway. Plaintiff's car left skid marks of 38 feet and defendant's car, 50 feet, according to a highway patrolman who investigated the accident shortly after it occurred.
The case was submitted to the jury on a special verdict. The jury found that plaintiff was not guilty of negligence. It found defendant was guilty of negligence but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. The main question here is whether defendant's negligence was a proximate cause as a matter of law.
Plaintiff contends that Haugen v. Dick Thayer Motor Co., 253 Minn. 199, 91 N.W.2d 585, is controlling. The facts of that case are not at all similar to those now before us. In that case, Haugen was driving north and defendant Schlimme was driving west on county highways of equal importance, and they collided in an intersection where neither highway was controlled by stop signs. Schlimme had the directional right-of-way. The jury found that Schlimme was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision and that Haugen was guilty of negligence but that his negligence was not a proximate cause. The trial court granted judgment against Haugen notwithstanding the verdict, and we affirmed. Haugen's defense was that he had not seen the Schlimme car although he had every opportunity to do so. We said (253 Minn. 206, 91 N.W.2d 590):
'It appears from an examination of the record that both cars entered the intersection almost simultaneously, which compels the conclusion that the failure of Haugen to maintain a proper lookout and to yield the right-of-way was as much a cause of the accident as the speed of the Schlimme car. * * *
'* * * Not only was Haugen familiar with the intersection, but he should have given more than normal attention to it in view of the fact that vehicles approaching from the right had the right-of-way.
'We think the trial court was right in coming to the conclusion that Haugen's failure to maintain a proper lookout and yield the right-of-way contributed to the accident, irrespective of the speed of the Schlimme vehicle.'
It is evident that in that case a reasonable person could only conclude that the failure to maintain a lookout led to Haugen's failure to yield the right-of-way and, as such, directly contributed to the collision.
1. Proximate cause, like negligence and contributory negligence, is a fact question which ordinarily must be left to the jury, and we have frequently said that it is only where different minds can reasonably arrive at only one result that fact issues become questions of law. 1
2. Even where there is a finding of negligence, proximate cause usually presents a jury issue. 2 Infrequently cases do arise where a person's negligence is of such a nature that proximate cause becomes a question of law. 3 Cases also arise where negligence is not the proximate cause. 4
3. The principal difficulty in this case arises from the fact that the jury found defendant negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause. At the same time it found that plaintiff was not negligent. In view of these findings, the jury's negative answer as to whether defendant's negligence was a proximate cause must have been based either on its determination that Trupiano's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision or that Trupiano's negligence was an intervening cause insulating the negligence of defendant.
Both plaintiff and defendant had a right to assume that Trupiano would observe the law until the contrary became evident. 5
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